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H. Lee Cheek, Jr.
“The Role of Existential Openness in the Apology and the Gorgias”

Joe Corrado
“How a Changing Political Environment Shaped the Big Three Automakers’ Strategies Toward National Emissions Regulations from 1990-2010”

Kimberly D. Gill and Thomas P. Dolan
“The Impact of Korean Unification on U.S. Involvement in the Korean Peninsula”

Martha Humphries Ginn, Craig Douglas Albert and Andrew Phillips
“Leaving the Classroom to Stay in College: Investigating the Relationship between Model UN Study Away and Retention”

Kristina LaPlant and James LaPlant
“Dixie Rising? Revisiting the Classification of the Southern States in the 21st Century”

Eleanor G. Morris
“Gender Mainstreaming in EU Integration Policy: A Missed Opportunity for the EU”

Hector R. Ramirez

Saundra J. Reinke and Betty J. Eason
“Ready, Willing, and Able? Evaluating the Training and Preparation of Nonprofit Managers”

Weiqi Zhang
“Treating Coordination Continuously: Retesting the Varieties of Capitalism on National Innovation Style”

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The Role of Existential Openness in the *Apology* and the *Gorgias*

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The purpose of this essay is to elucidate the importance of Plato’s commitment to rational discourse in the *Apology* and *Gorgias*. Both dialogues chronicle the transfer of authority from the destructive world of Athens to the philosophers. The organization of politics and society, according to Plato, is determined by the orderliness of the souls of its citizens. The central element of the successful Platonic revolution is a profound yearning for political and spiritual regeneration.

How a Changing Political Environment Shaped the Big Three Automakers’ Strategies toward National Emissions from 1990-2010

**Joe Corrado**  
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This article contends that political pressure from the Obama administration led the Big Three Automakers to reserve their longstanding opposition to a national increase in emissions standards. A content analysis of hundreds of New York Times and Washington Post articles is used to test the explanatory power of a few explanatory models of what determines the automakers strategy toward federal emissions policy. Economic factors, the inconvenience of multiple state plans, and pro-environment CEO all were found to lead to little or no support for an increase in national emissions standards. A combination of pressure from the Obama administration and the reliance on loans from the government led to the reversal in strategy.
The Impact of Korean Unification on U.S. Involvement in the Korean Peninsula

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The unification of South Korea and North Korea is a goal which both governments claim is a high priority, but because each side sees unification differently it is unlikely to occur in a fashion that either foresee. Analysts differ greatly on how and when unification might occur, and on what the costs of unification will be and how those costs will be met. For the United States, unification has major implications both because of the longstanding military commitment to South Korea, and because unification would have a major impact on the balance of power with neighboring countries.

Leaving the Classroom to Stay in College: Investigating the Relationship between Model UN Study Away and Retention

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The escalating costs of higher education have generated an increasing emphasis on college retention rates as a metric to determine if public universities are being good stewards of student and taxpayer dollars. Emerging research suggests that study abroad programs, in addition to promoting cross-cultural skills,
global understanding, strong interpersonal skills, and academic knowledge, may possibly impact a student’s decision to stay in college. Building on this research, we use a case study to explore the relationship between learning experiences during college programs outside of the classrooms, such as a study away trip, and student retention rates. We identify the benefits of the Model UN program at Augusta State University and its contribution to students’ college success and improvement of academic experience. Specifically, we examine the extent to which this program offers the critical components identified in the literature as factors that lead to increases in retention and persistence rates. We find that the Model UN program at ASU was successful in developing both academic and social integration, as well as increasing intellectual development. We suggest that Political Science departments invest in Model UN programs and other study away opportunities to increase retention and enhance student education.

Dixie Rising? Revisiting the Classification of the Southern States in the 21st Century

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James LaPlant
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As arguably the most studied region of the United States, the South remains a popular focus for political science research given that the region uniquely provides the strongest level of support for Republican presidential candidates, hosts both party conventions in 2012, and stands witness to an ongoing top-down Republican realignment. Our study initially recalculate Woodard’s (2006) classification of national, emergent, and traditional states in the South through 2010 Census data with findings that highlight the preeminence of Virginia, the rising status of North Carolina, and the intriguing case of Louisiana as an emerging state. Our study revisits some of the most popular classification systems
and indexes utilized by social scientists to study southern politics. The popular Ranney index of party competition is calculated for the southern states from 2007-2011 along with a federal measure and a combined state/federal measure of party competition. Furthermore, Holbrook and Van Dunk’s (1993) measure of district-level electoral competition is updated for southern state legislatures from 2008 through 2011. This study concludes with an analysis of contested seats in the most recent election cycle for southern state legislatures. The state-level Ranney index as well as the federal measures and combined measures of party competition clearly highlight the trickle-down Republican realignment in the South. This realignment is in full force in southern state legislatures. The 2008 and projected 2012 battleground states of North Carolina and Virginia most closely approximate a “perfect” two-party competition score of .50 in the combined measures. For two-party competitive states in this study, distinct geographic areas of Republican and Democratic dominance can still be observed within those states. The top three states in terms of electoral competition (North Carolina, Tennessee, and Louisiana) all rank as two-party competitive and emergent states in this study, while the bottom three states (South Carolina, Arkansas, and Georgia) are modified one-party states. While district-level electoral competition has increased in most southern state legislatures from the 1980s to the present period, less than half of the legislative seats were contested in the most recent elections in five southern states, and overall competition scores remain anemic for many southern states. The lowest levels of electoral competition and the highest percentage of uncontested seats can be found in southern states with citizen legislatures.

Gender Mainstreaming in EU Integration Policy: A Missed Opportunity for the EU

Eleanor G. Morris
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Gender mainstreaming is a strategy, used not only in the European Union but the United Nations as well, whose goal is to ensure that gender equality is central to all activities of policy creation, discussion,
The concept of gender mainstreaming is based on the idea that policy should be created looking at the needs of all constituencies from the outset rather than creating a policy and then making sure, after the fact, that it will work for all. The EU is committed to using gender mainstreaming as a tool in all policy areas, including the relatively recent integration efforts that fall largely under the rubric of migration policy. The EU’s new commitment to fostering the effective integration of migrants stems not only from the missed economic opportunities of weak integration, but also from the social disruption that poor integration can cause. While one would predict that gender mainstreaming and sound integration initiatives would complement each other and the overall goals of the EU, in particular the always-important goal of economic growth, this study demonstrates that rhetoric and policy are still very far apart when migrants, particularly female ones, take center stage. In particular, the EU’s singular focus on the ways in which female migrants can contribute in economic terms, while surely important given the EU’s economic crisis, ignores the very specific challenges that exist for migrant women in the EU. By not promoting an integration strategy that encourages female migrants to participate and integrate into European social, cultural, and economic life, the EU is missing a critical opportunity for widespread growth.

US-Mexico Border Protection at Stake: An Overview of the US Visa System Before and After 9/11

Hector R. Ramirez
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Every year, millions of international travelers enter the United States through and between land, sea, and air ports of entry. There, travelers are required to show an official passport and a visa issued by a US Embassy, though some exemptions apply in the US Visa Waiver Program. To a great extent, for US homeland security strategists, the US visa application process has become a strategic tool for protecting the US homeland from abroad, especially in the aftermath of 9/11 all visitors are scrutinized before entering the US territory. By providing
an overview of the US visa issuance system, this paper examines security at US ports of entry as a way of assessing the changes to the US visa system before and after 9/11. The assessment contributes to an evaluation of US security policy performance in areas other than between ports of entry where undocumented migrants and smugglers cross the borderline through the desert, mountains, and canals to get to urban areas. To a large extent, the balance of evidence shows that the level of integration between the United States and Mexico (economic, social, political, cultural integration) may be a stronger determinant of what is happening at US ports of entry on the US-Mexican land border, and the security programs implemented have had only marginal effects, given the long-standing dynamics of the US-Mexican land border.

Ready, Willing, and Able? Evaluating the Training and Preparation of Nonprofit Managers

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As government has increasingly outsourced service delivery, critics have contended the state has become “hollow,” a government with little or no capacity to manage its relationships with service providers much less deliver services itself. In this environment, government’s heavy reliance on nonprofit agencies raises questions about the capacity and ability of these organizations to effectively deliver services and achieve public goals. A key component of that capacity and ability is the education and training of nonprofit employees, particularly the leaders of these organizations. This study evaluated the preparation and training of nonprofit managers in a medium-sized Southern city using semi-structured interviewing and assessed the need for additional education.
Treating Coordination Continuously: Retesting the Varieties of Capitalism on National Innovation Style

Weiqi Zhang
University of Georgia

What causes national differences in innovative activities? The theory of varieties of capitalism (VOC) claims that coordinated market economies have comparative advantages in incremental innovation and liberal market economies have comparative advantages in radical innovation. In addition, the VOC has faced challenges from recent literature that offers conflicting evidence. This paper identifies two weaknesses of existing literature on VOC and creates a continuous economic coordination index to test VOC hypotheses on innovation with time-series-cross-sectional analysis. The results suggest that VOC can explain long term relationship between coordination and radical innovation; however, for the short term, it can only explain cross country variation but not intra-country variation. This weakness suggests that one key factor is missing. I propose culture as the missing factor to solve the puzzle. The results also indicate that international relations do not play much role in affecting radical innovation. Last, the results show that the US is not an outlier in radical innovation.
The Role of Existential Openness in the *Apology* and the *Gorgias*

H. Lee Cheek, Jr.
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The purpose of this essay is to elucidate the importance of Plato’s commitment to rational discourse in the *Apology* and *Gorgias*. Both dialogues chronicle the transfer of authority from the destructive world of Athens to the philosophers. The organization of politics and society, according to Plato, is determined by the orderliness of the souls of its citizens. The central element of the successful Platonic revolution is a profound yearning for political and spiritual regeneration.

In the *Gorgias*, like the *Protagoras*, Socrates must confront one of the great figures of his time, Gorgias of Leontini, who is not merely a *rhetor*, but an innovator of rhetorical approaches and an accomplished teacher. Werner Jaeger describes Gorgias as the man who “set the tone for the last thirty years of the fifth century” and as “the embodiment of the art” of rhetoric (Jaeger 1941, 127). But, the dialogue is more than a discussion of the uses of rhetoric. It is a treatise that describes the revolutionary transfer of political and moral authority from the established “seat of power” in Athens to the philosophers. The revolution is existential in nature. The existential character of the dialogue evolves from a consciousness dependent on an individual awareness of life between the poles of the higher potentialities of politics and society, the perfection of the divine, and the lower potentialities, the problematic situation of humankind. The “In-Between,” the tension between the possibilities of human life and knowledge (metaxy), as the *Gorgias* suggests, does not fully represent human existence, but is a presentation of the struggle to participate in being.

Only Socrates acknowledges the role of the divine force in human affairs, the *daimon*, although such an influence is present throughout the dialogue.\(^1\) The problem of the *metaxy*, namely the choice between a limited ground or a fullness of being, is not articulated by Gorgias, Polus, or Callicles. One of the most persistent problems in the dialogue is the inability of the participants to

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\(^1\) This essay will use the Greek terms *diamon* and *daimonion* to denote the divine force in human affairs. The cited term will confirm to original textual usage.
communicate. Moreover, some of the participants in the discussion make a deliberate effort to disrupt the conversation in an effort to limit debate. The underlying cause of this dilemma rests in the character of the souls of the individuals involved in the discourse and their openness to the existential order (Cheek 1991, 60).

**Voegelin as Guide**

This exegesis will rely upon the scholarship of Eric Voegelin, because his work, in contradistinction to most twentieth and twenty-first century political thinkers, attempts to explicate the quest for the existential order (Walsh 1984; Hallowell 1987; and Planinc 1991). Voegelin was born in 1901, in Cologne, the son of an engineer. In this childhood, he read Marx’s *Das Kapital* and thought of himself as a Marxist until he came under the tutelage of the eminent market-oriented economist Ludwig von Mises at the University of Vienna. At an early juncture in his academic career, Voegelin was attracted to the study of law and political science. Voegelin began to realize the limitations of German social science. It lacked what Burke called the “politics of prudence,” a knowledge of politics as related to practice (Kirk 1993). During the 1925-26 academic year, Voegelin studied in the United States and was greatly influenced by the scholarly environment in America. His early works are in part a response to the crisis in Germany and Austria, but Voegelin’s greatest contributions were the products of his research in the United States, under the auspices of Louisiana State University, the Hoover Institution, and other academic facilities. He remained in the United States, with the exception of a period in Munich, until his death in 1985 (Webb 1981; Sandoz 1981; Federici 2002; Walsh 1990; Heilke 1999; Cheek 2006; and Cooper 1999).

Eric Voegelin’s scholarship represents one of the most ambitious scholarly undertakings of this century. Voegelin, through his research, encountered many of the central questions of political experience. The first three volumes of his magnum opus, *Order and History*, began as a search for order in history. These volumes stressed the ongoing “leaps in being” and the influences these leaps have had on humankind’s “new life.” History, while not reduced to the single, straight line of the Hegelian *weltgeist*, was presented as a “progression of tension” (Niemeyer 1976). His enterprise began as a study of Christianity, but he realized “one could not properly understand the Christian beginnings without going into the Jewish background” (Voegelin 1989, 63). This approach required a thorough knowledge of the classical languages, if it were to be successful. So in the early 1930s Voegelin undertook a study of Greek to augment his understanding of Plato and “become a competent political scientist” (Voegelin 1989, 39). Voegelin’s philological abilities are unique for
a political scientist and they provide the basis for much of the intricacy of his study of Platonic political thought.

The Apology Transfigured

The major discussions that take place in the Gorgias, especially the problems of spiritual disorder and the rule of the passions, have already been presented in the Apology. The Apology is a Platonic envelope where one can find reflected the range of tensions involved in the Platonic quest. It can also be understood as an introduction and summary of the tenets of the dialogues, as tragedy becomes the basis for an appreciation of the tension that surrounds the corpus of work examining these tensions.

The Apology introduces this movement and transition by illuminating our understanding of the Gorgias and its place within the larger genre of the Platonic dialogues. The purpose of this section is to elucidate the importance of the dialogue to the Gorgias, especially noting the prominent role of the daimonion, the divine voice Socrates hears during the course of the trial. This voice allows the reader to interpret the dialogue as a series of events taking place on two levels, mythical and political; therefore, the tools one should utilize in interpreting the Apology are also essential to an examination of the Gorgias.

In the Apology, when Socrates is questioned, he always states that he possesses human, not divine wisdom. His friends as well as his enemies both contradict this account, usually noting the old sage had “wisdom more than human” (Nietzsche [1880] 1954, 69). While Socrates stresses his association with the here and now, he is also open to the possibility of the existential order of being between the immanent and the transcendent. Meletus, the only witness the reader encounters, accuses Socrates of believing in the “things in the sky and things below the earth” (Plato [2002] 23, 18b) in an attempt to convince the jury that Socrates was not pious, and more importantly, that he had contributed to the political instability of the polis.

The accusations are followed by Socrates’ response. He defends his association with the youth of Athens, but he finds Meletus’ comments regarding the gods so ridiculous as to force him to retort that the consideration of serious issues cannot take place in such a forum. Socrates proceeds to critique the

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2 Unfortunately, the most significant contributions of the Apology have been reduced to ancillary concerns due to the attention given to the rhetoric Plato’s Socrates utilizes in his three speeches and the debate over whether (or not) he deserved the verdict he received (McComiskey 2002; West 1984; and Brickhouse 1989).

3 All references to the works of Plato will include the page number of the translation and the Stephanus reference number as well.
remainder of Meletus’ concerns, including the charge that he has corrupted young men through his teaching. He responds ironically: “Who improves our young men? The laws?” (Plato [2002] 29, 24e). Obviously, Meletus as the witness (and as the defender of the laws) must define his position. But Socrates is arguing that undisciplined human reason is not a true guide to wisdom. In fact, human wisdom cannot serve as the answer to all questions, and by its very essence in nature (physis) it is unable to approach an understanding of the kosmos.

Meletus’ polymathic⁴ questioning, an approach based on his reliance on the empirical evidence, limits his ability to experience the more universal problems related to the broader issues raised by Socrates. Socrates chooses to demonstrate the weaknesses of the arguments made by Meletus by using this line of response. He could have chosen a more eminent man like Gorgias, Prodicus, or Hippias, who were famous sophists, but Meletus is the most profound example of insolence towards the gods and to justice (dike). Even amidst the fervor of the trial and the presentation of the charges against him, Socrates boldly presents his defense. By attacking Meletus, a young and less experienced sophist, Socrates can avoid the recriminations resulting from attacking the older, more prominent accusers. Meletus also represents a spiritual point of demarcation. It is Meletus, like Polus in the Gorgias, who epitomizes the spiritual depravity of Athens. The absurdity of the challenge presented by Meletus forces Socrates to respond: “Is it by Zeus, what you think of me, Meletus, that I do not believe that there are any gods? That is what I say, that you do not believe in the Gods at all” (Plato [2002] 31, 27e).

It is the daimonion that has guided Socrates throughout his life and it has allowed him to incorporate a philosophical habit of mind. Meletus is no longer simply the central witness against Socrates, but he becomes the representative of the forces that threaten to weaken the philosophical understanding and appreciation of the role of the divine force (daimonion). We shall now turn our attention to this central concept and its role in the dialogue. Through an assessment of the role the daimonion assumes in Socrates’ life we can come to a more thorough understanding of Socrates as the active participant in the divine order.

For Socrates the daimonion has been his guide since childhood. Contrary to most scholarly commentaries, the daimonion is more than merely “a permanently implanted restraining power” (Brann 1978, 16; Stauffer 2009, 103-8), it a manifestation of the divine, theophanic voice in the life of the philosopher-king. While it is an inner check, the mystical element it contains is the guiding force (Leander 1974). The “heavenly manifestation” is more than

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⁴ A polymath is a person of great and varied learning.
what we refer to today as an agent or conscience, as it is a force not of this world and more than intuition. The *daimonion* is not guided by the philosopher’s intellect (*nous*), but by something Socrates is unable to comprehend fully. The *daimonion* is the regenerative force in society. As it has exhibited its most important presence in the life of Socrates, the life of the polis has experienced a state of profound decline. Athens, in other words, has ignored the voice and rejected its savior.

In the *Gorgias* the inability of the participants in the dialogue to apprehend the existential “difference” becomes a point of demarcation. The *Gorgias*, like the *Apology*, introduces participants who are unable to acknowledge the darkness that surrounds and engulfs their very souls. The spiritual world of the soul is confused with the pedestrian world of normal life.

Socrates succeeds in demonstrating that his opponents are unable to differentiate among the possible levels of human activity, but he must also admit that a process of refinement is impossible as it is presented in the arguments of his opponents. Gorgias’ banal refusal to elevate oratory from the ruins of superficiality restricts the possibility of a movement of the art towards an assimilation of the nature of moral knowledge, which is usually dependent upon the integration of theory and practice (*techne*). Polus’ inability to engage in discourse forces him to assume the position of a jester among men and he is unable to present the matters he would prefer to introduce into the debate. Callicles’ devotion to a new, naturalistic morality is weakened from the reverberations resulting from its lack of an ordering principle. The early insights of Socrates in the *Apology* become more explicit in the *Gorgias*. Socrates the condemned must assume the title of the defender of *dike* (justice), and confront the knowing and unknowing devotees of *adikia* (injustice). In an effort to approach a fuller understanding of the crisis as it is presented in the *Gorgias* and Plato’s revolutionary response we must examine Socrates and his partners in the discussion.

**Socrates and Gorgias (Gorgias, 447-461)**

**The Respected Opponent**

Socrates treatment of Gorgias is entirely different from his treatment of Polus or Callicles. Gorgias assumes a unique position among the debating opponents of Socrates. Many “Socratic” discussions, as in the *Gorgias*, result in the sharing of fulminations of one form or another, but Gorgias and Socrates refuse to engage in such exchanges with each other. On the other hand,

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5 Also see Roochnik (1998) for a less conventional, but alternative interpretation of *techne* in the political thought of Plato.
perhaps the most destructive interchange can be found in the *Protagoras*. Both Protagoras and Alcibiades are disturbed by Socrates’ questioning and reject vehemently his approach in the dialogue. Not only does Protagoras express anger towards Socrates, but he also criticizes his own responses, thus aiding the case offered by his opponent. In the *Protagoras* there is a persistent element of conflict between the discussants. Socrates, by Plato’s account, appreciates the seriousness of Protagoras’ situations, and admits he must proceed with caution:

> At this point I thought Protagoras was beginning to bristle, ready for a quarrel and preparing to do battle with his answers. Seeing this I became more cautious and proceeded gently with my questioning: Do you mean things which are beneficial to no human being, or things that are not beneficial at all? Do you call them good also? (Plato [1980] 329, 333e)

Socrates must respond to the challenge; he is, after all, bringing Protagoras’ basic assumptions about the situation of Athens and Athenian democracy into question. To a degree, Socrates has provoked Protagoras and presented him as an unjust man, unable to remove himself from a world of subjectivism. Protagoras’ paradoxes, as well as his position in the discussion, are exposed and refuted. Protagoras ends the debate affirming positions that are inconsistent with his earlier views Gorgias also enters his discussion with Socrates as a man of some distinction. Socrates notes he is eager to hear Gorgias’ comments and to enter into a conversation with him. The desire to participate in the forum is presented as genuine: “I’d like to find out from the man what his craft can accomplish, and what it is that he both claims and teaches” (Plato [1987] 2, 447c). Socrates’ hope to engage Gorgias is sincere and not merely a perfunctory statement. However, Plato does incorporate a comic device at several junctures throughout the dialogue. At this early point in the conversation we can notice Socrates’ respect and admiration for Gorgias. The sincerity of the Socratic quest is manifested in the first question he poses to Gorgias through Chaerephon, Socrates’ accomplice and the early interlocutor. Through the medium of the initial question Socrates ponders the nature of Gorgias’ “craft” and the more fundamental question of the position of Gorgias within Athenian society. The deferential quality of Socrates’ introductory reply sets the tone for the remainder of his discussions with Gorgias; although, at a later point Gorgias, conceding his defeat, will exit the discussion. He returns to the conversation in three other situations to intervene between Socrates and Polus (Plato [1987] 23, 463a), and he must re-enter the
debate between Socrates and Callicles on two occasions to encourage a continuation of the dialogue (Plato [1987] 72, 497b and 88, 506a).6

Socrates, who makes a tardy appearance at the gathering, is desperately seeking to engage in *dialegesthai*, or genuine dialogue, with Gorgias. Gorgias is recognized as a proficient teacher and Socrates attempts to gain a better understanding of the pedagogue’s unusual propensity for instilling his gift in his students. A veneer of order and unity (*homonoia*) is established between Socrates and Gorgias, due in no small part to a mutual respect for the other’s ability to promote their respective interpretations of political and social life. Such a common understanding is damaged by the subsequent antics of Polus (for example, Plato [1987] 2, 448a). We shall examine the role of Polus at a later point in the essay.

Socrates expresses his interest in discussing the nature of oratory and the problems associated with the sophistic use of the practice with Gorgias. As the master trainer and as an able discussant, Gorgias is considered by Socrates as a man of great importance. While Socrates’ encounters with Protagoras are clearly struggles, the discussions with Gorgias are of a more affable nature and assume the tone of a friend attempting to reprove or dissect the inconsistent statements of a comrade. Socrates suggests that his comments are a “word to the wise,” and that Gorgias is the only person for whom such a title is applicable:

> Gorgias, I take it that you, like me, have experienced many discussions and that you’ve observed this sort of a thing about them: it’s not easy for the participants to define jointly what they’re undertaking to discuss, and so, having learned from and taught each other, to conclude their session. Instead, if they’re disputing some point and one maintains that the other isn’t right or isn’t clear, they get irritated, each thinking the other is speaking out of spite. They become eager to win instead of investigating the subject under discussion. …So, I’m afraid to pursue my examination of you, for fear that you should take me to be speaking with eagerness to win against you, rather than to have our subject become clear (Plato [1987] 16, 457c-e).

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6 Gorgias demonstrates his fairness and devotion to the debate by urging Callicles to return to the matter at hand and to uphold the commitment he has made to participate in the discussion, namely, to accept the use of any tactic of refutation Socrates might employ (Plato [1987] 72, 497b).
The perpetuation of the conversation with Gorgias is once again reasserted by Socrates as his goal for the session. Gorgias is obviously different from either Polus or Callicles according to Socrates. Voegelin argues “he [Gorgias] is aware of the existential conflict underlying the intellectual crash, and his conscience worries him” (Voegelin 1957, 28). Gorgias, unlike the other participants, does not dismiss the “Platonic” revolt even though he may not be willing to participate in the movement to the degree that is required of a collaborator. Gorgias, nevertheless, possesses a reflective self-consciousness which allows him to understand the finiteness of his own existence. He never becomes angry at Socrates’ discursions; in fact, he usually accepts his suggestions, demonstrating a tacit agreement with the mission of Socrates. At this point in the dialogue the possibility of a shared, common level of philosophical understanding is probable.

The Prospects for a Common Understanding of Experience (Pathos, 453-454)

The possibility for the realization of a common experience on the behalf of Socrates and Gorgias demands examination. Socrates’ disagreement with the old order remains substantial and Gorgias must be considered to be part of the regime or at least supportive of the worldview of the rulers. Gorgias has served in an official capacity and has trained others for governmental service. He argues that the orators who have been under his tutelage are appropriately prepared for such an enterprise: “Socrates, you see that the orators are the ones who give advice and whose views on these matters prevail” (Plato [1987] 14, 456a). It would be a mistake to interpret this as a sweeping endorsement of his training routine; however, he is making what he considers to be a statement of fact. Gorgias should not be misinterpreted as an enemy of the Platonic revolution. He is a partial participant in the transcendental tension (helkein), and he evidences the force of the tension, although he is never fully open to the movement.

When this is acknowledged, a fuller appreciation of Gorgias can be achieved. Gorgias can now be understood as a more profound figure. Gorgias possesses qualities not usually associated with worshippers of hedonism, though Gorgias has been characterized as a man who is “motivated by an inordinate desire for personal pleasure and power over others” (Wiser 1983, 51) Such an indictment is too severe. The idea of pleonexy, the unrelenting quest for material aggrandizement, never dominates Gorgias’ conversation. Gorgias concedes to Socrates’ criticism of his critique of oratory by affirming

\footnote{7 “In Voegelin, the tension of existence when it is experienced as the power of attraction exercised by the transcendental. Correlative to zetein or zetesis.” (Webb 1981, 282).}
that the practice can be concerned with unjust as well as just causes (Plato [1987] 11, 454b). This also suggests an acceptance of the Socratic distinction associated with persuasion—it can either provide conviction without knowledge or aid the development of knowledge. The partial openness Gorgias demonstrates in the previously cited pericope must also be compared with his rejection of Socratic openness at other junctures.

Perhaps the most neglected element of the exchange between Gorgias and Socrates remains Gorgias’ appreciation of the dianoetic quality of Socrates’ responses. The Socratic enlargement of the sources of persuasion finds a receptive witness in Gorgias. He agrees that conviction can be altered by other means than oratory (Plato [1987] 11, 454a). Mathematics and great art, for example, can perform similar functions. Gorgias’ argument must be limited by his admission, if it is to be defensible after Socrates’ assessment, to the realm of large judicial gatherings. The orderliness of the discussion begins to exhibit some weaknesses. Gorgias’ digressions, according to Socrates, forces Socrates to assume the position of pursuing a strategy that he employs throughout most of the Platonic dialogues, and he becomes the initiating force behind the conversation: “I’m asking questions so that we can conduct an orderly discussion” (Plato [1987] 12, 454c). Gorgias submits to this “turn,” suggesting he willingly succumbs to the Socratic trap. Socrates not only offers the questions that must be answered, he also encourages particular answers from his partners in discussions. Gorgias is forced to recognize his diminished role in the exchange and he must defer the questions Socrates raises for him to his students in the hope these protégés can succeed where their master has failed.

**Gorgias’ Oratory and Justice (Gorgias, 455)**

Previously, Socrates suggested that the prime weakness of Gorgias’ argument concerning rhetoric was its inability to incorporate a role for the teaching of knowledge, and its central element, an appreciation for the transcendental pole of tension, the good *agathon* (Voegelin [1957], 112). Gorgias suggests, especially in his early responses to Socrates, that his approach to political life is disjointed from an understanding of the good, limiting the possibility for a transcendental ordering of the soul. But Gorgias, unlike the other participants in the debate, never separates his attempt at the philosophical enterprise⁸ from the prospect of acknowledging the pursuit of the good, although Gorgias occasionally departs from the active employment

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⁸ This “attempt” separates Gorgias from Polus and Callicles. His approach to the moral life could develop into a process that incorporates *phronesis*. When Gorgias’ position is refuted, he discerns the importance of Socrates’ presentation.
of such a life. He remains a participant in the struggle, although no clear elucidation of a resolution to the dilemma is presented.

The most profound limitation concerning Gorgias’ position, and one that is partially ameliorated at a later point in the dialogue, concerns his definition of oratory. Gorgias is, of course, defining the ordering principles of society, as he understands these ideas, when he offers his view of oratory. Oratory becomes for Gorgias the consummate element of his ontology of being. The elevation of oratory also suggests a partial refusal to accept the requirements of the full philosophical (noetic) openness, thus the path towards self-awareness seems more bewildering for Gorgias.

The scope of Gorgian openness cannot be fully explicated due to the boundaries of our analysis. The admiration exhibited for the “art of giving speeches” becomes for Gorgias “The greatest of human concerns...the best” (Plato [1987] 8, 451d). Again, the importance of persuasion is stressed and Socrates must ask for a refinement of the term; he defines the art of oratory as the practice of “instilling persuasion” (Plato [1987] 10, 453a) and Gorgias asserts he has defined oratory “quite adequately” and “That is the long and short of it” (Plato [1987] 10, 453a). Gorgias continues to accept the important role of his “art” throughout the dialogue. To a degree, he must endeavor to present a defense of his work, as he and the order he represents are under scrutiny in this interchange. Gorgias’ devotion to oratory is elevated over the ethical and moral constrains of the practice, suggesting that the great teacher is unable to counter the predicament that confronts him in the dialogue. Gorgias, unlike Polus and Callicles, continues the discussion with Socrates; both men listen patiently to the comments of the other, insinuating that some semblance of rational discourse is occurring. As Voegelin argues, true discussion can only transpire within a framework where limitations are incorporated by the rules of linguistic engagement (Voegelin 1961). Only then, can those engaged have a common understanding of terms central to a meaningful exchange.

The success of the Platonic mission depends on the transferal of knowledge so that virtue may be cultivated (Voegelin 1961). When this purpose cannot be served in the course of a discussion, Socrates excuses himself from the encounter. Voegelin suggests this improves the prospect for free speech:

Plato establishes the principle, all too frequently ignored today, that freedom of speech included also the liberty to refuse to listen. Freedom of speech serves the purpose of rational discussion; whoever abuses it in order to prevent discussion in breaking the rules of the game as accepted by civilized society (Voegelin 1961, 276).
Gorgias obeys the proper limits more closely and more thoughtfully than Socrates’ other debating partners in the *Gorgias*. In fact, after Gorgias leaves the conversation with Socrates, he assumes the role of facilitator, encouraging interaction and at several points he revives a floundering interchange.

Gorgias possesses some comprehension of the transcendental origin of the social order and this understanding is exemplified by his willingness to embrace a role for justice in the work of the practitioner of oratory. The practice, as Gorgias delineates it, contains a metaphysical element. Socrates expresses amazement at Gorgias’ portrayal and proceeds to associate a “supernatural” quality with the depiction. Gorgias agrees with Socrates’ interpretation and suggests oratory “encompasses and subordinates to itself just about everything that can be accomplished” (Plato [1987] 14, 456b). The sublimation of a potentially intemperate oratory suggests the principal weakness of Gorgias’ position: the practice remains a destructive exercise if it cannot improve the basis for an understanding of practical knowledge. Gorgias is unwilling to acquiesce to the demands of the Platonic truth. The philosophical inquiry, which must serve as the foundation for an understanding of this truth in existence, is deformed, and any movement towards the transcendental source is prohibited by Gorgias’ refusal to consider the intricacies of Socrates’ prescription.

However, Gorgias’ critique endures due to its receptivity to a role for the *agathon*, albeit with some qualifications. In other words, he apprehends a higher purpose for social and political discourse than the other debate participants. The mature solemnization of Gorgias’ argument includes a role for justice in the practice of oratory, and the indication that the use of oratory cannot be separated from the moral life:

> The orator has the ability to speak against everyone on every subject, so as in gatherings to be more persuasive, in short, about anything he likes, but the fact that he has the ability to rob doctors or other craftsmen of their reputation does not give him any more of a reason to do it. He should use oratory justly, as he would use any competitive skill (Plato [1987] 15, 457a).

Gorgias is incapable of a leap in being. He can never fully expose himself to the fuller dimensions of Socrates’ profound critique. Gorgias does not experience a transformation in openness, but he is influenced by the encounter with Socrates. The decline of his position within the discussion is essential to a recognition of his role within the larger dialogue.
Gorgias’ Fall: The Partial Rejection of Socratic Openness

Socrates begins his last exchange with Gorgias by reintroducing the existential problem, again demonstrating a special understanding of Gorgias and his situation. The degree of communication at this point between Socrates and Gorgias continues and a more thorough delineation of the dispute can be ascertained. Socrates tries to convince Gorgias that simply winning an argument is not as important as beginning a process towards right behavior. Gorgias rescinds his pledge of active and full participation in the discussion. The objective of the event can no longer be a path which brings one back to the transcendental origin of the social order. Gorgias’ exploration of the role of the oratory in society becomes divorced from its connection with the ethical and moral life. The role of oratory in social and political life is greatly depreciated and Gorgias’ argument begins to unravel.

Gorgias has moved in the direction of denying any prospects for transcendental fulfillment. The well-being of humankind is superseded by the profane desire to succeed at convincing others of your views, and promoting one’s own position in society. Questions of an enduring nature, if not excluded, cannot properly be examined due to the rage for approval and personal success. Socrates does not hold all oratory in disdain, only those practices that prevent the promotion of justice. Gorgias’ approach is not dismissed in its entirety. There are acknowledgments of his contributions in the course of the dialogue. Socrates never rejects the possibility that his approach to oratory and the moral life could also be misused. The discussion always returns to the pre-eminent Socratic tenet: oratory, as well as all other human activities, must be used to benefit justice (Plato [1987] 112-113, 527a-c). The approach to human affairs offered by Gorgias is impotent by its very nature; Gorgias’ mode of existence becomes more qualified and less open to the more substantial questions it must entertain.

The claims of Gorgias are further weakened by his inability to respond fully to the criticisms made against his use of oratory by Socrates. Again, Socrates exerts a willingness to allow Gorgias the opportunity to revise and extend his comments, but it is of no avail (Plato [1987] 17, 458d-e). The devaluation of the Gorgian position reaches a climax when the great teacher must admit that his practice of oratory may be used to persuade gatherings of people without knowledge of the good, the true and the beautiful (Plato [1987] 17, 459a). The divorcement of a role for justice, and for a recognition of the existential tension as it related to the use of oratory, depreciates the importance of Gorgias’ earlier arguments. The debate must now turn to Socrates who is presented with the opportunity of elaborating his assessment of the discussion and his critique of a bewildered discussant.
Socrates can pursue his mission with much freedom, given the capitulation of Gorgias. The penultimate concession transpires when Socrates queries Gorgias concerning the proposition that an orator must necessarily be just and that a just man will want to do just things. At this point, Gorgias, restrained by his previous submissions, answers “apparently so” (Plato [1987] 19, 460c). The response is once more followed by Socrates’ reintroduction of the existential problem although it is expressed in a dichotomized fashion: “if you, like me, think that being refuted is a profitable thing, it would be worthwhile to continue the discussion, but if you didn’t, to let it drop” (Plato [1987] 20, 461a). Gorgias’ embarrassment is so great that he cannot reenter the discussion. Voegelin correctly suggests that Socrates has exceeded the norms of rational discussion in this instance:

…nobody will ever deny that he knows what justice is and that he can teach it, the question in unfair and should not be asked. To involve a man [Gorgias] in a contradiction by forcing from him an admission on a point which he is ashamed to deny, betrays gross boorishness (agroikia) on the part of Socrates (Voegelin 1957, 25).

Socrates admonitions suggest an imprudent approach on his part. He proceeds to critique the idea of oratory as it was presented by Gorgias. He argues that oratory for Gorgias is whatever a particular defender of the “knack” may suggest that it is at any given time (Plato [1987] 22, 462b). It is a craft that can be constructed to fit the individual and his or her circumstances. The argument presented by Socrates is coherent and encourages one to reconsider Gorgias’ defense of oratory, but it does not accurately convey his position. The charge of relativism cannot be substantiated. Gorgias advocates a rule for justice in oratory, although he removes the teachers of the practice from sharing any responsibility for their students. Gorgias has already elucidated his view that justice must be part of oratory; nevertheless, his ability to overcome the earlier rationalization of a divorcement of justice from oratory and political life hinders his position in this discussion. Socrates continues his commentary and carefully proves that the removal of any obligation vis à vis the teacher is untenable, as the teacher must share part of the blame for the student. Gorgias again succumbs to Socrates’ criticisms.

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9 Socrates is actually replying to Polus at this point; however, the distinction is based on his earlier conversation with Gorgias.
Socrates’ performance in the discussion with Gorgias is tainted by his propensity for undertaking a strategy that seeks to denigrate the positions and stature of, rather than engaging in a deeper exploration of, the major concerns of the colloquy. Gorgias has the potential for approaching an existential understanding of the tensions involved in human life and he possesses a recognition of the role of intentionality as the ground for understanding. The prospects for the acquisition of a more reflective approach are never fully articulated by Gorgias. The inability to adequately come to terms with the tension prevents these events from ever assuming a structure. Gorgias deserves much of the blame for this failure, but as we shall note, he represents the only attempt to consider the consequences of the tensions of existence in the dialogue. To examine the antithesis, we must turn to an appraisal of Polus and Callicles.

Socrates and Polus (*Gorgias*, 461–481)

**Polus and Ideology**

The discussion between Gorgias and Socrates turns into a debate between Polus and Socrates. Socrates begins the interchange by thanking Polus for assuming the position of Gorgias. The existential issue surfaces again, but Socrates’ introduction suggests that the likelihood of having such an exchange with Polus is remote. Polus, Gorgias’ disciple, is offered the same opportunity as his teacher. He not only refuses to consider the prospects for his openness, but Polus cannot understand the dimensions of the discussion and its ramifications for political society. Polus’ ignorance of the crisis before him consigns his role within the dialogue to that of a comic figure; Socrates suggests such an approach when he refers to Polus, as he attempts to assume Gorgias’ argument, as “most admirable Polus” (*Plato* [1987] 21, 461c). Whereas Gorgias expresses an appreciation for the role of humankind in the search for the truth of existence, Polus loathes the prospects of confronting such a problem and prefers to experience life in the here and now, potentially disregarding the health of the living soul.

Polus must be understood as a defender of the life of desire. Rhetoric and oratory become the means for promoting such a presence in the world. Socrates correctly castigates Polus’ defense of oratory, describing the “knack” as an experience, *empeiria*, designed for “producing a certain gratification and pleasure” (*Plato* [1987] 22, 462c) Polus’ sensual proclamations can never acquire the refinement necessary to be considered a craft, *techne*. Socrates’ criticism of Polus and his proposal continues unabated at this point. To facilitate discussion, Socrates must present Polus with a childish analogy of the body and the soul in an attempt to present the proper relationship between
justice and oratory. Moreover, Polus exerts an immunity from confronting the multifaceted conundrum before him. The parable presented by Socrates, like those of Christ in the New Testament, assumes the form of true story (alethes logos), and has the potential of contributing and improving Polus’ comprehension of the ultimate consequences of his decisions and defense of the ephemeral world. Socrates’ redefinition of oratory reduces it now to something even less enduring than a “knack”: “You’ve (Polus) now heard what I say oratory is. It’s the counterpart in the soul to pastry baking, its counterpart in the body (Plato [1987] 26, 465d-e). Polus lacks the rhetorical proclivities to either present an alternative or directly refute the claims of Socrates. Socrates’ dismissal of Polus’ oratory as “a shameful thing” acquires more credibility when his debating opponent is unable to reformulate the arguments of his mentor so as to make them more compelling (Plato [1987] 24, 463d). The prospects for Polus contributing to the debate become more remote and he evinces no awareness of the ramifications of his attachment to the “old myths of society,” thereby affirming the foundational elements of the undifferentiated self (Gunnell 1968, 147). Polus has clearly lost the debate, due in no small part to his inability to participate, and he must now assume a more confrontational, if not an ad hominen, approach.

The Drift towards Relativism (468c) and the Introduction of the Measure of Pleasure and Pain (470)

Polus, Voegelin suggests, pursues a line of argument based on his intellectual dishonesty. Since he has failed in his attempt at rational discourse, he can only hope to gain success from either attacking Socrates or disrupting the discussion. Polus, of course, chooses to exploit Socrates the person and the rules of the debate. The interconnection of oratory and political power becomes the foci of Polus’ revised argument. Oratory, Polus retorts, can have the trappings of a salutary enterprise when it assists the seekers of political power and influence in realizing their goal of obtaining political office:

Socrates: I don’t think they’re held in any regard at all.

Polus: What do you mean, they’re not held in any regard? Don’t they have the greatest power in the cities?

Socrates: No, if by “having power” you mean something that’s good for the one who has power.

Polus: That’s just what I do mean.
Socrates: “In that case I think that orators have the least power of any in the city” (Plato [1987] 27, 466b).

Polus’ defense of the orators who serve as political leaders rests on relativistic premises, and the relativism takes the form of an organic argument. The activities of these political men are not constituted by an understanding of the good, but out of an interest in promoting their interests in the present.

As Polus correctly suggests, the conditions of political life are subject to frequent permutations; however, he rejects the possibility of an ordering principle. The Platonic mission, the search for the agathon, may be a response to the sublime positivism of sophistic rhetoric. It is not a prescriptive approach to political life that lends itself to a simple elucidation. It is an experience of turning towards the movement of the transcendent; after all, the good is to be pursued in terms of “what is most like it (eikon),” and “then carried on step further” (Voegelin 1957, 113). Voegelin demonstrates the good (agathon) cannot be immanentized for the sake of explaining its importance for every banal concern known to humankind. ¹⁰ The process must become “a search for truth concerning the order of being” (Voegelin 1956, xiv).

Obviously, Polus’ inability to even recognize the conflict prevents him for obtaining any appreciation of the Platonic mission. His fixity of purpose endures, and Polus yearns to continue the debate, even though he has been thoroughly refuted by Socrates. Polus’ plan in perpetuating the dialogue is to disrupt the exchange with Socrates. If he can accomplish this goal, he can appear to have successfully refuted Socrates’ arguments. Polus decides to revive his defense of self-gratification as the true foundation of the oratoric enterprise (Plato [1987] 22, 462d). He suggests all human actions should be in accordance with the interests of those people who are engaging in the acts. Polus disapproves of Socrates connection of the agathon and the kalon (admirable) as compared with the kakon (bad) and aischron (shameful) (Plato [1987] 39, 474d). Socrates argues the admirable and good person is truly happy, whereas the bad and shameful is not. The happy man is the result of education and a soul open to justice. Polus’ confusion and reluctance to participate in this discussion only augments the confinement of his compromised position. He remains completely closed to the existential problem and moves further away from participating in existence. The

¹⁰ “What is the idea of the agathon? The briefest answer to the question will best bring out the decisive point: Concerning the content of the agathon nothing can be said at all. That is the fundamental insight of Platonic ethics. The transcendence of the agathon makes immanent propositions concerning its content impossible” (Voegelin 1957, 113).
transferal of the knowledge of order, namely the understanding of the “truth of his own order,” is now an impossibility (Voegelin 1990, 136).

Polus is snared by his own attempt at deception. The good man is the powerful politician, regardless of how this person uses his power (Plato [1987] 31, 468e). Socrates proceeds to prove for Polus that great power is not “doing what one sees fit,” and, in fact, leaders who pursue such tactics are incapable of responding in the way they would truly want to respond (Plato [1987] 32, 469e). Polus becomes more disheveled and is forced to depart from the debate. While Gorgias, ever the decorous citizen, fades away from the discussion in silence, Polus withdraws as he submits his final comment in response to Socrates: “I think your statements are absurd, Socrates” (Plato [1987] 50, 480e).” Polus leaves the debate unconvinced of the importance of Socrates’ remark. No rapport takes place between the two men, and Polus demonstrates a lack of willingness to acquire the necessary prerequisites for appreciating Socrates’ existential challenge to the perverse order of Athens.

Socrates and Callicles (Gorgias, 481-527)

Callicles and Power

Callicles comprehends the Socratic revolt against the corruption he represents, as well as his own vehement rejection of the existential problem. Our treatment of Callicles will be less because he refuses to entertain the possibility of communication with Socrates regarding the problem of the existential quest. Callicles, unlike either Gorgias or Polus, realizes the threat posed by Socrates. Socrates is the enemy of the life Callicles holds so dear. The Socratic mission opposes the decadent order of Athens so thoroughly as to threaten its “spiritual core” (Voegelin 1957, 28). Callicles recognizes the severity of Socrates’ impugning of Athens and decides to retaliate.

For Callicles, like Polus and Thrasymachus (in the Republic), humankind’s role in political society cannot be defined by an attempt to engage in experiences that lead to the agathon (Voegelin 1957, 28) but in terms of the promotion of people with stronger natures over people possessed with weaker natures. Callicles must declare war on Socrates love of philosophy and he tries to accomplish the task by arguing for the relative unimportance of philosophy:

This is the truth of the matter, as you will acknowledge if you abandon philosophy and move on to more important

11 It is Thrasymachus who echoes Callicles’ argument when he asserts: “‘Listen then,’ he replied. ‘I say that justice or right is simply what is in the interest of the stronger party. Now where is your praise?’” (Plato [1986] 77).
things. Philosophy is no doubt a delightful thing, Socrates, as long as one is exposed to it in moderation at the appropriate time of life. But if one spends more time with it in than he should, it’s the undoing of mankind (Plato [1987] 55, 484c).

Philosophy, according to Callicles, is for children. To elevate the practice of philosophy as the overarching concern of political life is “ridiculous” (Plato [1987] 56, 485a). Callicles’ honesty separates him from Polus. Only Callicles clearly elucidates what the other participants in the debate believe to be true, as they are either unwilling or unable to adequately express their positions. Socrates argues for a life of balance and moderation so that person’s soul can pursue the proper path in life. Callicles refuses to accept such an ordering of greatest good (eros), claiming man should be allowed to have appetites as large and as unrestrained as possible (Plato [1987] 64-65, 492a). This, for Callicles, is true happiness. The “flowing in” of power to the undisciplined man allows for the most pleasure and any limitation of this fulfillment interferes with man’s natural role. In his refutation of Socrates’ parable of the man and the jars, he argues that satisfaction must come not from having our jars filled with water, but from the continual and unmitigated aggrandizement of the process. The hedonism of Callicles also forms a philosophy of existence. He must not accept any limitation upon the conventions he represents, as such a move would denote a movement towards Socrates’ critique regarding the corruption of the foundations of life in the political order of Athens.

Quest for Order

Callicles slowly removes himself from an active role in the debate, allowing Socrates to reintroduce the prospects for the state of the existential community. Ironically, Callicles’ growing impotence encourages Socrates to restate and develop how a restoration could be achieved:

Yes, Callicles, wise men claim, that partnership and friendship, orderliness, self-control, and justice hold together heavens and earth, and god and men, and that is why they call this universe a world order, my friend, and not an undisciplined world-disorder (Plato [1987] 88, 507e-508a).

According to Socrates, there can be no happiness without personal restraint, and the man who exhibits this restraint is the just man. The tyrant and his legions are naturally afraid of the just man because he poses a threat to the regime (Plato [1987] 91, 510b-c). Callicles realizes Socrates’ critique has the
potential of overthrowing the established elements of Athenian society and that he will no longer be trusted by the citizens of Athens. Callicles senses the difference, but is unable to appreciate the decadence of his society and communicate the difference to others.

By his confession Callicles shares much in common with Socrates’ tyrannical man. The acquisition and preservation of political power form the needs of life that are most essential to survival. Socrates counters Callicles’ project, arguing there must be more to life than preservation, by ironically urging: “Perhaps one who is truly a man should stop thinking about how long he will live” (Plato [1987] 94, 512d-e). After all, the Socratic revolt, of course, results in his death. Socrates knows he is “one of a few Athenians...to take up the true political craft and practice true politics” (Plato [1987] 105, 521d). Callicles has no understanding of the experience of reality and cannot be dissuaded from holding Socrates and his order of an existential reality in disdain. He also is in a state of intellectual confusion, which should also be understood as a condition of spiritual decay. At a weak moment, he admits the order of the soul should be justice, confirming Socrates’ claim of justice as the underlying principle of oratory. Callicles’ acquiescence again suggests he is no longer an active participant in the discussion. He has been refuted by Socrates and he has admitted the logical inconsistency of his position. Callicles’ presentation of the mutual compatibility of goodness and strength has failed. Socrates’ view of goodness can now properly be understood as participation in the existential order and as aiding the attempt to redeem a corrupt Athens.

Conclusion

Socrates fails in his attempt to convince his opponents of the concrete, existential situation that provides the basis for openness. Only Gorgias possesses the potential of approaching the existential problem in a serious way, even though his struggle is unsuccessful. The relationship between Socrates and Gorgias is characterized by displays of mutual respect and cooperation at several junctures.

As we have suggested, the *Apology* and the *Gorgias* chronicle the transfer of authority from the destructive world of Athens to the philosophers. The organization of the society, according to Plato, is determined by the orderliness of the souls of its citizens. The central element of the successful Platonic revolution is, Voegelin reminds us, “a radical call for spiritual regeneration” (Voegelin 1957, 39). The attempt to assist the soul in overcoming its passions and the potential for spiritual derailment must continue. The disruptions of order in this century also require that modern men
and women avoid an attachment to the “dogmatic derailments” represented by the numerous contemporary messianic movements (Voegelin 1957, 39).

References


The Role of Existential Openness in the *Apology* and the *Gorgias*  
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The purpose of this essay is to elucidate the importance of Plato’s commitment to rational discourse in the *Apology* and *Gorgias*. Both dialogues chronicle the transfer of authority from the destructive world of Athens to the philosophers. The organization of politics and society, according to Plato, is determined by the orderliness of the souls of its citizens. The central element of the successful Platonic revolution is a profound yearning for political and spiritual regeneration.

In the *Gorgias*, like the *Protagoras*, Socrates must confront one of the great figures of his time, Gorgias of Leontini, who is not merely a *rhetor*, but an innovator of rhetorical approaches and an accomplished teacher. Werner Jaeger describes Gorgias as the man who “set the tone for the last thirty years of the fifth century” and as “the embodiment of the art” of rhetoric (Jaeger 1941, 127). But, the dialogue is more than a discussion of the uses of rhetoric. It is a treatise that describes the revolutionary transfer of political and moral authority from the established “seat of power” in Athens to the philosophers. The revolution is existential in nature. The existential character of the dialogue evolves from a consciousness dependent on an individual awareness of life between the poles of the higher potentialities of politics and society, the perfection of the divine, and the lower potentialities, the problematic situation of humankind. The “In-Between,” the tension between the possibilities of human life and knowledge (metaxy), as the *Gorgias* suggests, does not fully represent human existence, but is a presentation of the struggle to participate in being.

Only Socrates acknowledges the role of the divine force in human affairs, the *daimon*, although such an influence is present throughout the dialogue.\(^1\) The problem of the *metaxy*, namely the choice between a limited ground or a fullness of being, is not articulated by Gorgias, Polus, or Callicles. One of the most persistent problems in the dialogue is the inability of the participants to

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\(^1\) This essay will use the Greek terms *diamon* and *daimonion* to denote the divine force in human affairs. The cited term will confirm to original textual usage.
communicate. Moreover, some of the participants in the discussion make a deliberate effort to disrupt the conversation in an effort to limit debate. The underlying cause of this dilemma rests in the character of the souls of the individuals involved in the discourse and their openness to the existential order (Cheek 1991, 60).

Voegelin as Guide

This exegesis will rely upon the scholarship of Eric Voegelin, because his work, in contradistinction to most twentieth and twenty-first century political thinkers, attempts to explicate the quest for the existential order (Walsh 1984; Hallowell 1987; and Planinc 1991). Voegelin was born in 1901, in Cologne, the son of an engineer. In this childhood, he read Marx’s *Das Kapital* and thought of himself as a Marxist until he came under the tutelage of the eminent market-oriented economist Ludwig von Mises at the University of Vienna. At an early juncture in his academic career, Voegelin was attracted to the study of law and political science. Voegelin began to realize the limitations of German social science. It lacked what Burke called the “politics of prudence,” a knowledge of politics as related to practice (Kirk 1993). During the 1925-26 academic year, Voegelin studied in the United States and was greatly influenced by the scholarly environment in America. His early works are in part a response to the crisis in Germany and Austria, but Voegelin’s greatest contributions were the products of his research in the United States, under the auspices of Louisiana State University, the Hoover Institution, and other academic facilities. He remained in the United States, with the exception of a period in Munich, until his death in 1985 (Webb 1981; Sandoz 1981; Federici 2002; Walsh 1990; Heilke 1999; Cheek 2006; and Cooper 1999).

Eric Voegelin’s scholarship represents one of the most ambitious scholarly undertakings of this century. Voegelin, through his research, encountered many of the central questions of political experience. The first three volumes of his magnum opus, *Order and History*, began as a search for order in history. These volumes stressed the ongoing “leaps in being” and the influences these leaps have had on humankind’s “new life.” History, while not reduced to the single, straight line of the Hegelian *weltgeist*, was presented as a “progression of tension” (Niemeyer 1976). His enterprise began as a study of Christianity, but he realized “one could not properly understand the Christian beginnings without going into the Jewish background” (Voegelin 1989, 63). This approach required a thorough knowledge of the classical languages, if it were to be successful. So in the early 1930s Voegelin undertook a study of Greek to augment his understanding of Plato and “become a competent political scientist” (Voegelin 1989, 39). Voegelin’s philological abilities are unique for
a political scientist and they provide the basis for much of the intricacy of his study of Platonic political thought.

The Apology Transfigured

The major discussions that take place in the Gorgias, especially the problems of spiritual disorder and the rule of the passions, have already been presented in the Apology. The Apology is a Platonic envelope where one can find reflected the range of tensions involved in the Platonic quest. It can also be understood as an introduction and summary of the tenets of the dialogues, as tragedy becomes the basis for an appreciation of the tension that surrounds the corpus of work examining these tensions.

The Apology introduces this movement and transition by illuminating our understanding of the Gorgias and its place within the larger genre of the Platonic dialogues.2 The purpose of this section is to elucidate the importance of the dialogue to the Gorgias, especially noting the prominent role of the daimonion, the divine voice Socrates hears during the course of the trial. This voice allows the reader to interpret the dialogue as a series of events taking place on two levels, mythical and political; therefore, the tools one should utilize in interpreting the Apology are also essential to an examination of the Gorgias.

In the Apology, when Socrates is questioned, he always states that he possesses human, not divine wisdom. His friends as well as his enemies both contradict this account, usually noting the old sage had “wisdom more than human” (Nietzsche [1880] 1954, 69). While Socrates stresses his association with the here and now, he is also open to the possibility of the existential order of being between the immanent and the transcendent. Meletus, the only witness the reader encounters, accuses Socrates of believing in the “things in the sky and things below the earth” (Plato [2002] 23, 18b)3 in an attempt to convince the jury that Socrates was not pious, and more importantly, that he had contributed to the political instability of the polis.

The accusations are followed by Socrates’ response. He defends his association with the youth of Athens, but he finds Meletus’ comments regarding the gods so ridiculous as to force him to retort that the consideration of serious issues cannot take place in such a forum. Socrates proceeds to critique the

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2 Unfortunately, the most significant contributions of the Apology have been reduced to ancillary concerns due to the attention given to the rhetoric Plato’s Socrates utilizes in his three speeches and the debate over whether (or not) he deserved the verdict he received (McComiskey 2002; West 1984; and Brickhouse 1989).

3 All references to the works of Plato will include the page number of the translation and the Stephanus reference number as well.
remainder of Meletus’ concerns, including the charge that he has corrupted young men through his teaching. He responds ironically: “Who improves our young men? The laws?” (Plato [2002] 29, 24e). Obviously, Meletus as the witness (and as the defender of the laws) must define his position. But Socrates is arguing that undisciplined human reason is not a true guide to wisdom. In fact, human wisdom cannot serve as the answer to all questions, and by its very essence in nature (physis) it is unable to approach an understanding of the kosmos.

Meletus’ polymathic question, an approach based on his reliance on the empirical evidence, limits his ability to experience the more universal problems related to the broader issues raised by Socrates. Socrates chooses to demonstrate the weaknesses of the arguments made by Meletus by using this line of response. He could have chosen a more eminent man like Gorgias, Prodicus, or Hippias, who were famous sophists, but Meletus is the most profound example of insolence towards the gods and to justice (dike). Even amidst the fervor of the trial and the presentation of the charges against him, Socrates boldly presents his defense. By attacking Meletus, a young and less experienced sophist, Socrates can avoid the recriminations resulting from attacking the older, more prominent accusers. Meletus also represents a spiritual point of demarcation. It is Meletus, like Polus in the Gorgias, who epitomizes the spiritual depravity of Athens. The absurdity of the challenge presented by Meletus forces Socrates to respond: “Is it by Zeus, what you think of me, Meletus, that I do not believe that there are any gods? That is what I say, that you do not believe in the Gods at all” (Plato [2002] 31, 27e).

It is the daimonion that has guided Socrates throughout his life and it has allowed him to incorporate a philosophical habit of mind. Meletus is no longer simply the central witness against Socrates, but he becomes the representative of the forces that threaten to weaken the philosophical understanding and appreciation of the role of the divine force (daimonion). We shall now turn our attention to this central concept and its role in the dialogue. Through an assessment of the role the daimonion assumes in Socrates’ life we can come to a more thorough understanding of Socrates as the active participant in the divine order.

For Socrates the daimonion has been his guide since childhood. Contrary to most scholarly commentaries, the daimonion is more than merely “a permanently implanted restraining power” (Brann 1978, 16; Stauffer 2009, 103-8), it a manifestation of the divine, theophanic voice in the life of the philosopher-king. While it is an inner check, the mystical element it contains is the guiding force (Leander 1974). The “heavenly manifestation” is more than

4 A polymath is a person of great and varied learning.
what we refer to today as an agent or conscience, as it is a force not of this world and more than intuition. The *daimonion* is not guided by the philosopher’s intellect (*nous*), but by something Socrates is unable to comprehend fully. The *daimonion* is the regenerative force in society. As it has exhibited its most important presence in the life of Socrates, the life of the polis has experienced a state of profound decline. Athens, in other words, has ignored the voice and rejected its savior.

In the *Gorgias* the inability of the participants in the dialogue to apprehend the existential “difference” becomes a point of demarcation. The *Gorgias*, like the *Apology*, introduces participants who are unable to acknowledge the darkness that surrounds and engulfs their very souls. The spiritual world of the soul is confused with the pedestrian world of normal life.

Socrates succeeds in demonstrating that his opponents are unable to differentiate among the possible levels of human activity, but he must also admit that a process of refinement is impossible as it is presented in the arguments of his opponents. Gorgias’ banal refusal to elevate oratory from the ruins of superficiality restricts the possibility of a movement of the art towards an assimilation of the nature of moral knowledge, which is usually dependent upon the integration of theory and practice (*techne*).\(^5\) Polus’ inability to engage in discourse forces him to assume the position of a jester among men and he is unable to present the matters he would prefer to introduce into the debate. Callicles’ devotion to a new, naturalistic morality is weakened from the reverberations resulting from its lack of an ordering principle. The early insights of Socrates in the *Apology* become more explicit in the *Gorgias*. Socrates the condemned must assume the title of the defender of *dike* (justice), and confront the knowing and unknowing devotees of *adikia* (injustice). In an effort to approach a fuller understanding of the crisis as it is presented in the *Gorgias* and Plato’s revolutionary response we must examine Socrates and his partners in the discussion.

**Socrates and Gorgias (Gorgias, 447-461)**

**The Respected Opponent**

Socrates treatment of Gorgias is entirely different from his treatment of Polus or Callicles. Gorgias assumes a unique position among the debating opponents of Socrates. Many “Socratic” discussions, as in the *Gorgias*, result in the sharing of fulminations of one form or another, but Gorgias and Socrates refuse to engage in such exchanges with each other. On the other hand,

\(^5\) Also see Roochnik (1998) for a less conventional, but alternative interpretation of *techne* in the political thought of Plato.
perhaps the most destructive interchange can be found in the *Protagoras*. Both Protagoras and Alcibiades are disturbed by Socrates’ questioning and reject vehemently his approach in the dialogue. Not only does Protagoras express anger towards Socrates, but he also criticizes his own responses, thus aiding the case offered by his opponent. In the *Protagoras* there is a persistent element of conflict between the discussants. Socrates, by Plato’s account, appreciates the seriousness of Protagoras’ situations, and admits he must proceed with caution:

> At this point I thought Protagoras was beginning to bristle, ready for a quarrel and preparing to do battle with his answers. Seeing this I became more cautious and proceeded gently with my questioning: Do you mean things which are beneficial to no human being, or things that are not beneficial at all? Do you call them good also? (Plato [1980] 329, 333e)

Socrates must respond to the challenge; he is, after all, bringing Protagoras’ basic assumptions about the situation of Athens and Athenian democracy into question. To a degree, Socrates has provoked Protagoras and presented him as an unjust man, unable to remove himself from a world of subjectivism. Protagoras’s paradoxes, as well as his position in the discussion, are exposed and refuted. Protagoras ends the debate affirming positions that are inconsistent with his earlier views Gorgias also enters his discussion with Socrates as a man of some distinction. Socrates notes he is eager to hear Gorgias’ comments and to enter into a conversation with him. The desire to participate in the forum is presented as genuine: “I’d like to find out from the man what his craft can accomplish, and what it is that he both claims and teaches” (Plato [1987] 2, 447c). Socrates’ hope to engage Gorgias is sincere and not merely a perfunctory statement. However, Plato does incorporate a comic device at several junctures throughout the dialogue. At this early point in the conversation we can notice Socrates’ respect and admiration for Gorgias. The sincerity of the Socratic quest is manifested in the first question he poses to Gorgias through Chaerephon, Socrates’ accomplice and the early interlocutor. Through the medium of the initial question Socrates ponders the nature of Gorgias’ “craft” and the more fundamental question of the position of Gorgias within Athenian society. The deferential quality of Socrates’ introductory reply sets the tone for the remainder of his discussions with Gorgias; although, at a later point Gorgias, conceding his defeat, will exit the discussion. He returns to the conversation in three other situations to intervene between Socrates and Polus (Plato [1987] 23, 463a), and he must re-enter the
debate between Socrates and Callicles on two occasions to encourage a
continuation of the dialogue (Plato [1987] 72, 497b and 88, 506a).

Socrates, who makes a tardy appearance at the gathering, is desperately
seeking to engage in *dialegesthai*, or genuine dialogue, with Gorgias. Gorgias
is recognized as a proficient teacher and Socrates attempts to gain a better
understanding of the pedagogue’s unusual propensity for instilling his gift in
his students. A veneer of order and unity (*homonoia*) is established between
Socrates and Gorgias, due in no small part to a mutual respect for the other’s
ability to promote their respective interpretations of political and social life.
Such a common understanding is damaged by the subsequent antics of Polus
(for example, Plato [1987] 2, 448a). We shall examine the role of Polus at a
later point in the essay.

Socrates expresses his interest in discussing the nature of oratory and the
problems associated with the sophistic use of the practice with Gorgias. As the
master trainer and as an able discussant, Gorgias is considered by Socrates as a
man of great importance. While Socrates’ encounters with Protagoras are
clearly struggles, the discussions with Gorgias are of a more affable nature and
assume the tone of a friend attempting to reprove or dissect the inconsistent
statements of a comrade. Socrates suggests that his comments are a “word to
the wise,” and that Gorgias is the only person for whom such a title is
applicable:

Gorgias, I take it that you, like me, have experienced many
discussions and that you’ve observed this sort of a thing
about them: it’s not easy for the participants to define jointly
what they’re undertaking to discuss, and so, having learned
from and taught each other, to conclude their session.
Instead, if they’re disputing some point and one maintains
that the other isn’t right or isn’t clear, they get irritated, each
thinking the other is speaking out of spite. They become
eager to win instead of investigating the subject under
discussion. …So, I’m afraid to pursue my examination of
you, for fear that you should take me to be speaking with
eagerness to win against you, rather than to have our subject
become clear (Plato [1987] 16, 457c-e).

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6 Gorgias demonstrates his fairness and devotion to the debate by urging Callicles
to return to the matter at hand and to uphold the commitment he has made to participate
in the discussion, namely, to accept the use of any tactic of refutation Socrates might
employ (Plato [1987] 72, 497b).
The perpetuation of the conversation with Gorgias is once again reasserted by Socrates as his goal for the session. Gorgias is obviously different from either Polus or Callicles according to Socrates. Voegelin argues “he [Gorgias] is aware of the existential conflict underlying the intellectual crash, and his conscience worries him” (Voegelin 1957, 28). Gorgias, unlike the other participants, does not dismiss the “Platonic” revolt even though he may not be willing to participate in the movement to the degree that is required of a collaborator. Gorgias, nevertheless, possesses a reflective self-consciousness which allows him to understand the finiteness of his own existence. He never becomes angry at Socrates’ discursions; in fact, he usually accepts his suggestions, demonstrating a tacit agreement with the mission of Socrates. At this point in the dialogue the possibility of a shared, common level of philosophical understanding is probable.

The Prospects for a Common Understanding of Experience (Pathos, 453-454)

The possibility for the realization of a common experience on the behalf of Socrates and Gorgias demands examination. Socrates’ disagreement with the old order remains substantial and Gorgias must be considered to be part of the regime or at least supportive of the worldview of the rulers. Gorgias has served in an official capacity and has trained others for governmental service. He argues that the orators who have been under his tutelage are appropriately prepared for such an enterprise: “Socrates, you see that the orators are the ones who give advice and whose views on these matters prevail” (Plato [1987] 14, 456a). It would be a mistake to interpret this as a sweeping endorsement of his training routine; however, he is making what he considers to be a statement of fact. Gorgias should not be misinterpreted as an enemy of the Platonic revolution. He is a partial participant in the transcendental tension (helkein), and he evidences the force of the tension, although he is never fully open to the movement.

When this is acknowledged, a fuller appreciation of Gorgias can be achieved. Gorgias can now be understood as a more profound figure. Gorgias possesses qualities not usually associated with worshippers of hedonism, though Gorgias has been characterized as a man who is “motivated by an inordinate desire for personal pleasure and power over others” (Wiser 1983, 51) Such an indictment is too severe. The idea of pleonexy, the unrelenting quest for material aggrandizement, never dominates Gorgias’ conversation. Gorgias concedes to Socrates’ criticism of his critique of oratory by affirming

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7 “In Voegelin, the tension of existence when it is experienced as the power of attraction exercised by the transcendental. Correlative to zetein or zetesis.” (Webb 1981, 282).
that the practice can be concerned with unjust as well as just causes (Plato [1987] 11, 454b). This also suggests an acceptance of the Socratic distinction associated with persuasion—it can either provide conviction without knowledge or aid the development of knowledge. The partial openness Gorgias demonstrates in the previously cited pericope must also be compared with his rejection of Socratic openness at other junctures.

Perhaps the most neglected element of the exchange between Gorgias and Socrates remains Gorgias’ appreciation of the dianoetic quality of Socrates’ responses. The Socratic enlargement of the sources of persuasion finds a receptive witness in Gorgias. He agrees that conviction can be altered by other means than oratory (Plato [1987] 11, 454a). Mathematics and great art, for example, can perform similar functions. Gorgias’ argument must be limited by his admission, if it is to be defensible after Socrates’ assessment, to the realm of large judicial gatherings. The orderliness of the discussion begins to exhibit some weaknesses. Gorgias’ digressions, according to Socrates, forces Socrates to assume the position of pursuing a strategy that he employs throughout most of the Platonic dialogues, and he becomes the initiating force behind the conversation: “I’m asking questions so that we can conduct an orderly discussion” (Plato [1987] 12, 454c). Gorgias submits to this “turn,” suggesting he willingly succumbs to the Socratic trap. Socrates not only offers the questions that must be answered, he also encourages particular answers from his partners in discussions. Gorgias is forced to recognize his diminished role in the exchange and he must defer the questions Socrates raises for him to his students in the hope these protégés can succeed where their master has failed.

**Gorgias’ Oratory and Justice (Gorgias, 455)**

Previously, Socrates suggested that the prime weakness of Gorgias’ argument concerning rhetoric was its inability to incorporate a role for the teaching of knowledge, and its central element, an appreciation for the transcendental pole of tension, the good *aganthos* (Voegelin [1957], 112). Gorgias suggests, especially in his early responses to Socrates, that his approach to political life is disjointed from an understanding of the good, limiting the possibility for a transcendental ordering of the soul. But Gorgias, unlike the other participants in the debate, never separates his attempt at the philosophical enterprise\(^8\) from the prospect of acknowledging the pursuit of the good, although Gorgias occasionally departs from the active employment

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\(^8\) This “attempt” separates Gorgias from Polus and Callicles. His approach to the moral life could develop into a process that incorporates *phronesis*. When Gorgias’ position is refuted, he discerns the importance of Socrates’ presentation.
of such a life. He remains a participant in the struggle, although no clear elucidation of a resolution to the dilemma is presented.

The most profound limitation concerning Gorgias’ position, and one that is partially ameliorated at a later point in the dialogue, concerns his definition of oratory. Gorgias is, of course, defining the ordering principles of society, as he understands these ideas, when he offers his view of oratory. Oratory becomes for Gorgias the consummate element of his ontology of being. The elevation of oratory also suggests a partial refusal to accept the requirements of the full philosophical (noetic) openness, thus the path towards self-awareness seems more bewildering for Gorgias.

The scope of Gorgian openness cannot be fully explicated due to the boundaries of our analysis. The admiration exhibited for the “art of giving speeches” becomes for Gorgias “The greatest of human concerns...the best” (Plato [1987] 8, 451d). Again, the importance of persuasion is stressed and Socrates must ask for a refinement of the term; he defines the art of oratory as the practice of “instilling persuasion” (Plato [1987] 10, 453a) and Gorgias asserts he has defined oratory “quite adequately” and “That is the long and short of it” (Plato [1987] 10, 453a). Gorgias continues to accept the important role of his “art” throughout the dialogue. To a degree, he must endeavor to present a defense of his work, as he and the order he represents are under scrutiny in this interchange. Gorgias’ devotion to oratory is elevated over the ethical and moral constrains of the practice, suggesting that the great teacher is unable to counter the predicament that confronts him in the dialogue. Gorgias, unlike Polus and Callicles, continues the discussion with Socrates; both men listen patiently to the comments of the other, insinuating that some semblance of rational discourse is occurring. As Voegelin argues, true discussion can only transpire within a framework where limitations are incorporated by the rules of linguistic engagement (Voegelin 1961). Only then can those engaged have a common understanding of terms central to a meaningful exchange.

The success of the Platonic mission depends on the transferal of knowledge so that virtue may be cultivated (Voegelin 1961). When this purpose cannot be served in the course of a discussion, Socrates excuses himself from the encounter. Voegelin suggests this improves the prospect for free speech:

Plato establishes the principle, all too frequently ignored today, that freedom of speech included also the liberty to refuse to listen. Freedom of speech serves the purpose of rational discussion; whoever abuses it in order to prevent discussion in breaking the rules of the game as accepted by civilized society (Voegelin 1961, 276).
Gorgias obeys the proper limits more closely and more thoughtfully than Socrates’ other debating partners in the *Gorgias*. In fact, after Gorgias leaves the conversation with Socrates, he assumes the role of facilitator, encouraging interaction and at several points he revives a floundering interchange.

Gorgias possesses some comprehension of the transcendental origin of the social order and this understanding is exemplified by his willingness to embrace a role for justice in the work of the practitioner of oratory. The practice, as Gorgias delineates it, contains a metaphysical element. Socrates expresses amazement at Gorgias’ portrayal and proceeds to associate a “supernatural” quality with the depiction. Gorgias agrees with Socrates’ interpretation and suggests oratory “encompasses and subordinates to itself just about everything that can be accomplished” (Plato [1987] 14, 456b). The sublimation of a potentially intemperate oratory suggests the principal weakness of Gorgias’ position: the practice remains a destructive exercise if it cannot improve the basis for an understanding of practical knowledge. Gorgias is unwilling to acquiesce to the demands of the Platonic truth. The philosophical inquiry, which must serve as the foundation for an understanding of this truth in existence, is deformed, and any movement towards the transcendental source is prohibited by Gorgias’ refusal to consider the intricacies of Socrates’ prescription.

However, Gorgias’ critique endures due to its receptivity to a role for the *agathon*, albeit with some qualifications. In other words, he apprehends a higher purpose for social and political discourse than the other debate participants. The mature solemnization of Gorgias’ argument includes a role for justice in the practice of oratory, and the indication that the use of oratory cannot be separated from the moral life:

The orator has the ability to speak against everyone on every subject, so as in gatherings to be more persuasive, in short, about anything he likes, but the fact that he has the ability to rob doctors or other craftsmen of their reputation does not give him any more of a reason to do it. He should use oratory justly, as he would use any competitive skill (Plato [1987] 15, 457a).

Gorgias is incapable of a leap in being. He can never fully expose himself to the fuller dimensions of Socrates’ profound critique. Gorgias does not experience a transformation in openness, but he is influenced by the encounter with Socrates. The decline of his position within the discussion is essential to a recognition of his role within the larger dialogue.
Gorgias’ Fall: The Partial Rejection of Socratic Openness

Socrates begins his last exchange with Gorgias by reintroducing the existential problem, again demonstrating a special understanding of Gorgias and his situation. The degree of communication at this point between Socrates and Gorgias continues and a more thorough delineation of the dispute can be ascertained. Socrates tries to convince Gorgias that simply winning an argument is not as important as beginning a process towards right behavior. Gorgias rescinds his pledge of active and full participation in the discussion. The objective of the event can no longer be a path which brings one back to the transcendental origin of the social order. Gorgias’ exploration of the role of the oratory in society becomes divorced from its connection with the ethical and moral life. The role of oratory in social and political life is greatly depreciated and Gorgias’ argument begins to unravel.

Gorgias has moved in the direction of denying any prospects for transcendental fulfillment. The well-being of humankind is superseded by the profane desire to succeed at convincing others of your views, and promoting one’s own position in society. Questions of an enduring nature, if not excluded, cannot properly be examined due to the rage for approval and personal success. Socrates does not hold all oratory in disdain, only those practices that prevent the promotion of justice. Gorgias’ approach is not dismissed in its entirety. There are acknowledgments of his contributions in the course of the dialogue. Socrates never rejects the possibility that his approach to oratory and the moral life could also be misused. The discussion always returns to the pre-eminent Socratic tenet: oratory, as well as all other human activities, must be used to benefit justice (Plato [1987] 112-113, 527a-c). The approach to human affairs offered by Gorgias is impotent by its very nature; Gorgias’ mode of existence becomes more qualified and less open to the more substantial questions it must entertain.

The claims of Gorgias are further weakened by his inability to respond fully to the criticisms made against his use of oratory by Socrates. Again, Socrates exerts a willingness to allow Gorgias the opportunity to revise and extend his comments, but it is of no avail (Plato [1987] 17, 458d-e). The devaluation of the Gorgian position reaches a climax when the great teacher must admit that his practice of oratory may be used to persuade gatherings of people without knowledge of the good, the true and the beautiful (Plato [1987] 17, 459a). The divorcement of a role for justice, and for a recognition of the existential tension as it related to the use of oratory, depreciates the importance of Gorgias’ earlier arguments. The debate must now turn to Socrates who is presented with the opportunity of elaborating his assessment of the discussion and his critique of a bewildered discussant.
Socrates can pursue his mission with much freedom, given the capitulation of Gorgias. The penultimate concession transpires when Socrates queries Gorgias concerning the proposition that an orator must necessarily be just and that a just man will want to do just things. At this point, Gorgias, restrained by his previous submissions, answers “apparently so” (Plato [1987] 19, 460c). The response is once more followed by Socrates’ reintroduction of the existential problem although it is expressed in a dichotomized fashion: “if you, like me, think that being refuted is a profitable thing, it would be worthwhile to continue the discussion, but if you didn’t, to let it drop” (Plato [1987] 20, 461a). Gorgias’ embarrassment is so great that he cannot reenter the discussion. Voegelin correctly suggests that Socrates has exceeded the norms of rational discussion in this instance:

…nobody will ever deny that he knows what justice is and that he can teach it, the question in unfair and should not be asked. To involve a man [Gorgias] in a contradiction by forcing from him an admission on a point which he is ashamed to deny, betrays gross boorishness (agroikia) on the part of Socrates (Voegelin 1957, 25).

Socrates admonitions suggest an imprudent approach on his part. He proceeds to critique the idea of oratory as it was presented by Gorgias. He argues that oratory for Gorgias is whatever a particular defender of the “knack” may suggest that it is at any given time (Plato [1987] 22, 462b). It is a craft that can be constructed to fit the individual and his or her circumstances. The argument presented by Socrates is coherent and encourages one to reconsider Gorgias’ defense of oratory, but it does not accurately convey his position. The charge of relativism cannot be substantiated. Gorgias advocates a rule for justice in oratory, although he removes the teachers of the practice from sharing any responsibility for their students. Gorgias has already elucidated his view that justice must be part of oratory; nevertheless, his ability to overcome the earlier rationalization of a divorcement of justice from oratory and political life hinders his position in this discussion. Socrates continues his commentary and carefully proves that the removal of any obligation vis à vis the teacher is untenable, as the teacher must share part of the blame for the student. Gorgias again succumbs to Socrates’ criticisms.

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Socrates is actually replying to Polus at this point; however, the distinction is based on his earlier conversation with Gorgias.
Socrates’ performance in the discussion with Gorgias is tainted by his propensity for undertaking a strategy that seeks to denigrate the positions and stature of, rather than engaging in a deeper exploration of, the major concerns of the colloquy. Gorgias has the potential for approaching an existential understanding of the tensions involved in human life and he possesses a recognition of the role of intentionality as the ground for understanding. The prospects for the acquisition of a more reflective approach are never fully articulated by Gorgias. The inability to adequately come to terms with the tension prevents these events from ever assuming a structure. Gorgias deserves much of the blame for this failure, but as we shall note, he represents the only attempt to consider the consequences of the tensions of existence in the dialogue. To examine the antithesis, we must turn to an appraisal of Polus and Callicles.

Socrates and Polus (Gorgias, 461-481)

Polus and Ideology

The discussion between Gorgias and Socrates turns into a debate between Polus and Socrates. Socrates begins the interchange by thanking Polus for assuming the position of Gorgias. The existential issue surfaces again, but Socrates’ introduction suggests that the likelihood of having such an exchange with Polus is remote. Polus, Gorgias’ disciple, is offered the same opportunity as his teacher. He not only refuses to consider the prospects for his openness, but Polus cannot understand the dimensions of the discussion and its ramifications for political society. Polus’ ignorance of the crisis before him consigns his role within the dialogue to that of a comic figure; Socrates suggests such an approach when he refers to Polus, as he attempts to assume Gorgias’ argument, as “most admirable Polus” (Plato [1987] 21, 461c). Whereas Gorgias expresses an appreciation for the role of humankind in the search for the truth of existence, Polus loathes the prospects of confronting such a problem and prefers to experience life in the here and now, potentially disregarding the health of the living soul.

Polus must be understood as a defender of the life of desire. Rhetoric and oratory become the means for promoting such a presence in the world. Socrates correctly castigates Polus’ defense of oratory, describing the “knack” as an experience, *empeiria*, designed for “producing a certain gratification and pleasure” (Plato [1987] 22, 462c) Polus’ sensual proclamations can never acquire the refinement necessary to be considered a craft, *techne*. Socrates’ criticism of Polus and his proposal continues unabated at this point. To facilitate discussion, Socrates must present Polus with a childish analogy of the body and the soul in an attempt to present the proper relationship between
justice and oratory. Moreover, Polus exerts an immunity from confronting the multifaceted conundrum before him. The parable presented by Socrates, like those of Christ in the New Testament, assumes the form of true story (alethes logos), and has the potential of contributing and improving Polus’ comprehension of the ultimate consequences of his decisions and defense of the ephemeral world. Socrates’ redefinition of oratory reduces it now to something even less enduring than a “knack”: “You’ve (Polus) now heard what I say oratory is. It’s the counterpart in the soul to pastry baking, its counterpart in the body (Plato [1987] 26, 465d-e). Polus lacks the rhetorical proclivities to either present an alternative or directly refute the claims of Socrates. Socrates’ dismissal of Polus’ oratory as “a shameful thing” acquires more credibility when his debating opponent is unable to reformulate the arguments of his mentor so as to make them more compelling (Plato [1987] 24, 463d). The prospects for Polus contributing to the debate become more remote and he evinces no awareness of the ramifications of his attachment to the “old myths of society,” thereby affirming the foundational elements of the undifferentiated self (Gunnell 1968, 147). Polus has clearly lost the debate, due in no small part to his inability to participate, and he must now assume a more confrontational, if not an ad hominen, approach.

The Drift towards Relativism (468c) and the Introduction of the Measure of Pleasure and Pain (470)

Polus, Voegelin suggests, pursues a line of argument based on his intellectual dishonesty. Since he has failed in his attempt at rational discourse, he can only hope to gain success from either attacking Socrates or disrupting the discussion. Polus, of course, chooses to exploit Socrates the person and the rules of the debate. The interconnection of oratory and political power becomes the foci of Polus’ revised argument. Oratory, Polus retorts, can have the trappings of a salutary enterprise when it assists the seekers of political power and influence in realizing their goal of obtaining political office:

\[ Socrates: \text{I don’t think they’re held in any regard at all.} \]
\[ Polus: \text{What do you mean, they’re not held in any regard?} \]
\[ \text{Don’t they have the greatest power in the cities?} \]
\[ Socrates: \text{No, if by “having power” you mean something that’s good for the one who has power.} \]
\[ Polus: \text{That’s just what I do mean.} \]
Socrates: “In that case I think that orators have the least power of any in the city” (Plato [1987] 27, 466b).

Polus’ defense of the orators who serve as political leaders rests on relativistic premises, and the relativism takes the form of an organic argument. The activities of these political men are not constituted by an understanding of the good, but out of an interest in promoting their interests in the present.

As Polus correctly suggests, the conditions of political life are subject to frequent permutations; however, he rejects the possibility of an ordering principle. The Platonic mission, the search for the agathon, may be a response to the sublime positivism of sophistic rhetoric. It is not a prescriptive approach to political life that lends itself to a simple elucidation. It is an experience of turning towards the movement of the transcendent; after all, the good is to be pursued in terms of “what is most like it (eikon),” and “then carried on step further” (Voegelin 1957, 113). Voegelin demonstrates the good (agathon) cannot be immanentized for the sake of explaining its importance for every banal concern known to humankind. 10 The process must become “a search for truth concerning the order of being” (Voegelin 1956, xiv).

Obviously, Polus’ inability to even recognize the conflict prevents him for obtaining any appreciation of the Platonic mission. His fixity of purpose endures, and Polus yearns to continue the debate, even though he has been thoroughly refuted by Socrates. Polus’ plan in perpetuating the dialogue is to disrupt the exchange with Socrates. If he can accomplish this goal, he can appear to have successfully refuted Socrates’ arguments. Polus decides to revive his defense of self-gratification as the true foundation of the oratoric enterprise (Plato [1987] 22, 462d). He suggests all human actions should be in accordance with the interests of those people who are engaging in the acts.

Polus disapproves of Socrates connection of the agathon and the kalon (admirable) as compared with the kakon (bad) and aischron (shameful) (Plato [1987] 39, 474d). Socrates argues the admirable and good person is truly happy, whereas the bad and shameful is not. The happy man is the result of education and a soul open to justice. Polus’ confusion and reluctance to participate in this discussion only augments the confinement of his compromised position. He remains completely closed to the existential problem and moves further away from participating in existence.

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10 “What is the idea of the agathon? The briefest answer to the question will best bring out the decisive point: Concerning the content of the agathon nothing can be said at all. That is the fundamental insight of Platonic ethics. The transcendence of the agathon makes immanent propositions concerning its content impossible” (Voegelin 1957, 113).
transferal of the knowledge of order, namely the understanding of the “truth of his own order,” is now an impossibility (Voegelin 1990, 136).

Polus is snared by his own attempt at deception. The good man is the powerful politician, regardless of how this person uses his power (Plato [1987] 31, 468e). Socrates proceeds to prove for Polus that great power is not “doing what one sees fit,” and, in fact, leaders who pursue such tactics are incapable of responding in the way they would truly want to respond (Plato [1987] 32, 469e). Polus becomes more disheveled and is forced to depart from the debate. While Gorgias, ever the decorous citizen, fades away from the discussion in silence, Polus withdraws as he submits his final comment in response to Socrates: “I think your statements are absurd, Socrates” (Plato [1987] 50, 480e).” Polus leaves the debate unconvinced of the importance of Socrates’ remark. No rapport takes place between the two men, and Polus demonstrates a lack of willingness to acquire the necessary prerequisites for appreciating Socrates’ existential challenge to the perverse order of Athens.

**Socrates and Callicles (Gorgias, 481-527)**

**Callicles and Power**

Callicles comprehends the Socratic revolt against the corruption he represents, as well as his own vehement rejection of the existential problem. Our treatment of Callicles will be less because he refuses to entertain the possibility of communication with Socrates regarding the problem of the existential quest. Callicles, unlike either Gorgias or Polus, realizes the threat posed by Socrates. Socrates is the enemy of the life Callicles holds so dear. The Socratic mission opposes the decadent order of Athens so thoroughly as to threaten its “spiritual core” (Voegelin 1957, 28). Callicles recognizes the severity of Socrates’ impugning of Athens and decides to retaliate.

For Callicles, like Polus and Thrasymachus (in the Republic), humankind’s role in political society cannot be defined by an attempt to engage in experiences that lead to the agathon (Voegelin 1957, 28) but in terms of the promotion of people with stronger natures over people possessed with weaker natures.  Callicles must declare war on Socrates love of philosophy and he tries to accomplish the task by arguing for the relative unimportance of philosophy:

This is the truth of the matter, as you will acknowledge if you abandon philosophy and move on to more important

11 It is Thrasymachus who echoes Callicles’ argument when he asserts: “‘Listen then,’ he replied. ‘I say that justice or right is simply what is in the interest of the stronger party. Now where is your praise?’“ (Plato [1986] 77).
things. Philosophy is no doubt a delightful thing, Socrates, as long as one is exposed to it in moderation at the appropriate time of life. But if one spends more time with it in than he should, it’s the undoing of mankind (Plato [1987] 55, 484c).

Philosophy, according to Callicles, is for children. To elevate the practice of philosophy as the overarching concern of political life is “ridiculous” (Plato [1987] 56, 485a). Callicles’ honesty separates him from Polus. Only Callicles clearly elucidates what the other participants in the debate believe to be true, as they are either unwilling or unable to adequately express their positions. Socrates argues for a life of balance and moderation so that person’s soul can pursue the proper path in life. Callicles refuses to accept such an ordering of greatest good (eros), claiming man should be allowed to have appetites as large and as unrestrained as possible (Plato [1987] 64-65, 492a). This, for Callicles, is true happiness. The “flowing in” of power to the undisciplined man allows for the most pleasure and any limitation of this fulfillment interferes with man’s natural role. In his refutation of Socrates’ parable of the man and the jars, he argues that satisfaction must come not from having our jars filled with water, but from the continual and unmitigated aggrandizement of the process. The hedonism of Callicles also forms a philosophy of existence. He must not accept any limitation upon the conventions he represents, as such a move would denote a movement towards Socrates’ critique regarding the corruption of the foundations of life in the political order of Athens.

Quest for Order

Callicles slowly removes himself from an active role in the debate, allowing Socrates to reintroduce the prospects for the state of the existential community. Ironically, Callicles’ growing impotence encourages Socrates to restate and develop how a restoration could be achieved:

Yes, Callicles, wise men claim, that partnership and friendship, orderliness, self-control, and justice hold together heavens and earth, and god and men, and that is why they call this universe a world order, my friend, and not an undisciplined world-disorder (Plato [1987] 88, 507e-508a).

According to Socrates, there can be no happiness without personal restraint, and the man who exhibits this restraint is the just man. The tyrant and his legions are naturally afraid of the just man because he poses a threat to the regime (Plato [1987] 91, 510b-c). Callicles realizes Socrates’ critique has the
potential of overthrowing the established elements of Athenian society and that he will no longer be trusted by the citizens of Athens. Callicles senses the difference, but is unable to appreciate the decadence of his society and communicate the difference to others.

By his confession Callicles shares much in common with Socrates’ tyrannical man. The acquisition and preservation of political power form the needs of life that are most essential to survival. Socrates counters Callicles’ project, arguing there must be more to life than preservation, by ironically urging: “Perhaps one who is truly a man should stop thinking about how long he will live” (Plato [1987] 94, 512d-e). After all, the Socratic revolt, of course, results in his death. Socrates knows he is “one of a few Athenians...to take up the true political craft and practice true politics” (Plato [1987] 105, 521d). Callicles has no understanding of the experience of reality and cannot be dissuaded from holding Socrates and his order of an existential reality in disdain. He also is in a state of intellectual confusion, which should also be understood as a condition of spiritual decay. At a weak moment, he admits the order of the soul should be justice, confirming Socrates’ claim of justice as the underlying principle of oratory. Callicles’ acquiescence again suggests he is no longer an active participant in the discussion. He has been refuted by Socrates and he has admitted the logical inconsistency of his position. Callicles’ presentation of the mutual compatibility of goodness and strength has failed. Socrates’ view of goodness can now properly be understood as participation in the existential order and as aiding the attempt to redeem a corrupt Athens.

Conclusion

Socrates fails in his attempt to convince his opponents of the concrete, existential situation that provides the basis for openness. Only Gorgias possesses the potential of approaching the existential problem in a serious way, even though his struggle is unsuccessful. The relationship between Socrates and Gorgias is characterized by displays of mutual respect and cooperation at several junctures.

As we have suggested, the Apology and the Gorgias chronicle the transfer of authority from the destructive world of Athens to the philosophers. The organization of the society, according to Plato, is determined by the orderliness of the souls of its citizens. The central element of the successful Platonic revolution is, Voegelin reminds us, “a radical call for spiritual regeneration” (Voegelin 1957, 39). The attempt to assist the soul in overcoming its passions and the potential for spiritual derailment must continue. The disruptions of order in this century also require that modern men
and women avoid an attachment to the “dogmatic derailments” represented by the numerous contemporary messianic movements (Voegelin 1957, 39).

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The Role of Existential Openness, Cheek

University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
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Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press.
How a Changing Political Environment Shaped the Big Three Automakers’ Strategies toward National Emissions from 1990-2010

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This article contends that political pressure from the Obama administration led the Big Three Automakers to reserve their longstanding opposition to a national increase in emissions standards. A content analysis of hundreds of New York Times and Washington Post articles is used to test the explanatory power of a few explanatory models of what determines the automakers strategy toward federal emissions policy. Economic factors, the inconvenience of multiple state plans, and pro-environment CEO all were found to lead to little or no support for an increase in national emissions standards. A combination of pressure from the Obama administration and the reliance on loans from the government led to the reversal in strategy.

President Obama raised fuel economy standards by 40% with the support of the big three automakers in 2009. Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors all expressed support for this. This was a reversal of long-term strategy of opposition to any federal increase in national fuel economy standards. This paper contends that a political environment of inevitability for reform caused the automakers to change course and constructively work with the Obama administration to shape an increase in emissions standards.

In 2006, the United States had the highest amount of carbon dioxide emissions from the transportation sector (Perl and Dunn 2007, 2). The dominant policy instrument that mandates reductions in greenhouse gas emissions is the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) regulatory regime. These rules were enacted in response to the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 and 1974. The standards were designed to raise the average fuel economy of a car from 13.1 miles per gallon (mpg) in 1975 to 27.5 mpg in 1985. Since the passage of CAFÉ, automakers have consistently fought against any increase in
fuel economy standards despite a variety of reasons that could have led them to accept that they should work with the government for a new unified standard. Melnick (1984) argues that pollution deadlines from Clean Air Act of 1970 were routinely delayed but occasionally enforced by the Environmental Protection Agency. This occasional enforcement could be quite costly to the businesses that were made to comply. Automakers opposition to higher fuel economy standards could have been based on the fear that they may be sporadically forced to invest a lot of money to meet new fuel efficiency standards.

President Obama acted as a policy entrepreneur when he exerted effort to reduce emissions in U.S. automakers as well as with his failed efforts to enact a cap and trade plan. The environment was one of the major issue areas on which Obama focused in his first two years in office. Kingdon (1984/1995) noted that a defining characteristic of policy entrepreneurs is their willingness to invest resources such as time, energy, and their reputation in exchange for a later return. Mintrom and Norman (2009) point out that most of the literature on policy entrepreneurs is not linked to theories about policy change. According to Lindblom (1968) policy changes are slow and reactive so there is little room for decisive action by an entrepreneur. The efforts by President Obama are better explained by Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) theory of policy change. They argue that the process is one of long term political stability punctuated by bursts of abrupt significant change.

The type of environmental regulations placed upon industries depends on the type of market economy. In coordinated market economies such as Germany, Japan, and Sweden, government and industry often negotiate agreements for achieving environmental improvements. As a liberal market economy, the United States has had an adversarial relationship between government and business on regulatory issues. Mikler (2005, 418) says, “Firms in the European Union and Japan are more likely to cooperate with government in setting regulations on a more voluntaristic basis than in the United States … The result is they are more likely to feel comfortable with, and committed to, the aims of regulation and comply with its requirements more willingly.” For the purposes of this study, we should expect that the auto industry will avoid working with the federal government on voluntary arrangements during both of the Bush administrations as well as the Clinton administration.

**Hypothesis**

Internal or external factors may shape corporate strategies toward environmental policy. This paper will analyze the following independent
variables in order to determine what shapes the automakers strategy toward federal emissions policy. The senior management’s commitment toward environmentalism is the key internal driver of corporate strategy. Nash (2000) and Hirshorn and Oldenburg (1991) both found that senior management attitudes were major indicators of a willingness to adopt environmental practices. To test this theory of corporate strategies, this study will focus on the tenure of William C. Ford, Jr. as the CEO of Ford from 1998 to 2006. Ford was an outlier in terms of his public verbal commitment to environmentalism. Ford’s strategies will be compared to those of General Motors and Chrysler during this period to determine the effect of senior management attitudes on corporate environmental strategies. Consumer demand could also shape strategies toward regulation. Mikler (2009) states that US auto firms focused upon market forces more than German and Japanese auto firms. This could have led the Big Three automakers to resist emissions regulations on the basis that there was insufficient demand for fuel-efficient cars.

Three external factors will be analyzed as independent variables as well. A new intuitionalist theory suggests that firms may be influenced by other firms that they consider to be model performers (Suchman and Edelmann 1996). Did Ford or Toyota, through their perception that reputations as environmentally friendly manufacturers would produce greater U.S. auto sales, lead other major manufacturers to support federal regulations in an effort to mute this perceived advantage?

The second external variable is the existence of state plans requiring environmentally efficient vehicles. California was the first state to call for tough emissions standards. Several northeastern states later attempted to do this as well. A variety of different state standards should cause automakers to have greater support for a federal emissions standard to avoid making several different versions of the same vehicle. So, the automakers support for federal emissions standards should increase when states are able to pass regulations on their own.

The last external variable is the “politics of inevitability.” Wainess (1999) demonstrated that the American Medical Association shifted strategies in the early 1970s when it appeared that some form of national health insurance legislation was likely to pass. The AMA learned from its earlier experience of opposing Medicare legislation. When Medicare legislation was being drafted the AMA was shut out of the discussion. To avoid the same fate in the early 1970s, the AMA decided to offer its own moderate proposal to head off support for more comprehensive legislation. Corrado (2007) found that the National Association of Manufacturers supported an employer mandate for a period of time when it appeared as if President Clinton’s Health Security Acts passage was imminent. During the 2009-2010 health reform episode President
Obama gained the support of insurance industry publicly by working with them to on the individual mandate which guaranteed them more healthy customers. A deal was also made with the pharmaceutical industry. Large Democratic majorities in Congress helped to overcome some segments of business opposition to the Affordable Act as well. When it appears as if a law is about to pass or federal rules are about to be issued corporations have an incentive to be constructive in order to shape the new standards. The pressure is similar to a game of chicken in which the federal government or businesses will blink. Democratic administrations are much more likely to support federal rules for the environment. President Clinton’s approach was to encourage the voluntary cooperation of the automakers. President Obama was willing to issue federal rules at a time when Chrysler and General Motors were repaying the federal government loans that may have saved them from bankruptcy. The beginning of the Obama administration is a time period in which there was an imminent threat of increased federal fuel efficiency standards.

Generating sufficient pressure on businesses requires meeting two important conditions. First, there must be a proximate policy entrepreneur that expends effort to create a political environment in which coercive legislation or regulation is imminent. Second, businesses, the Big Three Automakers, have to perceive this pressure to be real and imminent. These conditions were only met during the beginning of the Obama administration.

**Methods**

This study employs a content analysis of *New York Times* and *Washington Post* articles from 1990 to 2010 to see how much influence each of the above variables had upon the strategies of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler toward federal emissions regulations. These are two papers capable of performing investigative journalism in the United States (Jones 2009). The use of these papers or even one of these papers has utilized by other scholars. Farnsworth and Lichter (2005) used a content analysis of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* to demonstrate how coverage of Congress is much less than coverage of the executive. Another study examined news coverage of presidents in a content analysis of just the *New York Times* (Farnsworth and Lichter 2012). Lima and Siegel (1999) employed this method for analyzing the tobacco policy debate. Finally, a content analysis of these papers was used to examine narratives about climate change (McComas and Shanahan 1999).

1990 is the year in which California enacted its emissions regulations and 2009 is year in which President Obama raised the Corporate Average Fuel Economy regulations. Each major automakers name and the term “emissions” were used in a Lexis-Nexis search of each newspaper. One thousand articles
were found in the General Motors search in the *New York Times* and four hundred and eighty articles were found in the *Washington Post* search. There were one thousand *New York Times* articles on Ford along with five hundred and fifty seven articles from the *Washington Post*. Chrysler was covered much less. Five hundred and forty one *New York Times* articles and two hundred thirty five *Washington Post* articles were examined for Chrysler. Direct statements from officials and summaries of actions from each automaker were counted as a strategy. Additionally, actions such as advertising, lobbying and money spent for or against federal emissions regulations were coded as strategies.

Additional methods were used to determine what effect the market had upon the automakers’ strategies toward federal emissions regulations. In the case of domestic consumer demand, an econometric analysis is used to determine the validity of the automakers’ claim that there was no market for fuel-efficient cars even as gas prices rose in from 2002-2005. Standard and Poors’ (2009) industry survey data are also utilized to determine how competition from Toyota and Honda, who had a reputation of being more environmentally focused, could have affected the automakers’ receptiveness to emissions’ regulations.

**Findings and Discussion**

**Refuting the Conventional Wisdom about Consumer Demand**

The Big Three automakers often claimed that there was insufficient demand for fuel-efficient cars. This claim led them to resist state and federal efforts to regulate emissions. Walter McManus’ business career included working nine years working for General Motors in assignments in economics, marketing, and product development. His research applies econometric and consumer demand theory to test the link between gasoline prices and vehicle sales (McManus 2007). McManus refutes the conventional wisdom that consumers are unwilling to pay for fuel efficient cars.

McManus (2007, 56) explains that gas prices rose nearly 70% from 2002 to 2005 before soaring in August 2005 when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the Gulf of Mexico. His model is based on the economic theory that future gas prices are part of the calculation that consumers make when buying a vehicle. Prices for less fuel efficient cars fell from 2002 to 2005. “In fact, the average large SUV price fell $2300 more between 2002 and 2005 than the average small car price did” (McManus 2007, 58). Sales of Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) stayed even during this time while revenue and profits declined. McManus shows that U.S. automakers subsidized consumers through incentives and deep discounts in order to offset increased fuel prices.
Automakers public statements about sales could have motivated by public relations concerns about decisions that were already made, according to McManus (2007, 59).

**Multiple State Plans**

California’s Air Resources Board approved tough standards to control smog in September 1990. The plan called for autos sold in California to include 25% low emissions vehicles by 1997 with further increases until 96% of all cars sold there would have be low in their smog emissions (Matthews 1990). An agreement to adopt California’s standard was reached by nine northeastern governors in October 1991 (Wald 1991). This was the start of a prolonged process where the automakers had to deal with changing state standards that could easily have prompted them to look to the federal government to standardize the process in which they make cars.

The initial strategy of the automakers toward these state actions was to oppose them. When California came out with its standards a common refrain was that it was technologically unfeasible to create low emissions cars (Stevenson 1990). Ford noted that there was a lack of a market for these cars in California (Wald 1991). The same held true for the Northeastern states plan to adopt California’s rules. General Motors conducted a state by state struggle to block the Northeast from doing this (Wald 1993a).

A shift occurred in 1993. A Federal Court in Boston ruled that Massachusetts was allowed to adopt California’s standards (Wald 1993b). All of the automakers showed greater willingness to compromise at this point. This was evident when they all offered to sell gasoline powered cars with lower emissions than the federal standard and higher than the standard in California (Wald 1993c). At the same time that this offer was floated General Motors was lobbying and fighting the northeastern standards in courts.

All three major automakers lobbied against eastern states adopting the California plans while they voiced support for a 49-state plan floated by General Motors (Wald 1993d). The American Automobile Manufacturers Association (GM, Ford, and Chrysler all belong to this organization) filed a lawsuit against New York, Massachusetts, and Maine to prevent the government from imposing California standards in the Northeast (Wald 1994b). The automakers were particularly concerned about any requirement to make electric cars. The automakers all wrote a letter that threatened that they would drop their 49-state plan unless New York and Massachusetts got rid of the requirement for electric cars. “The automakers said in their letter that they were committed to electric vehicles as soon as they are commercially viable and supported by necessary infrastructure. Neither our industry nor the
American consumer can afford burdensome costs associated with attempting to bring an immature technology to market” (Bennett 1995a).

All three also remained opposed to any federal increase in emissions standards during this time. They argued that an increase in the emissions standards for trucks would only help the Japanese auto makers (Bennett 1995b). They also stated their opposition to the Clinton administration’s interest in limiting greenhouse gas emissions as the Kyoto treaty was being negotiated. Chrysler’s chief executive, Robert Eaton, said, “This sort of fuzzy thinking provides the warm illusion of saving the sky, which we’re not sure needs saving, but it won’t have any impact at all on global warming. It will just move jobs to those countries which are allowed to spew whatever they want into the air” (Dao 1997). All three maintained opposition to a raise in the fuel economy standards in the United States while they agreed to a deal to do this in Europe (Bradsher 1998).

A new phase in the negotiations with the states occurred when all three auto makers offered to produce cars that emit 70% less of some pollutants if eight eastern states and Washington, D.C., gave up their right to adopt the California emissions standards (Wald 1998). California changed the environment again when it decided to regulate greenhouse gases. The chief executive of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers said, “Federal law is designed to ensure a consistent fuel economy program across the country” (Hakim 2004d). In the end, the automakers never followed through with their counteroffer in the negotiations with the Northeastern state. While they exhibited a shift towards constructive negotiation, they never came around to either acting voluntarily to create a 49-state solution or supporting a federal solution that would have created a single national emissions standard.

Chart 1 shows that the automakers were opposed to state plans to create their own levels of emissions standards for cars sold on their territory. The numbers represent the amount of strategies used to represent opposition to state plans during this time. The strategies include lawsuits and public statements.

Chart 2 shows the amount of times that each automaker said that it was ready to sell a 49-state cleaner car in order to stop states other than California from pursuing their own regulations. General Motors first offered the deal. This indicates that they were slightly more willing to compromise. The automakers reiterated their willingness to sell cleaner nationwide car in similar language several times from 1993-1998.

Chart 3 shows the unified opposition to federal plans to for emission regulations through either talks with the Clinton administration to increase corporate average fuel economy standards or opposition to mandatory standards.
Chart 1. Automakers’ Opposition to State Plans, 1993-1998*

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<th>Automaker</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chrysler</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>GM</td>
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* For articles analyzed, see Appendix 1.

Chart 2. Automaker Support for a Plan to Sell a Cleaner National Car in Exchange for Various State Agreements Not to Pursue Plans to Regulate Emissions on Their Own, 1993-1998*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Automaker</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GM</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Ford</td>
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<td>Chrysler</td>
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*For articles analyzed, see Appendix II.
in the Kyoto treaty. The big three automakers did not support any form of federal emissions regulation from 1993-1998.

**William C. Ford: Environmental Commitment from the Top**

William C. Ford Jr. became the chairman of Ford in September 1998. He has close ties with the environmental movement and has made periodic calls for the auto industry to focus more on the environment. While William Ford’s verbal commitment to the environment is striking compared to other American auto-making chief executives, it is important to see whether the commitment to environmental goals by the top management led to support of federal emissions policy.

In 1999 Ford withdrew from the Global Climate Coalition, a group which opposed the Kyoto treaty and disputed that global warming was man-made. William Ford said, “We believe that some things can be done [to improve the environment] and we will work to do those things whenever possible” (Brown and Hamilton 1999a). Similarly, GM endorsed scientific studies showing that humans are primarily responsible for global warming in the same time period (Drozdiak 2000). Chrysler also exhibited a shift in strategies when Robert
Eaton retired and it was acquired by Daimler-Benz A.G. Both Eaton and Robert Lutz were skeptical of global warming. The combined Daimler-Chrysler company has shown more enthusiasm for environmental issues (Krebs 1999).

Ford’s leadership under William Ford did encourage GM and Chrysler to respond. In 1999, Ford decided to increase the fuel economy of all of its SUV’s by 25% in the next five years. General Motors quickly responded that it would beat Ford’s energy efficiency in SUV’s (Bradsher 2000b). Similarly, Ford announced that it would sell hybrid SUVs in 2003 while General Motors said they would sell them in the future (El-Tabaway 2003). Ford also joined the Chicago climate exchange, an organization that trades carbon credits, in a voluntary attempt to reduce carbon emissions (Behr and Pianin 2003). Finally, Ford announced that it would work with the Sierra Club to raise the average miles per gallon its vehicles and to reduce pollutants (Behr and Pianin 2003).

One should be careful not to overstate Ford’s support for governmental policy that requires the reduction of emissions. For instance when California passed regulations requiring a 30% reduction in greenhouse gases over 12 years, the Automobile Alliance (of which all of the big three automakers are members) filed a lawsuit stating that only the federal government could regulate fuel economy standards (Schneider 2004). Did the automakers actually support a federal solution or where they simply trying to avoid California’s higher standards?

Daimler-Chrysler, Ford, and GM opposed a Senate environmental bill in 2001 (Hakim 2002a). “Ford backed an intense lobbying and advertising effort against a Senate proposal to raise fuel economy standards for the first time since the 1980s” (Hakim 2002b). Due to the lack of support for a tangible federal effort to raise fuel economy standards, one should be skeptical of the automakers claim that they prefer federal efforts to those of the states during this period. Moreover, Ford backtracked on some of its earlier commitments. In 2002 Ford backed away from its commitment to increase the fuel economy of its SUV’s by 25% (Hakim 2002f).

In summary, while support from senior management does account for some shift in the strategy of Ford toward emissions regulations it is certainly less than what meets the eye. Most importantly, for the purpose of this study, Ford did not support federal efforts to increase federal fuel economy standards during the tenure of William C. Ford. It decided to lobby heavily against Senate legislation rather than working constructively to improve the environment.

Chart 4 includes a count of the strategies pursued by Ford while it was led by William C. Ford Jr. from 1998-2006. Its voluntary efforts to create market advantage against other automakers include joining the global climate exchange
pledges to reduce emissions of trucks and SUV’s, admissions about the role of car emissions in global warming, the creation of an environmental division, statements about environmental vision, and long term pledges to reduce emissions. Ford retreated on its pledge to reduce SUV’s emissions by 25% and it abandoned its Think division which focused on environmental sustainability. Ford did not support any federal emissions regulations efforts from 1998-2006. It opposed the Kerry-Hollings Senate bill, and increases in fuel economy standards twice.

**New Institutionalism: Ford and Toyota’s Effect**

Ford’s voluntary commitment to environmentalism did have a mild effect on the other companies. General Motors quickly moved to counter Ford’s attempts to capture a segment of the market by positioning itself as first adopter of green cars and trucks among U.S. automakers. However, none of the big three automakers supported any federal emissions legislation during the tenure of William C. Ford.

Toyota provides another test case for the theory that a company with a good environmental reputation and strong economic performance can lead U.S. car manufacturers to support regulations that would force them to move
in what appear to be a more profitable sales strategy. The Toyota Prius is the most popular hybrid car in the United States. That buzz that Toyota receives from the Prius may have helped it to capture the largest market share of U.S. dealer new light vehicle sales in 2007 and 2008 (Standard & Poor’s 2009). While it is easy to make a case that Toyota’s enjoys a reputation as a green automaker in the United States, in order to compel other automakers to mimic it Toyota must also be seen as being a leader due to its green reputation. The time period in which U.S. automakers began to support federal emissions regulations is one in which Toyota’s economic standing was mixed. In the summer of 2008, U.S. sales of the Prius spiked as gas prices rose (Tabuchi 2009a). Yet 2008 was a bad year for Toyota as its loss of 7.7 billion dollars was more than General Motors lost that year (Maynard and Bunkley 2009). Moreover, Toyota fell behind Ford in sales during April 2009 as it sold 42% fewer cars than it did in April 2008 (Tabuchi 2009b). So, it is hard to be able to draw a clear case of what Toyota’s economic image was during the time frame that the big three automakers’ changed their strategies to support higher fuel economy standards.

The Political Environment and the Politics of Inevitability

Clinton Administration

The Clinton administration did exhibit some interest in greening the automobile industry. In 1993, it committed itself to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000 but the Senate voted down the method for doing this (Skjaerseth and Skodin 2003). While forming a Climate Action Plan in 1993 and the United States Climate Action Report in 1997, the administration did not place federal pressure on industries to enact these priorities. Skjaerseth and Skodin (2003) note that these plans were implemented through, “public voluntary programs, information campaigns, and partnerships between business and government. The plans had very low political priority. The priority of the US during the 1990s was research, not action” (118-19).

Greater pressure was applied when the Clinton administration committed itself to the Kyoto protocol from 1997-2001. The Senate did not ratify this protocol. As noted above, the U.S. auto industry did exhibit a willingness to admit that there was an environmental impact from its product and made some voluntary efforts to reduce its environmental impact at this time. Yet, all of the big three automakers opposed the binding limits that were negotiated in the Kyoto protocol. President George W. Bush ended the U.S. commitment to the Kyoto protocol in 2001 and this external pressure on the automakers was removed.
2006 Midterm Elections

The political environment shifted in 2006 when Democrats won control of the House and the Senate. In April 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases that come from automobiles in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency*. Representative Edward Markey worked on legislation to increase fuel efficiency to 35 miles per gallon by 2018 with 4% yearly increases each year after that. President Bush proposed raised fuel efficiency standards by as much as 4% a year for ten years (Freeman 2007a).

The shift in the political winds is evident through actions of Representative John Dingell (D-MI). Dingell was the chair of the House Energy and Commerce committee and a staunch ally of the automobile industry. As Congress worked on legislation that would raise fuel efficiency, Dingell warned the auto industry “no” was not a sufficient answer after the 2006 midterm elections swept in a number of pro-environment Democrats (Birnbaum and Mufson 2007). Jad Mouawad from the *New York Times* summarized the change in the political environment this way. “But the political winds have shifted. All three presidential candidates have said they favor mandatory curbs on emissions, and the Democratic majority in Congress wants a strong climate policy. The Senate debate could help set parameters of future legislation which many experts expect to see within two years” (2007).

The political winds had not shifted completely. Legislation would have to overcome a likely veto from President Bush if it could be passes at all. The Environmental Protection Agency decided not to regulate greenhouse gases in 2008. So, the automakers had some ambiguity to deal with. Did their strategy change from 2006-2008?

All of the big three automakers opposed the Democratic proposals for higher fuel economy standards but noted that some increase was appropriate (Barringer and Maynard 2007). They also constructively proposed a weaker version of an increase (Broder and Maynard 2007). “Detroit continued to lobby against the most stringent Congressional proposals to raise fuel-economy standards, supporting more modest proposals instead. Automakers support aggressive fuel-economy standards for all vehicles to as much as 35 miles per gallon by 2022, Dave McCurdy, president of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers said in a statement” (Barringer and Maynard 2007). This alliance represents all of the big three automakers. Additionally, Ford joined the Climate Action Partnership in 2006 and worked with business and environment groups on plan for mandatory caps on emissions by the government (Mouawad 2008). This is a clear shift in strategy caused by a change in the political environment. While the automakers were not yet on board with an actual proposal to increase fuel economy they expressed
willingness to work on this issue. This was a sharp break from their consistent opposition.

2008 Recession and President Obama’s Election

During the fall of 2008, as the presidential campaign was drawing to its end, the economy took a turn for the worse. The big three automakers were hit hard by the economic recession. The chief executives of GM, Ford, and Chrysler planned to ask Congress for twenty-five billion in loans as a part of the expected stimulus package. GM feared bankruptcy at this time (Marr and Montgomery 2008). Barack Obama won the 2008 presidential election. Improving the environment was one of his top priorities. Henry Waxman (D-CA) replaced John Dingell (D-MI) as the chair of the House Energy and Commerce committee. Waxman, a liberal environmentalist, was much less likely to heed automakers’ complaints about auto emissions policy (Montgomery and Marr 2008). The political environment had shifted to a point that action on fuel economy standards appeared to be imminent.

In December 2008, Congress passed a loan package of $13.4 billion for GM and Chrysler with a provisional four billion more available for GM in February 2009. Ford decided that it did not need loans from the federal government. The Obama administration was given considerable latitude to determine the conditions under which money would be released to the automakers. President-elect Obama broadly insisted that GM and Chrysler increase their fuel efficiency as a condition for accepting the loans (Sanger, Herzenhorn, and Vlasic 2008). Chart 5 documents the strategy shift that occurred in 2009 for General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford. It is important to note that the strategies shown in this chart all occurred in 2009 when President Obama was exerting pressure on the automakers. It is also important to emphasize that while General Motors and Chrysler accepted federal loans, Ford did not. Yet Ford’s strategy count with respect to environmental regulation is identical to the other auto manufacturers. Ford could have tried to differentiate itself to conservatives by showing how it did not need a government bailout as a way to sell more cars. Several of these strategies counted in 2009 came from statements by spokespeople for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers which represents all of the big three automakers.

Plans for a reduction in emissions started to form early in 2009. Representatives Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Edward Markey (D-MA) wanted emissions to be reduced by 20% from 2005 levels by 2020, while President Obama’s plan called for a 14% reduction by 2020 (Broder 2009). As GM was working on its restructuring plan that called for closing plants and cutting jobs, President Obama made it clear that GM had to produce small, fuel-efficient,
low carbon-emitting cars (Sanger and Vlasic 2009). President Obama announced that he would propose new nationwide executive rules for automobile emission and mileage standards that would take effect in 2012. The rules were officially proposed in September 2009 and they called for a forty percent increase in fuel efficiency for cars and light trucks sold in the United States by 2016. The new fuel efficiency standard will be 35.5 miles per gallon for cars and light trucks. A sixty-day comment period was set before the new regulations became final in early 2010 (Broder 2009).

The shift in strategy due to this sharp increase of political pressure was gradual at first but a clear break from the automakers historical opposition to increased fuel efficiency standards is evident. Dave McCurdy, president of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, depicted the beginning of the shift in strategy. “Has the industry lost its power to say no? It is saying, ‘yes, however … let’s work it out.’ It’s a different starting point in the discussion. The nature of the industry has changed” (Kindy and Marr 2009). A spokeswoman for the Alliance of Automobile Industry also signaled a willingness to compromise while she noted that lawsuits against states regulating greenhouse gases where still in place in the beginning of 2009.
“The suits are still there. But she added, “We’re the first to say we would like to find a better way forward” (Mufson and Eilperin 2009).

The shift in strategy became clearer as the automakers perceived that their ability to say no was rapidly evaporating. Ford issued a statement, “We are pleased that President Obama is taking decisive and positive action as we work together toward one national standard for vehicle fuel economy and the economy” (Mufson 2009c). This occurred despite the fact that Ford did not accept federal loans. Gloria Berquist, the spokeswoman for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, said, “This is an example of where the federal government has actually done something right. A year ago, we were facing piecemeal policies set out in by the EPA, DOT, and groups by different states. Our auto engineers cannot design vehicles to different standards” (Broder 2010).

The acceptance of loans certainly added to the pressure to come to the negotiating table to form a new federal standard. GM chief executive Bob Lutz said, “The federal government, which effectively owns about seventy percent of GM, must be heeded now” (Leahy 2009). The shift in strategy came when the final pieces of the puzzle that created inevitability of action were put into place. The acceptance of federal loans made GM and Chrysler susceptible to standards set by the Obama administration for the loans. Once Obama was elected there was a greatly increased chance of the signing of congressional legislation and/or the issuance of new regulations by the Environmental Protection Agency. This shift was summarized by Broder, “The industry position represents an about-face after years of battling tougher mileage standards in the courts and in Congress, reflecting the change in the political climate and the automakers’ shaky financial condition” (2009).

References


How a Changing Political Environment Shaped the Big Three, Corrado


How a Changing Political Environment Shaped the Big Three, Corrado

Washington Post, 21 September.


**Appendix 1: Sample of New York Times and Washington Post Articles That Were Coded to Determine Automakers’ Opposition to State Plans 1993-1998**


**Appendix 2: Sample of *New York Times* and *Washington Post* Articles That Were Coded to Determine Automakers’ Showing Support for a Multiple-State “Cleaner Car” if States Other Than California Agreed to End Their Plans for Emissions Regulations**


**Appendix 3: Sample of *New York Times* and *Washington Post* Articles That Were Coded to Determine Automakers’ Opposition to the Kyoto Treaty or Mandatory Federal Emissions Standards, 1993-1998.**


**Appendix 4: Sample of Articles in Which I Coded Ford’s Voluntary Greening, Opposition to Federal Standards, and Retreats from Pledges in a Lexis-Nexis Search from 1998-2006.**

How a Changing Political Environment Shaped the Big Three, Corrado


The Impact of Korean Unification on U.S. Involvement in the Korean Peninsula

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The unification of South Korea and North Korea is a goal which both governments claim is a high priority, but because each side sees unification differently it is unlikely to occur in a fashion that either foresee. Analysts differ greatly on how and when unification might occur, and on what the costs of unification will be and how those costs will be met. For the United States, unification has major implications both because of the longstanding military commitment to South Korea, and because unification would have a major impact on the balance of power with neighboring countries.  
Keywords: Korea, Unification, Reunification, East Asia, U.S. Military.

Probably no aspect of Korean politics gets more domestic discussion than that of national unification. The governments of each side (The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, herein referred to as North Korea, and the Republic of Korea, referred to as South Korea) each purport to have unification as a primary goal; South Korea has a Ministry of Unification, while North Korea’s policy statements are made by the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF). In South Korea, the primary bridge across the Imjin River to Panmunjom, built in 1998, is named the T’ong-il (Unification) Bridge; at the nearby recreation center of Imjingak, the Korean word “Tong-il” is actually set in stone (concrete paving stones, actually) in a walkway leading to another historic bridge. On the south side of Pyongyang in North Korea, the Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification spans the Tongil Expressway. This stone archway is designed to represent two women in traditional Korean dress holding up a sculpture of a unified Korea.

1 The terms “unification” and “reunification” often used interchangeably; their significance is that older Koreans see the joining of the two Koreas as a return to the status quo, while younger South Koreans see it as a new condition. The Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification uses 통일, which translates as “unification.”
Interestingly, in North Korea these dresses are called jeoson ot; in South Korea, they are called hanbok. Even in the names of clothing the two sides express themselves differently (Saccone, 56).

The Korean Peninsula has been separated since 1945 into the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). The history of this separation is well documented, although the North’s version of events differs significantly from that of the rest of the world. It is accepted on both sides that the partitioning of the Korean Peninsula resulted from the defeat of Japan, which had colonized Korea in 1910, but the motivations of the United States and the Soviet Union in establishing their presences there are disputed. While the Soviet Union no longer exists, the U.S. has maintained a presence in South Korea as part of the United Nations Command, which was established in 1950 to counter the North Korean invasion of the South.

Studies over the last several decades have examined the scenarios, costs, and long-term results of unification/reunification of North and South Korea. There is no agreement on any of these aspects of Korean unification. Scenarios of unification compare the Koreas with the case of the East and West Germany (essentially the absorption of the East by the West), and the Vietnam model, which is military conquest of the South by the North.

Most assessments by Western (American) researchers assume that the failure of the North Korean regime will occur in the short term, generally within ten years of the time of the study. This time period was used in the 1980s, the 1990s, and is still being used today. Assessments by (South) Korean researchers tend to take a longer view of 30-50 years. These South Korean estimates generally assume that a unified Korea will be one in which the North is absorbed by the South, much as East Germany was integrated into a unified Germany which operates as West Germany did; the proposals offered by North Korea tend to foresee a confederation in which the North would maintain its current political structure in a confederation of the two sides.

The development of relations between North and South Korea will greatly shape the American role in East Asia. Unification of the Koreas is foreseen as an event that could greatly reduce the need for military forces (both Korean and American) there, or which would require an even greater commitment on the part of the United States to ensure the security of that region.

Overview of This Study

Most studies on Korean unification fall into three broad categories: methodological analyses which provide frameworks into which estimates can be input to derive cost estimates; short-term estimates of what will be required
in the event of sudden regime failure or regime change in North Korea; and longer-term estimates of the eventual cost of Korean unification. Some broad comments can be made of these three types.

The purely methodological estimates (Chun 1995; Piazolo 1997; Noland, Robinson, and Liu 1998; Noland, Robinson, and Wang 1999; Auerbach, Chun, and Yoo 2004; Wolf 2002; Wolf and Akramov 2005; Funke and Strulik 2005) generally dismiss concerns over military demobilization, seeing a reduction in military expenditures as a cost savings without addressing the problems of having hundreds of thousands of unpaid trained soldiers unemployed. While these people could eventually be used in a workforce, in the short term they would be a security threat and the possible basis for an armed insurgency.

These methodological descriptions generally attempt to apply the German model to Korean unification. There are problems with this. The two German states had never fought against each other, the borders were relatively open (when compared with the Koreas), and German unification was supported by the major powers (the United States and the USSR). While the two German states were unequal in their economic development, they were not as far apart as the two Koreas. Integration of the two German states has not been painless. It has resulted in a perception by many former East Germans that they are considered to be second-class citizens. Still, the divergence has not been as great as that seen by North Korean defectors to South Korea (Yang 2011, 22).

In the second case, the likelihood of North Korean regime failure has been broadly disproven over time. One of Samuel Huntington’s measures of governmental success is regime duration. As noted above, the Kim regime in North Korea has survived 12 American presidencies. Nevertheless, many see the failure of the regime in the North as inevitable, and coming in the short term (Stares & Wit 2009).

The third category of studies, generally made by the South Korean Unification Ministry but also supported by a few Western researchers, take a longer view of Korean unification. These studies do not see Korean unification as a repeat of German unification, and not as a process that will necessarily happen in the short term.

Overall, the methodologies to calculate the costs of Korean reunification vary significantly. Estimates range from hundreds of millions of dollars per year, to trillions of dollars over decades, and calculations are speculative due to the lack of reliable data on North Korea’s economy.

Most American research, especially that funded by many think tanks (e.g., The Hudson Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, the American Enterprise Institute) is based on a belief that the failure of the regime in the North is imminent, and this research stresses the need for a strong American involvement and military presence on the Korean Peninsula once the
government of North Korea fails. Others, like Selig Harrison of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Martin Hart-Landsberg, take the view that what might be best for American interests is not best for the interests of a reunified Korea, and that an American presence would make successful reunification less likely.

Assumptions and Observations

The estimates of the cost of Korean reunification vary widely, from estimates of $200-300 million annually, to those in the tens of trillions of dollars over many decades. The low-end (less expensive) estimates appear to be based on the assumption that after reunification, neither side will need to support the large military expenditures it had before unification, and that large savings can be made from military cutbacks. A major problem with this is that if the estimated one million North Korean military personnel are demobilized and simply lose their jobs, a situation like that which occurred in post-invasion Iraq could result. The insurgency which might follow would make successful reunification impossible. This is sometimes dismissed with a prediction that the newly-unemployed former military personnel would make up a large labor force, bringing down labor costs and thus stimulating the Korean economy.

The alternative to demobilization, which would mean integrating the military forces of the North and South, would result in a unified military of over 1.6 million people, armed with vast amounts of artillery, sophisticated aircraft, large numbers of submarines, and nuclear weapons. This would be unacceptable to China, especially if the United States remained involved militarily on the Peninsula. Conservative American researchers (Eberstadt 1997; Stares & Wit 2009) use this as the justification for a “stabilizing” American presence in post-unification Korea; others like Harrison counter that this is why the U.S. must be prepared to leave.

With all the possible scenarios and variables involved in this question, no single study can hope to come up with a final answer. In reviewing studies already completed, the most common was the belief that the failure of the Kim dynasty in North Korea is imminent. When one considers that this regime, which began in President Truman’s time (1948) and has existed through the administration of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama, perhaps failure should not be assumed, at least in the short term. The North Korean regime was established 14 years before Fidel Castro led the Cuban revolution.

One of the premises of this study, and the others cited, is that Korean unification will take place eventually. Although the regimes of Kim Il Sung
and Kim Jong II were maintained for over 60 years, the stresses brought about by failed socialism, nature, and a growing awareness in North Korea of its situation relative to other countries continue to pressure the regime. Nevertheless, a transition to the third generation, leadership by Kim Jong Eun, has begun and this third-generation leader of the new Kim Dynasty appears to be unchallenged. This makes the assumption of failure of the regime in the North questionable.

The “Arab Spring” of 2011 demonstrates that regimes long in power can be brought down through popular uprisings, as seen in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. However, other regimes (Iran and Syria) have resisted such internal pressure. The successful popular movements have generally credited social communications networks for the ability to coordinate group actions; these networks are not widespread in North Korea. Earlier domestic uprisings against authoritarian governments, such as the 1989 overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu, took place without modern communications, but in societies far freer than North Korea.

Other partitioned countries have reunited, including Vietnam, Germany, and Yemen. The means by which these reunifications have occurred vary widely, from military defeat in the case of Vietnam, to political collapse in the case of Germany, to political accommodation in the case of Yemen. A variety of scenarios under which the Koreas would unite have been proposed. Many of these include the collapse of the Kim dynasty in North Korea. In the early 1990s, the former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, The Honorable Choi Kwang Soo, wrote of the consequences which would result “if Kim Jong-II fails to secure a stable power basis in the post Kim Il-sung period and a power struggle erupts” (K. S. Choi 1992, 48). As with many of the more recent predictions of North Korean regime failure, Minister Choi has been proven wrong.

The Vietnamese model of unification, i.e., military conquest of one side by the other, would be the most destructive, least desired, and probably the least likely scenario. A commonly-cited casualty figure is that the first 24 hours of open conflict in Korea would result in hundreds of thousands of casualties in the South, and billions of dollars in damages. While a renewal of the Korean War is possible, the resulting devastation would set back the progress made in the South, and would lead to the defeat of the North in short order. Rather than China supporting North Korea as it did in the 1950s, China would more likely attempt to discourage overt military action by the North because military action by the North against the South would result in instability, which China wishes to avoid (Fuqua 1998, 137).

The German model of reunification would involve regime failure on the part of either North Korea or South Korea. Given the economic and diplomatic
success of the South as compared with that of the North, only regime failure in the North will be addressed in this study. Such failure could occur over a relatively short period, as postulated by many American researchers (Byman and Lind 2010, 44-74) or over a protracted period as envisioned by most South Korean researchers. Assuming that South Korea would remain intact to assist the North, a nonviolent reunification would result in the issues of the assimilation of North Koreans, education, dealing with the conflicting ideologies, nutrition, and of course the cost to bring about long-term stability.

Most observers believe that North Korea’s economy has significantly deteriorated since the 1990s. Famines have exacerbated the problems and further withered the state. Despite the numerous economic and social problems, North Korea continues to spend a large amount of its budget on military expenditures and its nuclear weapons program. Along this unsustainable path, some researchers believe that North Korea may soon be forced to economically integrate or reunify with South Korea. This study identifies several methodologies which estimate the costs of possible scenarios for reunification of North Korea and South Korea. It does not address the humanitarian issues of famine in North Korea, or the internment of hundreds of thousands of North Koreans in prison camps there.

Review of the Literature

A review of research reveals many two general approaches used to calculate the costs of Korean reunification, and these methods and their predictions have changed over time. These consist of short-term estimates using the German model of unification, and the longer-term approach used primarily by South Korean researchers. A third alternative, not discussed extensively in this article, would be an assumption that unification will not occur in the foreseeable future.

In 1993 Kang Suk Rhee estimated that a sudden collapse of the North Korean government would require “$816.7 billion (in 1990 dollars) over the ten-year period 2001-10” to raise North Korean productivity to 60% of South Korea’s, with South Korea spending between $46.05 billion to $47.88 billion annually for the first four years (Jeffries, 748). As Rhee noted in another study, this estimate was based on a Korea Development Institute (KDI) estimate of a German-style collapse of the North Korean regime, a scenario Rhee found unlikely (Rhee, 360-75). Rhee noted that while the two Germanys accepted American and Soviet involvement in their movement toward unification, both Koreas have rejected foreign interference. The North sees such involvement by the United States (which it identifies as an imperialist aggressor) and by Japan (which colonized the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945) as
intolerable, and the South wishes to avoid having this issue as a barrier toward any progress that might be made (Rhee, 364). Rhee pointed out that each Korea has proposed its own plan for reunification; the North desires a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK), while the South wants a Korean National Community Unification Formula (KNCUF). One fundamental difference between these approaches is that the DCRK would be a state, while the KNCUF would be a process (Rhee, 367). Of course, each side is suspicious of the other.

Writing soon after Rhee and Jeffries, Hong Tack Chun employed a “gradual integration approach” to examine the implications of Korean unification. Like Rhee, Chun did not foresee any success in a sudden unification in Korea, but instead of Rhee’s explanation of the involvement of outside powers, Chun pointed out that although the economies of the Germanys were widely separated, the difference between the economies of North and South Korea are far greater. For this reason he proposed a more gradual process. A gradual integration of North and South Korea would decrease the fiscal burden of reunification because North Korea is considerably worse off than South Korea, noting that it will take a considerable amount of time for North Korean wage levels to reach those of South Korea.

However, Chun noted that targeting for a zero income gap is unrealistic. He cited the European Union as an example of regional integration; within the European Union, per capita income disparities exist. Chun asserted that the Korean economies could be integrated without serious economic problems with North Korean per capita income only 40-60% of the levels in South Korea. He wrote that it would take approximately 20 years for the income ratio to increase to 0.4 and 28 years for the income ratio to increase to 0.6. Therefore, a smooth economic integration of North and South Korea would take about 20-30 years.

The vast differences in the economies of the two Koreas, and the steady progress of the South relative to the North, was the basis of Marcus Noland’s “Some Unpleasant Arithmetic Concerning Unification” in 1996. Noland raised the concern that following an economic collapse in North Korea, migration to the South could result in problems. He calculated that “assuming that a person carrying some belongings could travel 20 miles a day, 40 percent of the population of North Korea lives within a 5 day walk of the DMZ.” His recommendation to the South Korean government was to maintain the Military Demarcation Line as a barrier, and to “encourage capital investment in the North to lessen the incentive to migrate” (Noland 1996, 2). This reinforcement of the Military Demarcation Line is, in fact, what the South foresees in the event of a collapse in the North.
As others have noted, the economic success of South Korea has far outpaced the North. This increasing gap will lengthen the time required for unification, and increase its cost. Noland proposed various scenarios to reduce the gap; South Korea should plan for massive capital inflows to North Korea which would greatly increase its productivity, while simultaneously reducing South Korean economic growth. These scenarios include capital investment of as much as $3 trillion over ten years leading to economic growth in the North of 30 per cent a year. The increased growth rate in the North, when combined with the slowing of South Korean growth, would then make economic integration easier. What Noland did not address in this short essay is the operationalization of such scenarios, which would involve severe taxes on the South Korean population. The prospect of reduced economic growth is, to those younger South Koreans beginning their careers, less desirable than unification with North Koreans they do not see as family.

Marc Piazolo echoed the concerns raised by Rhee regarding any comparison of Korean unification to German unification. The relative scales of the German economies was not as divergent as the economies of the Koreas; personnel interchanges were much more frequent between East and West Germany, and trade between the German states was much higher than that on the Korean peninsula. Piazolo repeated the concern that the longer Korean unification is delayed, the more it will cost; using the ten-year prediction, he estimated a cost to South Korea of $270 billion annually (Piazolo 48-63). He estimates that easing of tensions could result in military cutbacks of $10 billion a year to South Korea. Nevertheless, Korean unification will be much more costly than German unification was.

Also writing in 1997, Nicholas Eberstadt stated that “the North is soon likely to implode, its economy deteriorating as its weapons of mass destruction accumulate” (Eberstadt 77-92). While not providing any quantitative estimate of the cost of Korean unification, Eberstadt stated that unification can greatly reduce the military expenditures on the peninsula since massive demobilization on both sides will “releas[e] hundreds of thousands of military personnel for economically productive undertakings” (Eberstadt 86). He suggests that the greatest contribution the U.S. will be able to make will be in security; “Just as the U.S. military commitment to the South has been the sine qua non (italics added) of deterrence on the peninsula, a vibrant U.S.-South Korean security relationship in a united Korea will be critical to the success of reunification” (Eberstadt 91).

In his very thorough study of Korean culture Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War, Roy Richard Grinker went beyond methodological estimations of the cost of unification, and examined some of the basic assumptions about what unification would mean to each side. His
conclusion was that while the South sees unification as “the southern conquest and assimilation of the north” (Grinker 1998, 10), the North envisions a joining of the two Korean cultures as they exist now. Grinker also examines the generational differences as South Koreans see the results of unification; older South Koreans see unification as “an endpoint something to achieve before death” while younger South Koreans see it as “an event … a place from which to launch an autonomous and authentic Korean history” (Grinker 1998, 20).

This bifurcation raises a major issue between the generations; while older (South) Koreans see the opportunity for unification decreasing as they near the end of their lives, younger South Koreans would take the more pragmatic approach of delaying unification until the North Korean economy has improved to the stage where the cost of unification would be lower, since it is the South that will have to bear the bulk of the financial burden.

In 1998, Noland, Robinson, and Liu addressed “The Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification: Alternate Scenarios”. These authors used a behavioral model to maximize South Korean income and peninsular income, allowing them to examine the distributional effects within South Korea. Their ideal scenario of unification produced positive net benefits to South Korea, “characterized by low levels of South Korean private investment in North Korea and high levels of North-South labor migration” (Noland et al 1998, 801-814). In their model, reunification would have resulted in North Korean income dropping in most cases.

These authors conclude that economic integration may result in higher levels of income and wealth inequalities in the South; however, redistribution provides for higher incomes and everyone in South Korea would be better off with unification than without it. As with the other estimations, this all takes place without military conflict.

Norman Levin examined South Korean public opinion in his “The Shape of Korea’s Future: South Korean Attitudes Toward Unification and Long-Term Security Issues” in 1999. Comparing data from 1996 and 1999, he noted a diminishing level of regard toward Americans and increasing respect for the Chinese; he also found that South Koreans were becoming less enthusiastic about the idea of swift unification. In 1999 more than 45% of respondents felt that unification would be more than 10 years away, or would never happen; this has been proven true (Levin 1999, 10). At the time this was written (five years after the death of Kim Il Sung and two years after Kim Jong Il had assumed full power as ruler in the North), South Koreans had begun to feel less insecure about threats from the North and concerns were developing about the U.S. provoking insecurity through its hard line toward Pyongyang. By 1999 South Koreans were becoming somewhat doubtful of their country’s long-standing security relationship with the United States (Levin 1999, 44).
The following year, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung surprised the U.S. by traveling to Pyongyang for a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il, after which Secretary of State Madeline Albright also visited Pyongyang with an American delegation.

As these events occurred, Robert Dujarric wrote that “the nature of the North Korean state makes it difficult to affirm with any certainty that it can survive the next decade or even the next 12 months. Therefore, policy-makers should be prepared for a sudden collapse.” (Dujarric 2000, ii) He advised that the U.S. should prepare for a “large and prolonged U.S. military presence in Korea and Japan after Korean unification.” Dujarric envisioned the collapse of North Korea as a situation in which farmers are able to increase productivity, but where factory workers and the North Korean military are unemployed (Dujarric 2000, 14). The American experience with the demobilized Republican Guard in Iraq during the second war there indicates that simply releasing a large military force is unwise. Dujarric makes the interesting comparison of Korean unification to the Union victory in the American Civil War, pointing out that the Civil War is a better model than German unification because East and West Germany never fought each other. Citing Grinker, Dujarric feels that unification will be seen in the South as a victory over the North; others see that a maintenance of some degree of separation between the two sides after the collapse of the Northern regime would be advisable.

One point Dujarric addressed is that of dealing with the ousted leadership. “Should the leaders of the ruling party be prosecuted for their crimes? How should torturers, camp guards, and other lesser criminals be punished? Should some, or all, members of the party be banned from politics?” (Dujarric 2000, 17) Other states have faced this; South Africa has dealt with its apartheid past through its Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the new governments brought into power during the Arab Spring of 2011 will have to deal with similar issues. Other issues, such as property claims by Koreans on both sides wanting a “right of return” will actually be closer to the claims Palestinians make against Israel. Dujarric concluded that some agencies in the U.S. (the Pentagon, etc.) will advocate a strong U.S. military role in a unified Korea, while others (Congress, the Department of Commerce, and U.S. Trade Representative) will focus on economics and trade (Dujarric 2000, 68). The end of a military threat may lead some to seek reductions in military spending, in the way a “peace dividend” was expected in the U.S. in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Dujarric notes that the financial burden to the South after unification will likely bring any Korean support to U.S. forces (Host Nation Support, etc.) to an end (Dujarric 2000, 78). If U.S. forces are not permitted to remain in Korea, Dujarric states, they would have to relocate to Japan. This would not be welcomed, and likely not permitted, by the Japanese.
In 2002, Charles Wolf gave a very optimistic prediction of the costs of reunification, stating that “[i]f the process of reunification is negotiated sensibly and managed carefully, the ensuing cost burden imposed on the South and its allies can be limited to a sum that is less than one-tenth of the conventional estimates!” (Wolf 2002, 203) He noted that the literature has projected costs as high as $2-3 trillion, about five or six times South Korea’s gross domestic product in 2002 figures. However, he asserted that these costs may be reduced by pursuing several principal offsets and economic goals. This is based on the assumption of significant military downsizing after unification. Noting that North Korea employs over one million people in the armed forces (about 30-40% of the North Korean GDP), Wolf concluded that $13-15 billion could be saved annually after reunification due to military downsizing.2

Wolf also noted that South Korea’s military is also a substantial size at approximately 600,000 people; this brings the total military forces on the Korean peninsula to about 1.7 million people. He suggests that an additional $2-3 billion could be saved annually if the unified Korean military downsizes. Ideally, he envisions a total military force of approximately 400,000 people to garner the given amount of savings. While this is nice in theory, downsizing on this scale would at first lead to widespread unemployment in the unified nation, leading to a labor surplus and downturn in wages. Writing in 2002, Wolf did not know the results of demobilization of the Iraqi military after the U.S. invasion, and the resultant insurgency that developed.

Wolf does assert that economic growth after reunification requires realistic goals—sufficient, but not excessive. For example, while the goal of doubling per capita income in North Korea over five to seven years is reasonable, an equalization of per capita income between North and South Korea over the same amount of time is excessive. He argues that if realistic goals are set early in the reunification process, total capital costs of achieving those goals should not exceed four to five times North Korea’s GDP.

Wolf concluded that some $75 billion could be saved in his proposed military build-down; he estimates the costs of reconstruction in the North at $200 billion, arriving at a net reunification cost of $125 billion. He assumed that half of this total may come from private foreign capital and the other half would be paid for by public capital transfers from South Korea, Japan, the United States, the World Bank Group, and the Asian Development Bank.

2 North Korea’s armed forces (1,106,000 personnel) are ranked as fifth-largest in the world, behind China, the U.S., Iran, and Russia. South Korea is ranked sixth, with 653,000 personnel. As a percentage of population, North Korean armed forces represent 4.5% of all North Koreans, while the South’s military is 1.4% of its population. (Globalfirepower.com, accessed July 10, 2012)
More recently, writing for the Council on Foreign Relations, Stares and Wit address the various scenarios under which Korea would be unified, and focus on unification without war. They do address the issues of refugee assistance and humanitarian needs in the North, and conclude with a policy recommendation that the U.S. should not attempt to undermine the Kim regime in the North, but instead try to encourage that regime toward behavioral change (Stares and Wit 2009, 29).

Many of the assumptions in the studies addressed above overlook the tenacity of the regime currently in power in North Korea. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind address this in “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea.” Byman and Lind point out that the Kim regime has developed institutions to limit public dissent, making any popular uprising (such as those seen in the Arab Spring) virtually impossible. They compare North Korean society to that of Middle Eastern states, pointing out that North Korean nationalism is much stronger because of the long-standing restrictions imposed there. The anti-American inculcation begins in primary school; Byman and Lind quote a mathematics textbook: “The brave uncles from the Korean People’s Army destroyed six tanks of the wolf-like American bastards. Then they destroyed two more. How many did they destroy altogether?” (Byman and Lind 2010, 54). This level of public indoctrination is generally ignored or overlooked in many of the purely methodological analyses of Korean unification, and must be recognized as a barrier to any idea of public uprising against the Kim regime in the North.

Jacques Fuqua’s Korean Unification: Inevitable Challenges cites a 2009 study proposing a three-stage reunification model which would involve a 15-year period of transition, followed by 10 years of integration, and 12 years of “maturity” (Fuqua 1998, 153). This is more in keeping with the long-term approach envisioned by South Korea’s Ministry of Unification.

Scott Snyder, Director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at The Asia Foundation, wrote in early 2011 describing the differences between German unification and the possible Korean scenarios, noting that German unification was a negotiated process in which East German authorities accepted that they had “lost legitimacy in the eyes of the East German people to govern effectively” (Snyder 2011, 41-47). This is very different from the North Korean survival strategy explained by Byman and Lind.

Snyder sees the U.S. and China as key players in any set of circumstances which would bring about Korean reunification, noting that China was willing to support the government of the North even after the military provocations of 2010 (the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong-do) because China values peace and stability in the region, because stability furthers its (China’s) economic interests.
Non-Western Analysis

Many of the analyses reviewed above have been disproven by the events since they were prepared, so one generalization that can be made is that predictions are usually unreliable. One more detailed, and recent analysis comes from the Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification; consisting of a set of estimates, this report provides short-term (10-year), mid-term (20-year), and long-term (30-year) scenarios and expectations. All of these are based on the assumption of North-South agreements on the elimination of nuclear weapons and a peace agreement between the two sides (통일, 어떻게 준비할 것인가?, 12).³

In the short term, with the assumption that the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of people in the North is 21% of those living in the South, and assuming that the South will have to provide living expenses and medical support to the North, this study estimates that the first year of unification would cost between $47 billion and $213 billion (통일 22; see footnote 3). At the upper level, these equate to 6.8% of the GDP of the South and 59.9% of the GDP of the North, considerably higher than the percentage cost to East and West Germany.

This study notes that public support for unification in South Korea is decreasing; in 2007 21% of respondents in a survey saw “no need” for unification; by 2011 this had risen to 70%, based largely over concern for the cost to South Koreans (통일 27; see footnote 3). The study details past unification cost estimates, which range from a few hundred billions of dollars to Marcus Noland’s 1996 estimate of $3.172 trillion. The study does point out that some of the estimates of German unification were wrong because East German assets were overestimated. The Unification Ministry study does forecast significant long-term savings in defense spending; South Korea currently spends nearly 3% of its GDP on defense and the study estimates this could be cut to 1.5%. If unification occurred in the short term, this could lead to a defense budget reduction by 2040 of $585.3 million annually.

Another publication by the Korea Institute for Unification (J. Choi 2011) echoes the declining South Korean interest in national unification, citing studies which showed that 91.4% of South Koreans surveyed in 1994 supported it, with this number falling to 83.9% in 2005 and 76.6% in 2010. In particular, younger South Koreans see unification as an event that will impact negatively on them personally (J. Choi 2011, 23).

Andrei Lankov’s extensive writing on Korea has led him to the conclusion that unification is not a reasonable expectation (Lankov 2012). This is based

³ This document is only available in Korean; its name translates as “Unification, how will it be achieved?”
more on what he sees as a realization on the part of South Koreans that the
cost of Korean unification is too great to be borne all at once by South Korea;
in other writings he goes on to say that phased unification is also impossible
because once North Koreans recognize the standard of living that is available
in the South, they will not want to delay full unification.

**America’s Role in Korea for the Short Term**

The role for the United States in a unified Korea is not certain. In the short
term, the U.S. can expect to remain on the Korean Peninsula as part of a
deterrent force against North Korean aggression; conversely, North Korea
cannot be expected to give up its nuclear capability, because the leadership of
the North sees this nuclear capability as its guarantee of security. The plans of
the South Korean Unification Ministry set North Korean denuclearization as a
precondition to movement toward unification, resulting in an impasse which
precludes any short-term solution. Thus, military planners should not expect to
see any decrease in tensions on the Korean peninsula.

As the Korean population ages, the portion of South Koreans who hold
unification as a necessary achievement will diminish because it is older South
Koreans who most strongly desire rapid unification. As this older generation
passes away, popular pressure for unification and the sacrifices it would
require will diminish (Levin 1999, 10). In the 30- to 50-year timeframe
envisioned by South Korea’s Unification Ministry studies, popular support for
unification will further erode.

At the time of this writing, the third generation of the modern Kim
Dynasty is establishing itself in Pyongyang without any of the internal
struggles predicted by those observers who foresaw a collapse of the regime.
Although Kim Jung Eun did not have as long to be groomed for his leadership
role as his father Kim Jong-Il had, he does appear to have the support of the
North Korean military and political leadership. Although this youngest Kim
received a foreign education in Switzerland, there appears to be no reason to
expect that he will digress from the policies of his father and grandfather in
terms of maintaining North Korean security.

Under these conditions, the most significant change in the role or status of
the United States on the Korean Peninsula will likely come from the South
Korean populace as the generation which remembers the role of the U.S. in
protecting Korea ages and dies, and is replaced by a generation which to some
extent sees the U.S. as an occupying force left over from a Cold War which
Korea did not cause.
References


Leaving the Classroom to Stay in College: Investigating the Relationship between Model UN Study Away and Retention

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The escalating costs of higher education have generated an increasing emphasis on college retention rates as a metric to determine if public universities are being good stewards of student and taxpayer dollars. Emerging research suggests that study abroad programs, in addition to promoting cross-cultural skills, global understanding, strong interpersonal skills, and academic knowledge, may possibly impact a student’s decision to stay in college. Building on this research, we use a case study to explore the relationship between learning experiences during college programs outside of the classrooms, such as a study away trip, and student retention rates. We identify the benefits of the Model UN program at Augusta State University and its contribution to students’ college success and improvement of academic experience. Specifically, we examine the extent to which this program offers the critical components identified in the literature as factors that lead to increases in retention and persistence rates. We find that the Model UN program at ASU was successful in developing both academic and social integration, as well as increasing intellectual development. We suggest that Political Science departments invest in Model UN programs and other study away opportunities to increase retention and enhance student education.
analysts agree that strategic planning and effective teaching methods are factors in students persisting in education. Emerging research suggests that study abroad programs, in addition to promoting cross-cultural skills, global understanding, and strong inter-personal skills, may also impact a student’s decision to stay in college. This research suggests that study away programs in Political Science like Model United Nations or Mock Trial can potentially increase both the academic experience of the student, as well as persistence rates. Specifically, we study the relationship between learning experiences during a college program outside of the classroom and student persistence rates.

We will examine the extent to which a study away program at Augusta State University offers the critical components identified in the literature as factors that lead to increases in retention rates. We expect to find a positive relationship between students’ participation in a study away trip, such as the Model United Nations program, and students’ persistence toward their educational goals. In a still struggling economy, cheaper yet still academically rigorous study away trips provide a learning mechanism that the literature suggests will contribute to student success in college, specifically their persistence rates.

Our research adds to the literature by proposing that study away programs, in addition to study abroad trips, meet the requirements needed for students to persist and excel in college. We argue that in an ever-globalizing world, study away programs such as the National Model United Nations (NMUN) provide an exceptional educational experience. Further, NMUN provides an affordable option for many students to participate in an international competition about the international system, where they learn about negotiation, international relations theory, and how to think about these issues from the point of view of their assigned country. This potentially creates not just a well-educated student, but also a well-rounded individual, one with global sensitivity and a cosmopolitan understanding of international diversity.

Defining Student Success

Scholars have identified three measures of student success in college: retention, persistence, and attrition (Bean 1980; Hackman and Dysinger 1970; Nam and Folger 1965; Tinto 1975). Retention is a basic university measure of the percentage of students that continue in their education at the school, though calculated differently for various types of colleges and programs (Wild and Ebbers 2002). Persistence is a measure of the student’s desire and action to start and complete a degree (Seidman 2005). Attrition, related to both retention and persistence, refers to the decrease of the student body as a result of low retention rates (Hagedorn 2006). While negative attrition indicates
Students are not satisfied with their education and do not graduate or meet their expectations, positive attrition occurs when students still complete their goals and consider themselves successful (Fralick 1993). Students who are enrolled in college, but transfer to another school and students that discontinue their education after mastering a certain skill or meeting job requirements cause positive attrition (Polinsky 2003). Negative attrition, however, is associated with students who enter college with an already low high school GPA, or have no stated goals for college or a declared major (Fralick 1993). These students may also have problems scheduling school around their work schedule or may be unhappy with professors’ instruction methods (Polinsky 2003).

Despite variations in terminology, theories of college success incorporate factors that encourage students to pursue their education. Tinto’s (1975; 1987) Student Integration Model places responsibility for retention with both individual students and academic institutions. Together, the students and institution form a social and academic community, and students’ integration (or lack thereof) into this community plays a large role in retention. Tinto argues that students’ success in both academic and social integration determines attrition; a student who fails to be integrated into the college community is less likely to finish college. Measures of social integration include students’ interaction with peers and involvement in extracurricular activities, whereas measures of academic integration include GPA, the student’s assessment of the value of what they are learning as well as the extent to which they enjoy learning, and the student’s perception of how they are doing academically. Academic integration involves not just meeting academic standards, but identifying and embracing the norms in the academic setting. Interaction with faculty tends to help with both social and academic integration. In general, contact with faculty outside of class is found to be important in student academic development and the decision to remain in college (Endo and Harpel 1982).

Ashar and Skenes (1993) extended the Student Integration Model to non-traditional students, and noted that while social integration affects retention of these students, academic integration was found to have little effect. Commitment to learning, as well as intellectual development and culture, were unimportant to their sample of managers and potential managers. Allen et al. (2008) focus on students close to graduation and find that how well students connect with other students and the college at-large affects persistence. For two-year institutions, Deil-Amen (2011) similarly finds that this social connectedness makes students feel supported and contributes to their feeling of belonging and confidence, improving their overall college life.

Though institutions have a responsibility in increasing retention, students are also responsible for their decisions to persist in education. Students who clarify their academic and career goals and who believe that their education
will help them succeed in their career are more likely to return to school the
next semester (Luke II 2009; Pascarella and Terenzini 2005). Students’
motivation to succeed academically is also a factor in their persistence (Fralick
1993; Friedman and Mandel 2009). Students with low motivation to get good
grades are at a higher risk of dropping out. Others (Allen et al. 2008; Lotkowski,
Robbins, and Noeth 2004) find that pre-college academic preparation is important,
noting that high school GPA and rankings have positive effects on persistence.

Individual demographic factors such as race, gender, socioeconomic
status, and family support, have also been found to affect persistence (Tinto
1975). Other than Asians, minorities tend to have lower persistence rates
(Astin 1997; Murtaugh, Burns, and Schuster 1999). Results on gender are less
conclusive. While some find females have lower persistence rates (Polinsky
2003; Robertson 1991), others have found similar or even higher rates than
their male counterparts (Astin 1975; Lewallen 1993). Personal and financial
problems, high work demands, and attending school part-time, all negatively
affect persistence (Polinsky 2003). Financial support and socioeconomic status
also negatively affect persistence; students who work or experience financial
hardship are less likely to graduate (Lotkowski, Robbins, and Noeth 2004).
Allen et al. (2008) find that students with a higher socioeconomic status are
more likely to remain enrolled or transfer rather than drop out.

**Study Abroad Programs and Retention**

Study abroad programs foster relationships between students and faculty,
provide valuable out-of-classroom experience for students, and have a reputation
for creating well-rounded students with superior academic performance. Given
the previous insight on retention, it is clear why Metzger (2006, 167) calls
study abroad programs a 21st century retention strategy. Metzger notes that
students who participate in study abroad grow personally and develop
academically; these students perform better in school and benefit from the
unique social experience of being outside of the classroom with peers. Posey
(2003) finds a direct link between study abroad programs and increased
retention, noting students’ higher graduation rates and less time spent attaining
their degree. In another study abroad program, students who participated had a
64% greater chance of graduating within five years and over a 200% greater
chance of graduating in six (Hamir 2011, 4). The Rome Program of the
University of Dallas is another example of clear retention benefits; students
who participated persisted for almost one more semester than those who did
not go (Young 2003; Young 2007-2008).

Scholars mention social and academic integration, key features of Tinto’s
Student Integration Model, as part of study abroad programs. Young (2003)
Leaving the Classroom to Stay in College, Ginn, Albert, & Phillips

notes that students live in close proximity to each other and take the same classes, integrating them more with each other, both socially and academically. Young (2007-2008) also notes that informal interaction between the students and faculty, which develops academic integration, is critical to the Rome program. Dwyer (2004) noted that in addition to overall academic development, study abroad students also had an increased interest in academic study. Emanoif (1999) and Kitsantas (2004) find that study abroad programs increase life skills, academic experience, cultural views, and global understanding. Hadis (2005) found that students became more independent and more open to new ideas after studying abroad. Younes and Asay (2003, 143) note that study abroad consists of traditional learning of course material, but students also learn more about themselves and gain a deeper understanding of the world. Younes and Asay (2003) discovered that students benefited from strengthening preexisting relationships, opportunities for new relationships, and learning from other students. The large group aspect was also helpful for students; inexperienced travelers learned from the group, and students often enjoyed the diversity of others. Such group dynamics contribute to social and academic integration since they stimulate more personal and frequent peer and faculty interactions.

One of the most ambitious efforts to explore achievement of learning outcomes through study abroad is the Georgia Learning Outcomes of Students Studying Abroad Research Initiative (GLOSSARI). Richard C. Sutton and Donald L. Rubin were the principal investigators of the project that studied learning outcomes of study abroad participants in the 35-institution University System of Georgia. Initial findings were that those who studied abroad, when compared to those that did not, achieved higher scores on learning outcomes including functional knowledge, knowledge of global interdependence, cultural relativism, and world geography (Sutton and Rubin 2004). The final report from the decade-long project found that students who studied abroad had higher GPAs after returning, had higher graduation rates, and that the initial findings on increased cultural knowledge continued in the expanded sample (Sutton and Rubin 2010). Furthermore, the study found that study abroad was beneficial to academically at-risk students by providing needed focus to be successful.

In sum, study abroad programs integrate students socially with close living arrangements and opportunities to get to know both students and faculty outside the classroom setting. These programs also contribute to academic integration, as students are shown to be more intellectually developed, academically curious, and to have more interaction with faculty. While study abroad programs have been successful at increasing retention, not all students can participate due to financial constraints. Interestingly, very little research
has been done exploring whether shorter, less expensive trips within the United States are capable of fostering social and academic integration, too. Utilizing the knowledge we have regarding study abroad programs, we posit that other programs that involve a setting outside the classroom serve the same functions and meet the same goals as a study abroad trip. We hypothesize that study away programs have many of the attributes of study abroad programs that encourage retention, but do so at only a fraction of the cost. Using a descriptive case study method, we will explore a study away program in hopes of documenting the benefits of this type of programs in retention efforts. Specifically, we will describe a study away program at Augusta State University in the spring of 2011 that consisted of a seven-day trip to New York City, where 18 undergraduate students competed in the National Model United Nations. Utilizing demographic data combined with self-reported student data in reflective questions and essays, we intend to show that this program met many of the factors identified as having a positive impact on student persistence in college.

Case Study: National Model UN Study Away Program at Augusta State University

Located in the second largest city in Georgia, Augusta State University, a unit of the University System of Georgia, has an enrollment of just under 7,000 students. The average age for undergraduate students is 25. Minority enrollment currently stands at 34%. The university struggles with retention rates\(^1\) such that at the beginning of the fall semester of the sophomore year, ASU loses approximately 32% of the cohort that began the previous fall as freshmen. Further, when this cohort reaches the four-year graduation checkpoint, the graduation rate is a mere 5.3%, and only 14% graduate in five years, and 20.2% graduate in six years.

The ASU Improvement Plan identifies the lack of institutional connectedness as a primary factor in low retention. The only on-campus housing at the university is an apartment-style complex that accommodates fewer than 500 students. Based on survey data, students indicated that they did not actively participate in university life outside the classroom, either in student activities, sponsored events, athletic events or intramurals. The report suggests that students view ASU as a place to attend class and then go home. We argue that since our Model UN is a three-credit-hour program, students may enroll in the course for the academic credit, but the study away trip component facilitates a university life outside the classroom that provides connectedness

\(^1\) For the complete report, see http://www.aug.edu/vpaa/retention_graduation.pdf.
to the university, the faculty, and fellow students. The plan also identifies positive factors to increase retention that include faculty attitude toward students and the availability of teaching faculty outside the classroom. Again, we would suggest that the trip component of this course provides the students a unique view of the supervising faculty and facilitates social integration with students and academic integration with faculty in a way that cannot be achieved in the traditional classroom setting and is similar to what is found in study abroad trips.

While the National Model United Nations has been in existence for almost half a century, Augusta State had never participated in the program until 2011. Two Political Science faculty members partnered with the Study Abroad program office at ASU and developed the NMUN as a study away program. Collaborating with the Study Abroad program had several advantages, including the ability to offer course credit for participation, reduced administrative burdens for the faculty, and student eligibility for Study Abroad scholarship and fundraising programs to offset the cost of the trip. The decision to offer the program as a for credit course, unlike many schools that offer Model UN as an extracurricular activity, was critical to its success at ASU, where most students work and do not have the extra time to devote if the endeavor does not count toward their degree. The trip to NYC cost individual students under $1,500, although tuition for the course and living expenses while in NYC were additional. While the cost is not a trivial amount of money to our average student, it is still well below the cost of a Study Abroad trip and several students were able to participate in fundraisers and were awarded scholarships from the Study Abroad office to cover the entire cost of the trip.

The participants could enroll in either a 2000- or 4000-level Study Abroad course that could be course substituted accordingly for a lower- or upper-level Political Science course. The course met twice a week for one and a half hours each time. Students were expected to dress in professional attire for each class meeting to prepare them for the conference and to promote a group identity for the students. Coursework included reading multiple texts on the United Nations, parliamentary procedure, and assigned country. Other assignments included writing multiple drafts of position papers, public speaking exercises, and simulations. The final assignment was an assessment of the experience that included a list of open ended questions and a reflective essay. The student responses to these questions and reflective essays comprise the primary data source for this descriptive case study. These answers and essays were content analyzed independently by three coders for reliability.
Analysis

We assert that Model UN at ASU was successful in increasing intellectual development, as well as developing both academic and social integration. After a brief discussion of demographics and persistence, we will discuss the evidence supporting intellectual development, academic integration, and social integration. A total of 18 students participated in the National Model United Nations program at Augusta State University in spring 2011. There were a total of ten (56%) females and eight (44%) males. This was a slightly larger percentage of males when compared to our general population of students—65% female, 35% male. Of the students enrolled, five could be classified as minority in terms of race or ethnicity. The 28% minority figure in our sample was slightly below the 35% minority representation in our general student population. The students ranged in age from 18 to 33 with a mean age of 23. There were ten Political Science majors, two English majors, and then the remaining six students each had different majors including Business, Communications, Foreign Languages, History, Sociology, and undeclared.

To assess the impact of the study away program on retention, the most obvious measure would be individual student persistence in their education after completing the course. Clearly, it is impossible to determine causality in this scenario since we cannot isolate the impact of other contributing factors. Of the 18 students enrolled, four graduated in the same semester. We readily admit that participation in NMUN had little, if any, impact on the progress of these students towards graduation given the timing of enrollment. Of the remaining 14, eleven enrolled again at ASU the following semester, which is a 78.5% persistence rate. Of the remaining three students, two experienced positive attrition by enrolling the following term in other University of Georgia System schools. Further, the other student went on to attend a community college outside the state due to financial constraints. Of the 11 students at ASU in fall 2011, one graduated in December 2011, another two graduated in May 2012, and the remaining eight enrolled in classes at ASU for the fall 2012 semester. As far as intellectual development and academic performance, on average, the students that continued at ASU after Model UN achieved a tenth of a point increase in their cumulative GPAs from the semester prior to enrolling in Model UN to the semester after completing the course, a trend that remained a year after enrollment.

The raw graduation and persistence numbers suggest that the study away program may have a positive impact on these rates, but the small sample size severely limits our ability to make any broad conclusions. Further, gains in academic achievement are problematic in such programs due to the self-selection of participation (Hadis 2005). Thus, to isolate the program’s effectiveness more accurately for our small sample, we will look at student
perceptions of the program and its influence on their academic journey at ASU. After summarizing student improvement in terms of academic integration, we will explore social integration.

First, we look at the extent to which students perceived that the program increased their intellectual development and academic performance. Since academic integration includes the student’s assessment of the value of what they are learning as well as their perception of how they are doing in academically, we feel these self-reported measures are valid for our research purposes. In addition to the open ended directed questions, students were given a week after returning from the trip to write a reflective essay imagining that they had the opportunity to write a letter to their former, naïve self from the first day of class, describing the ways this class impacted their life. While the parameters of this assignment were much more open than the direct questions, the theme of enhanced academic skills permeated these essays as well.

We asked students to explain, if at all, the ways in which their writing skills improved as a result of NMUN. Sixteen students stated that their writing skills had improved as a result of participating in NMUN. Eleven students indicated that writing resolutions for the conference improved their ability to develop more concise and succinct statements, and four indicated that they learned how to write more diplomatically. In the reflective essays, one student said, “You will learn how to be a more concise writer as you will be forced to say a million things in a two-page position paper.” Another suggested that their research skills in general increased by stating, “I would encourage students that are looking for an opportunity to further develop their research skills while feeling uncertain of the outcome to take this class.” One student articulately summarized the academic integration occurring in the experience by writing, “… you develop many skills that are necessary and applied to daily experiences … and you also realize that the actual process of the work is more fun and advantageous than the final outcome.”

We also asked the ways in which their speaking skills had improved as a result of NMUN. Almost 90% of the students identified tangible ways their speaking skills improved. Eight said they were more confident, less nervous, or no longer scared of public speaking. Seven said that their overall abilities increased. Four said that the speaking style utilized in the class helped them to speak more concisely and choose their words more carefully. From the standpoint of the professors, we witnessed that the class speeches also helped the students become more acquainted with each other, enhancing social integration as well. If a student was nervous, others would offer encouragement to help them feel comfortable and confident. Outside of class, more experienced students helped those who struggled, and after each speech, classmates offered advice for improving the speech, both in content and in style.
Another specific skill we asked about was their negotiation skills. Again, almost all (16 of 18) students indicated that they saw significant improvement in their negotiation skills. Six students said they were better at negotiation generally, and five students said they enhanced their ability to work with others in groups. Four mentioned that they learned how to fulfill the role of consensus builder and to help facilitate discussion to find common ground. Three specifically stated they learned how to get their way or that they were able to stand strong on their position. While we categorized each of these skills as academic in nature, it is arguable that each represents a job related skill that will benefit the students after they finish their college careers.

The literature suggests that students who experienced intellectual development and increased motivation were less likely to drop out and that clarification or validation of school related goals tended to positively impact persistence. We measured this type of development by probing students about increased self-confidence and self-growth. All but one student felt that NMUN improved their self-confidence in some way. Many students felt more confident and less nervous about public speaking as a result of the numerous opportunities they were given to practice speeches and converse with international students. Being able to negotiate gave many students the confidence they needed to work in a group setting. A few students mentioned with great enthusiasm that this element of the class/trip had helped their confidence greatly, that it was something they had struggled with often, and that they hoped to continue this trend of confidence. One student mentioned how much it would aid her in being more active in class discussions. Another stated that “It helped my confidence the same way that going on study abroad to Paris helped.”

Another question asked students to discuss the ways they thought the experience made an impact in their life. The main themes covered in the students’ answers were the friendships made during the trip, the life experience gained, having a greater awareness of international affairs, the ability to speak in public more confidently, and the inspiration it gave to solidify future goals. One student commented, “It really is a big deal that I feel like I can talk in my classes now.” Another student wrote, “I learned to be more assertive. I learned that fun and work are a possible, real combination.” Finally, one referred to the occasion as “… a great cultural experience, the mere opportunities one gets to go outside of their own comfort zone and experience things new to them, the better off they will be.”

The reflective essays also included many references to increasing self-confidence and self-growth due to participation in the NMUN. In fact, several students explicitly mentioned overcoming fears due to their experiences in the class and on the trip. One student announced, “For the first time you will also
learn how to write a speech for the allotted time and learn how to deal with your public speaking fears.” Another reflected on overcoming life-long insecurities in writing, “You will finally realize that you do not sound nearly as stupid as you think you do, and you will acquire a sense of self-confidence in your abilities that you never had before. You will be comfortable being smart, which for so long has been difficult for you to do.” Several students articulated the fact that the experience helped them become more well-rounded, worldly, dedicated, and educated individuals.

Students also noted the importance of getting to know their professors outside the classroom, and this type of academic integration has been found to greatly increase student persistence. At ASU, because students do not participate in many activities outside of the classroom, it is more difficult to make student-faculty connections. The NMUN trip provided this opportunity and substantially increased the connections made between the students and faculty. Throughout the day, students interacted with their professors as they walked around the conference, checking in with each committee member and engaging in dialogue about the processes and happenings of the day. At the end of the day, the students met with their faculty mentors to debrief the day’s activities. These sessions were fairly informal and allowed each student the opportunity to bond with one another and gave the entire group, including the faculty, a sense of loyalty. Each day, the faculty dined with the students and took them out to popular places in NYC to fully experience the trip. During these outings, the students got to see their professors as more than teachers. Inside jokes were formed, hilarious and sometimes awkward moments provided great bonding opportunities, and eating and socializing together solidified the truly exceptional and fully integrated experience.

One of the most critical factors influencing a student’s decision to remain in college is a sense of social integration. Developing a sense of integration at ASU is an uphill battle. As discussed previously, many students view ASU as a place to take classes and then go home. With limited residential facilities on our campus, the vast majority of students live off campus; many commute from the home they share with their parents, and as a result, do not feel connected to the university in significant ways. We argue that by taking the students off campus as a group to compete in a conference where they directly represent the university, we were able to cultivate a sense of integration with their peers, faculty advisors and the university in general.

To explore this concept, we asked students to explain the ways they bonded with their classmates during NMUN. A majority of the students indicated that they acquired a sense of camaraderie during the NYC trip through group outings, hotel arrangements, and talking with each other about the experience of NMUN. Most believed they gained a better sense of each
other’s personalities as well as how better to work together. Several indicated that previous impressions and assessments made between students about one another changed in the course of the NMUN trip to NYC as some were seen to “come out of their shell.” Multiple students noted that the trip was a turning point in feeling bonded with other classmates and wished that they had felt that way before the trip.

Interestingly, we asked if the class developed a group identity by the end of the semester and after the trip to NYC; 16 out of 18 students felt that there was definitely a group identity formed. Those sensing a group identity felt it was formed by rooming with fellow students in such close quarters, spending an abundance of time with each other, enduring the process together, representing ASU, and by creating inside jokes. The majority of the students felt like they had bonded in ways they had not prior to the trip. The idea that the trip itself was necessary to cultivate cohesion and that the cohesion did not exist prior to the trip was a primary theme in the reflective essays. Multiple students indicated that things changed once they began the journey of the trip. One student noted, “The class dynamic greatly improved, I feel, once the trip began.” Another student indicated, “As for your classmates, you may be very distant from them and find some unapproachable, but that will change as soon as you make your way to New York. There will be a bond between you and the rest of your classmates by the time the trip is halfway done.” One student suggested that certain class members did not even know everyone’s names after being in a class of 18 students for three months, but that changed in New York where they could definitely see more cohesion.

Several students expressed regret that the camaraderie did not develop until the trip, in essence realizing what they had missed out upon with the lack of social integration early on. One student stated, “I most certainly bonded with my classmates; however, I had to wait until the trip to do so. I truly wish I was able to befriend many of them prior to the trip.” Further, one noted that “Your roommates are some of the funniest people you will ever meet, and you will regret that you only spent a week getting to know them better, rather than an entire semester. I wish that I had hung out with my NMUN classmates so much more before the trip.”

To further validate the sense of social integration that developed during the study away experience, it should be noted that several students explicitly used the word family to describe the bonds that developed on the trip. According to one student, “My favorite part (was) … being able to really get to know other people on a more personal basis. I gained a connection with people that I may not have otherwise even talked to.” The student continues, “Every one of us in this class has grown together in various ways because of our newfound connection with each other. We have grown to be like a family support
system for one another and that is just something that you cannot get anywhere else because it is priceless.” A fellow classmate echoed these points in writing, “The best part of the trip will be hanging out with everyone and getting to know each other better. This class and trip is an excellent opportunity to bond with your classmates and have a great time. The study away course is a great experience that differs from any other class. I feel the bond between our classmates was much stronger than in any of the other traditional classes that you have taken, it’s like you’re all one big crazy family.”

Discussion

This article has reviewed several ways retention and persistence rates can be increased on university campuses. The literature suggests that strong academic performance, academic integration, and social integration all positively impact a student’s decision to remain in college and that study abroad trips address a majority, if not all, of these variables. Our work suggests that it is perhaps beneficial to universities to establish less expensive study away programs in addition to study abroad programs, particularly at smaller institutions with a nontraditional, diverse, economically challenged student population like that of Augusta State University. In our study, we found that participating in the National Model United Nations increased student perceptions of their academic performance, both in writing and speaking capabilities. Additionally, the NMUM experience created a sense of academic integration, as well as social integration, providing students with a sense of belonging with each other, faculty, as well as the university, and through the context of investigating international affairs and diplomacy, with the globalized world at large.

Universities concerned about retention often look to student affairs programs first to solve the problem. We suggest that raising awareness of the importance of academic integration in retention is critical to help redirect resources towards successful academic programs like Model UN. In Political Science, we are fortunate to have multiple opportunities for students to study away. Successful programs include, but are not limited to: Model UN, Model Arab League, Model African Union, and the American Mock Trial Association competitions. Although our work has a small sample size, we are confident that continuing research in this area will validate the positive effects these types of programs have on persistence rates. We assume that many of our colleagues are directing similar programs at their universities and may be struggling to compete for resources to help enhance or grow these programs. We feel that establishing an empirical link between these programs and retention will be vital in elevating their importance to universities and should help attract resources. While not always possible, we also suggest that the
ability to offer course credit for participation will enhance the connection to retention and eventually to resources.

Furthermore, these types of simulated experiences offered in Political Science provide hands-on, real world experience where students get to engage in tactics and strategies of international relations and negotiation. Students learn about game-theory, strategies of negotiation, and theories of international relations in an academic sense, but by participating in simulations, these students also get to see at a practical level how the world operates and how the international system works. The game simulation environment provides students a realistic chance to test the theories they learn in class within a real world context. This is learning at its best, and as the literature suggests, this type of learning benefits both students and the campus by increased rates of persistence and retention. Additionally, theses program tend to help students transcend their parochial visions of life and allows them to edge more toward a cosmopolitan understanding of the international world order. In an ever globalizing world, this is a critical facet of the university education.

References


Dixie Rising?  
Revisiting the Classification of the Southern States in the 21st Century

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As arguably the most studied region of the United States, the South remains a popular focus for political science research given that the region uniquely provides the strongest level of support for Republican presidential candidates, hosts both party conventions in 2012, and stands witness to an ongoing top-down Republican realignment.

Our study initially recalculates Woodard’s (2006) classification of national, emergent, and traditional states in the South through 2010 Census data with findings that highlight the preeminence of Virginia, the rising status of North Carolina, and the intriguing case of Louisiana as an emerging state. Our study revisits some of the most popular classification systems and indexes utilized by social scientists to study southern politics. The popular Ranney index of party competition is calculated for the southern states from 2007-2011 along with a federal measure and a combined state/federal measure of party competition. Furthermore, Holbrook and Van Dunk’s (1993) measure of district-level electoral competition is updated for southern state legislatures from 2008 through 2011. This study concludes with an analysis of contested seats in the most recent election cycle for southern state legislatures. The state-level Ranney index as well as the federal measures and combined measures of party competition clearly highlight the trickle-down Republican realignment in the South. This realignment is in full force in southern state legislatures. The 2008 and projected 2012 battleground states of North Carolina and Virginia most closely approximate a “perfect” two-party competition score of .50 in the combined measures. For two-party competitive states in this study, distinct geographic areas of Republican and Democratic dominance can still be observed within...
those states. The top three states in terms of electoral competition (North Carolina, Tennessee, and Louisiana) all rank as two-party competitive and emergent states in this study, while the bottom three states (South Carolina, Arkansas, and Georgia) are modified one-party states. While district-level electoral competition has increased in most southern state legislatures from the 1980s to the present period, less than half of the legislative seats were contested in the most recent elections in five southern states, and overall competition scores remain anemic for many southern states. The lowest levels of electoral competition and the highest percentage of uncontested seats can be found in southern states with citizen legislatures.

The American South is arguably the most studied region of the United States by social scientists. The centrality of the South to the Civil War, Reconstruction, Jim Crow, segregation, and the civil rights movement has focused the attention of countless historians on the region. FDR noted during the Great Depression that the South was the nation’s number one economic problem (Woodard 2006, 14), but the transformative economic growth in the region over the last half century has sparked numerous economic studies of the South. Furthermore, the high violent crime rate and incarceration rate as well as the frequent application of the death penalty in the South has been described by historians, sociologists, and political scientists as the “southern subculture of violence.” Most recently, the collapse of the solid Democratic South and the trickle-down realignment of the region has been a hallmark of contemporary political science research.

Our study begins by reviewing several of the most popular classification systems and indexes utilized by social scientists to study southern politics. This research project updates those rankings and indexes with 2010 Census data as well as state and federal election data from 2007 through 2011. The results provide important insights about southern politics at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Classifying the Southern States

V. O. Key’s seminal work, Southern Politics in State and Nation, is certainly an appropriate work from which to begin our analysis. Key (1949, 5) argued “in its grand outline the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro.” Bullock (2010, 1) reminds us that Key’s observation “was not a commentary on black political influence, which was nonexistent,
but rather an acknowledgment that the region expended so much political capital to keep African Americans away from the levers of power.” Key called our attention to the critical classification of “black belt” counties, especially in the Deep South states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Key (1949, 5) wrote that “it is whites of the black belts who have the deepest and most immediate concern about the maintenance of white supremacy. Those whites who live in counties with populations 40, 50, 60, and even 80 per cent Negro share a common attitude toward the Negro.” Key (1949, 9-11) observed that “the black belts became bulwarks of Democratic strength” and black belt whites succeeded in presenting “a solid regional front in national politics on the race issue.”

In his analysis of the one-party system of the South, Key (1949, 298) reported that “factions of the Democratic Party play the role assigned elsewhere to political parties.” Key (1949, 299-301) outlined the classification of states with a tightly organized majority faction, bi-factional divisions, and then varying degrees of multifactionalism. Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee were characterized by a dominant faction, while Georgia highlighted a dual division and Mississippi as well as Florida reflected multifactionalism (Key 1949, 299-300). Key (1949, 300) confesses to the difficulty of classifying the factional politics of most of the southern states.

While V. O. Key provides an insightful and powerful analysis of the southern states that still resonates today, another view from across the states examines the level of two-party competition. Holbrook and La Raja (2008, 83) explain:

A measure of interparty competition developed by Austin Ranney (1976, 59-60) constitutes a widely used and long-standing indicator of competition for control of government. The Ranney index has several different components: proportion of success, duration of success, and frequency of divided control. Ranney used these three dimensions to calculate his index of interparty competition, which we have updated for 2003-2006. The index is actually a measure of control of government, with a score of 0 indicating complete Republican control and a score of 1 indicating absolute Democratic control. At its midpoint (.5000), control of government is evenly split between the two parties, indicating a highly competitive environment.

In their calculations of the Ranney party control index from 2003 to 2006, Holbrook and La Raja (2008, 83) discover the relative strength of the two
parties is nearly perfectly balanced across the 50 state governments: the fifty-state average is .510, the vast majority of states are classified as competitive two-party states, and the number of modified Republican states (11) is almost equal to the number of modified Democratic states (13). In reference to the American South, a clear party balance is evident with three states classified as two-party competition (Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia), four are categorized as modified one-party Democratic (Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina), and the final four southern states are modified one-party Republican (Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas).

Woodard (2006, 238) identifies the limited focus on state offices as the major drawback of the Ranney party control index. Woodard (2008, 238) proposes a Ranney party control index for federal offices with “the president as a substitute unit for the governor, and the U.S. Senate and congressional delegations as replacements for chambers in the state legislature.” Woodard calculates federal measures of southern party competition for 1948-2004 and a combined measure of southern party competition for 1948-2004 (average of state and federal calculations) which will be discussed later in this study.

In addition to measuring party control of state government, the Ranney index has been utilized by political scientists to study electoral competition across the states. Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993, 956) describe the folded Ranney index in which “the two noncompetitive extremes are brought together at the low end and the midpoint becomes the high point. The resulting index ranges from .5 (no competition) to 1 (perfect competition).” Calculation of the folded Ranney index is rather straightforward: 1 – absolute value (.5 – Ranney party control index). In contrast to the folded Ranney index, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993, 956) propose a district-level measure of electoral competition from state legislative election results based upon the percentage of the popular vote won by the winning candidate, the winning candidate’s margin of victory, whether or not the seat is “safe,” and whether the race was contested or not. In relation to the study of southern politics, the district-level competition measure for 1982-1986 places seven southern states (South Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, Texas, Mississippi, Georgia, and Arkansas) in the bottom ten states for electoral competition in state legislative races (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993, 957).

In their comparison of the folded Ranney index and the district-level indicator in terms of validity and reliability, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993, 961) find “the district-level indicator to be both empirically and intuitively superior to the Ranney index.” The authors (1993, 961) conclude that “the primary problem with the Ranney index is that it is based largely on aggregate party balance in state government, not on election results. Aggregate party balance is an important concept and clearly has implications for public policy,
but it is not the same as competition, at least not the type of competition that is relevant to the individual legislator.”

Van Dunk and Weber (1997) focus on two elements of electoral competition in state legislative races: marginal seats and contested seats. In their analysis from the 1970s to the 1980s, Van Dunk and Weber (1997, 155) discover that “marginal and contested races decreased in three-fourths of the states. Furthermore, there was almost a continual decline in the percentage of contested and marginal races from 1968 to 1988.” Increases in legislative compensation, the greater the percentage of incumbents running, and state legislative races during presidential election years are all associated with decreased electoral competition, while higher levels of electoral competition are positively associated with legislative expenditures, the percentage of chamber seats held by the minority party, and tax increases (Van Dunk and Weber 1997, 155-156).

In a study of five state legislative elections from 1988 to 1998, Squire (2000, 132) reports that an average of one-third of state legislative elections were uncontested, while the average in U.S. House elections was slightly less than 12%. In terms of regional differences, two-thirds of the state legislative seats in Arkansas were uncontested in 1996, while every seat in the Massachusetts state legislature was contested (Squire 2000, 132). Squire’s (2000, 141-142) multivariate analysis reveals that “more professionalized and higher paying legislatures enjoy a higher percentage of contested contests.” When partisan competition is lacking, a higher percentage of state legislative seats are uncontested, and region still matters with less electoral competition in the South compared to the rest of the nation (Squire 2000, 142). In their analysis of all state legislative elections from 1968-2008, Forgette et al. (2012, 302) using a logit regression model found that legislative professionalism “increases the likelihood that elections will be contested by both political parties.” Furthermore, Hamm and Hogan (2008) explore primary and general elections in twenty-five state legislatures from 1994-1998, and a logistic regression analysis reveals that stringent campaign finance laws increased the likelihood that a candidate emerges to challenge an incumbent.

The “one-party South” or “solid Democratic South” has been the overarching historical classification of the South with a focus in recent decades on the advancement of “trickle-down” realignment in the region and the emergence of two-party politics. When describing the GOP in the South, Black and Black (2002, 2-3) remind us that “nowhere else in the United States had a major political party been so feeble for so many decades.” Initial Republican success would come in presidential elections in the South. In fact, Woodard (2006, 224) emphasizes that 1944 was the last time that all eleven former Confederate states voted Democratic in a presidential election.
Black and Black (2002, 4) explain that the two “Great White Switches” from the Democratic Party to the GOP, “first in presidential voting and then almost a generation later in partisan identification, laid the foundation for highly competitive two-party politics in the South.” Black (2004, 1004) asserts that “for a variety of reasons—the rise of an urbanized middle class, the growth of the civil rights movement and federal intervention in civil rights during the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the activation of conservative white religious groups, and increased campaigning by Republican candidates in the South—the size of the Democratic majority among southern voters contracted enormously during the next three decades.” In their valuable work *The Rise of Southern Republicans*, Black and Black (2002, 370) note the Reagan presidency was a watershed event for southern politics: “Ronald Reagan’s presidency legitimized the Republican party for many white southerners. His southern legacy was immense. Reagan substantially expanded grassroots Republicanism and inspired many potential Republican politicians to seek office.”

Republican advancement in the South trickled-down from the presidential level to statewide offices to congressional seats and then into the state legislatures (Woodard 2006, 224). The dramatic realignment of the American South is particularly evident by examining congressional and state legislative seats over the last half century. Only 6% of U.S. House seats in the South were held by Republicans in 1952, but the number increased to 25% in 1976 and then skyrocketed to 58% by 2000 (Woodard 2006, 231). In relation to southern U.S. Senate seats, Republicans controlled no seats in 1952, almost a quarter of the seats in 1976, and then almost 60% by 2000 (Woodard 2006, 227). In his analysis of the ascension of Republicans in southern U.S. House elections, Seth McKee (2010, 15) points to “three sequentially and temporally interdependent factors: (1) growing Republican identification among white southerners, (2) the electoral effects of redistricting implemented prior to the 1992 elections, and (3) the emergence of viable Republican candidates who campaigned on a message that was in step with the view of white southerners.” Across the southern state legislatures, Republicans controlled 4% of state house seats and 2% of state senate seats in 1952, 11% of state house and 9% of state senate seats in 1976, and then 44% of state house and 42% of state senate seats in 2000 (Woodard 2006, 234-235). Bullock (2010, 9) reminds us that the “1994 elections marked a breakthrough as Republicans gained majorities in the Florida and Tennessee senates and the lower chambers of North and South Carolina.”

The significance of these changes should not be underestimated. Black and Black (2008, 241) emphasize:
Broadly considered, the most important structural change in American party politics has been the collapse of Southern Battlefield Sectionalism. As we concluded in 2002, “A newly competitive South means a newly competitive America.” The disappearance of enormous Democratic surpluses from the South—surpluses that were a steady feature of elections for president and Congress for more than a century—has reshaped national politics.

Bullock (2010, 4) succinctly notes “while today’s South is not nearly as solidly Republican as Key’s solid Democratic South, when the nation is closely divided, the South provides decisive support.”

In his introductory chapter entitled “Southern Politics in the Twenty-First Century,” J. David Woodard proposes a composite ranking of the southern states based upon 2000 Census data. Woodard (2006, 15-17) utilizes a total of eight social, political, and economic indicators for each state: total population, per capita income, diversity measured as the percentage of the population non-southern born, percentage registered voters, education measured as the percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree, gross state product, infant mortality rate, and unemployment rate. Based upon the rankings, Woodard (2006, 17-18) classifies the southern states into three categories: national, emergent, and traditional states. The national states (Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Virginia) “have a measure of economic and social development approaching that of the rest of the country. These states are at, or above, the national median in per capita income … In sum, they are larger and more prosperous than their southern cousins and in some ways have more in common with the rest of the country than their neighbors.”

The second category of emergent states includes North Carolina and Tennessee. Woodard (2006, 17) explains these states “have moved from the economic backwaters, and are well on their way to achieving national status. They have produced presidential candidates, and attract national media attention, but are still below the national average in per capita income and have pockets of poverty that are more reminiscent of Great Depression poverty than twenty-first century affluence.”

Woodard (2006, 17-18) also calls attention to the growing urban and innovation centers in the emergent states. The traditional states (Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) “still lag behind the national average when it comes to income, and retain some of the rural poverty so typical of the South fifty years ago. Vestiges of the racial, economic, and demographic divisions so familiar to those who know the South are in these states” (Woodard 2006, 18). Woodard (2006, 18) concludes that each of the
traditional states “has a historically high proportion of blacks and a strong agricultural tradition.”

The final classification of the South involves basic geography. As noted previously, the five Deep South states stretch from Louisiana to Mississippi to Alabama to Georgia to South Carolina. The remaining southern states are referred to as the “Rim South” or the “Peripheral South.” Bullock and Rozell’s (2010) *The New Politics of the Old South* includes chapters on the eleven former Confederate states as well as Oklahoma. The very red Oklahoma certainly matches its southern neighbors in relation to politics as well as culture. Sabato’s (2010, 58) analysis of voting behavior in the South includes the eleven former Confederate states plus Oklahoma and Kentucky. The addition of Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia produces the especially broad “Census South.” For this study, we focus on the standard eleven southern states that once comprised the Confederacy.

**Revisiting the Classifications of the Southern States**

Our analysis revisits several of the aforementioned classifications and indexes for analyzing southern politics. We begin by recreating Woodard’s composite rankings of southern states with 2010 Census data. Furthermore, we calculate the Ranney party control index for 2007-2011. We follow Woodard’s methodology by calculating a federal equivalent of the Ranney index and then a combined state and federal measure. Finally, we explore electoral competition across the eleven southern state legislatures for the 2008-2011 period with careful attention to the percentage of contested seats.

Table 1 highlights the rankings of the southern states in 2010 for the eight measures utilized in the Woodard (2006) study. The southern states are ranked one through eleven on the eight measures, and the composite ranking is simply the average of the eight scores for each state. Not surprisingly, the “national states” of Virginia, Texas, Florida, and Georgia rank as the top four. Virginia has the top composite ranking of 3.38 (the state ranked second in 2000). Virginia’s top ranking is driven by the highest per capita income of any southern state as well as the highest percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree and the second lowest unemployment rate for 2010. Texas is in second place with the largest population and economy of any southern state as well as the lowest infant mortality rate. In Woodard’s 2000 ranking, Florida was in the top spot, but the composite ranking of 4.00 in this study is weighted down by the high unemployment rate in the Sunshine State. Only the Carolinas had a higher unemployment rate in 2010 than Florida. Georgia ranked fourth in the 2000 and 2010 composite measures. Interestingly, Georgia has the second highest percentage of population with a college degree.
Table 1. Composite Rankings of Southern States, 2000 and 2010

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Registered Voters calculated for 2008.

IMR is from US Department of Health and Human Services for 2007.

UE Rate calculated for 2008.

IMR is from the US Department of Health and Human Services for 2007.

in 2010 among the southern states. This may well reflect the payoff from almost 20 years of the HOPE Scholarship and the in-migration of college graduates to Georgia.

There is no surprise with the bottom four “traditional” states in the composite rankings. Arkansas, South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi rank in the bottom four on the key economic measures of per capita income and gross state product. They are also four of the five smallest states in relation to population. Only South Carolina avoids a ranking in the bottom four in terms of percentage of the population with a college degree.

The “emergent” states in Table 1 of Tennessee and North Carolina reflect the 2000 classification. Tennessee had a composite ranking in 2000 of 6.0 and has slipped to 7.0 based upon 2010 data. Across the eight measures, Tennessee ranks no higher than 6, and ranks near the bottom in terms of the percentage of eligible voters who are registered.

Tennessee has clearly not advanced in position compared to its southern neighbors. A case can certainly be made that North Carolina is on the precipice of achieving “national” state status. North Carolina ranks in the top four across five of the eight measures in Table 1. Woodard (2006, 17) emphasizes that national states are targets in presidential campaigns. North Carolina is hosting the 2012 Democratic National Convention, which clearly reflects its national prominence and battleground status for Obama’s reelection campaign efforts. Although a case might be made for North Carolina as a national state, its composite ranking is clearly weighted down by a very high unemployment rate, only South Carolina has a higher unemployment rate across the southern states in 2010.

Louisiana presents an interesting puzzle in Table 1. Louisiana’s sixth-place ranking is largely driven by the low unemployment rate and high voter registration rate. In 2010, Louisiana boasted the lowest unemployment rate of any southern state. The oil and natural gas industry has clearly benefited the state. Nossiter (2009) points to the injection of more than $51 billion in federal aid after Hurricane Katrina as a key factor in the state’s low unemployment rate and construction boom. In 2000, Louisiana ranked fifth among southern states in terms of voter registration and that ranking moved to the top for the most recent year (2008) with available data. If the unemployment rate and voter registration are excluded, Louisiana’s composite ranking on the other six measures would be 8.33, squarely placing the state in the traditional states category. Therein lies the problem for the methodology employed by Woodard. With only eight composite measures, an exceptionally high ranking on one or two measures can skew the overall ranking for a state. Louisiana’s population ranking slipped from seventh in 2000 to ninth in 2010 compared to its southern neighbors. It is certainly problematic to argue that Louisiana has
Dixie Rising? Kristina LaPlant & James LaPlant

Table 2. State Measures (Ranney Index) of Southern Party Competition, 1956-2011

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Key:
.8500 to 1.000: one-party Democratic
.6500 to .8499: modified one-party Democratic
.3500 to .6499: two-party competition
.1500 to .3499: modified one-party Republican
.0000 to .1499: one-party Republican

become an emergent state in the wake of population loss from Hurricane Katrina, but the stimulus effect of massive federal spending in the Bayou State over the last several years should not be underestimated.

The popular Ranney party control index is reproduced in Table 2 for 2007 through 2011. Following the methodology of Holbrook and La Raja (2008, 83), we calculated the following:

- Average percentage of the popular vote won by Democratic gubernatorial candidates
- Average percentage of seats held by Democrats in the state senate, in all legislative sessions
- Average percentage of seats held by Democrats in the state house of representatives, in all sessions
• Percentage of all gubernatorial, senate, and house terms that were controlled by the Democrats

For each of the southern states, we averaged the four percentages from above to create the Ranney index of party competition. The final column in Table 2 reveals that Arkansas is the only modified one-party Democratic states. For 2007-2011, six southern states (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) are classified as two-party competitive. South Carolina, Georgia, Texas, and Florida are classified as modified one-party Republican.

The 2003-2006 calculations reveal a clear balance with four modified one-party Democratic states, three two-party competition states, and four modified one-party Republican states. The overall picture in Table 2 from 1956 to the present is a powerful testimonial to the collapse of the solid Democratic South and the emergence of two-party competition, with the most recent calculations revealing that the three largest states in the South have achieved Ranney index scores below .30.

Table 3 calculates the Ranney party control index for federal elections along the same lines as Woodard (2006). For the bullet points outlined above, presidential election results replace gubernatorial elections, while U.S. House seats substitute for state house seats, and U.S. Senate seats take the place of state senate seats. Once again, the scores from 1956 to the present echo the collapse of the one-party South. Although not a single southern state can be classified as modified one-party Democratic for the 2007-2011 time period, Arkansas and Virginia have their highest scores on the federal measure since the 1960s. Five states (Arkansas, Virginia, Florida, North Carolina, and Louisiana) are classified as two-party competitive while all the remaining states (Mississippi, Tennessee, Georgia, Texas, South Carolina, and Alabama) are classified as modified one-party Republican for 2007-2011. In fact, Alabama’s score of .1735 flirts with the one-party Republican classification, but the state’s ranking in Table 2 (.5135) indicates clear two-party competition across the state measures. Staying with our theme of top-down realignment, the 2007-2011 scores for every state except Florida and Virginia are lower in Table 3 than Table 2, which reflect greater Republican advancement in the federal measures than the state measures. For the southern states other than Florida and Virginia, the Ranney index at the federal level is .15 lower on average than at the state level.

Following the methodology employed by Woodard (2006), Table 4 reports the average of the state and federal measures for a combined measure of southern party competition. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, eight states had a combined
Table 3. Federal Measures of Southern Party Competition, 1956-2011

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Key:
.8500 to 1.000: one-party Democratic
.6500 to .8499: modified one-party Democratic
.3500 to .6499: two-party competition
.1500 to .3499: modified one-party Republican
.0000 to .1499: one-party Republican

score above .80 and North Carolina had the lowest score at .6992. By 1996-2002, two-party competition reigned in ten southern states with Tennessee as a modified one-party Democratic state. For our recent calculations of 2007 through 2011, Arkansas retains a modified one-party Democratic score (.6973) on par with the 1960s and 1980s. The 2008 and projected 2012 battleground states of North Carolina (.5446) and Virginia (.4912) approximate a “perfect” two-party competition score of .50. The other southern battleground state of Florida also ranks as two-party competitive, although on the low end of the category. Furthermore, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee rank as two-party competitive in the combined measure. Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas are clearly modified one-party Republican, with Texas holding the lowest score for 2007-2011 in Table 4.

The final stage of our analysis explores electoral competition at the district-level for southern state legislatures. Our calculations for 2008-2011 replicate the methodology of Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993, 956). As mentioned
Table 4. Combined Measures of Southern Party Competition, 1956-2011

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Sources: 1956-2004 calculations by Woodard (2006); 2007-2011 calculations by the authors.

Key:
.8500 to 1.000: one-party Democratic
.6500 to .8499: modified one-party Democratic
.3500 to .6499: two-party competition
.1500 to .3499: modified one-party Republican
.0000 to .1499: one-party Republican

earlier in this paper, the district-level electoral competition measure for state legislatures includes four elements: (1) the percentage of the popular vote won by the winning candidate, (2) the winning candidate’s margin of victory, (3) the percentage of “safe” seats which is defined by the candidate winning 55% or more of the vote, and (4) the percentage of uncontested seats. These four percentages are then averaged and subtracted from 100 to create the district-level electoral competition values in Table 5. A score of zero for a state would indicate no electoral competition (all seats safe and uncontested with every candidate winning with 100% of the vote). Higher scores in Table 5 reflect greater district-level electoral competition in state legislatures.

North Carolina had the highest score for electoral competition (41.56) for 2008-2011. The Tar Heel State had the second highest score from 1982 to 1986. For the most recent time period, the emergent states of North Carolina, Tennessee, and Louisiana have the three highest scores for district-level electoral competition in Table 5.
If the 1982-1986 and 2008-2011 electoral competition scores are compared for southern state legislatures, the level of electoral competition increased in all the southern states except for Virginia and South Carolina. The decline in Virginia was more than ten percentage points (-12.77) while the dropoff in South Carolina was less than ten percentage points (-7.44). Among the states with an increase in district-level electoral competition, the most dramatic increase of more than ten percentage points can be identified for Arkansas (+11.55), Texas (+10.78), and Tennessee (+10.07). Furthermore, electoral competition increased by more than eight percentage points for North Carolina (+8.14) and Mississippi (+8.35). It is interesting that the two states at the extremes of the combined measures of party competition in Table 4, Arkansas and Texas, have witnessed the most dramatic increase in district-level electoral competition from the 1980s to the contemporary period in Table 5. It should be noted that with a score of 9.26 in the 1980s, Arkansas had almost nowhere to go but up, and Texas also had one of the lowest levels of electoral competition amongst the southern states in the 1980s. For the 1982-1986 period, the electoral competition scores averaged 25.14. The average
increased to 28.70 for the 2008-2011 period with the exclusion of Louisiana, since it was missing from the analysis in the 1980s.

South Carolina, Arkansas, and Georgia are the bottom three states in terms of electoral competition for the most recent time period in Table 5. Georgia has the most abysmal level of electoral competition in southern state legislative races for 2008-2011 with a score of 17.53. In the 1982-1986 period, Georgia had the second lowest score.

Our final table examines just the percentage of contested seats across the eleven southern state legislatures. Table 6 highlights that approximately two-thirds of the state legislative seats were contested in North Carolina for 2008-2011, which parallels the electoral competition findings in the previous table. Table 6 also reveals that North Carolina ranked first in the 1970s and second in the 1980s in terms of contested state legislative races. Tennessee, Texas, Florida, Louisiana, and Alabama witnessed competition in more than half of their state legislative seats in the most recent election. Table 6 illustrates that Virginia, Mississippi, South Carolina, Arkansas, and Georgia fall below 50%. In the 2010 state legislative elections, only one-third of the seats were contested in Georgia. Furthermore, Bullock (2010, 69) draws attention to a lack of competition when “in 2008 Democrats did little to capitalize on Obama’s charisma, as they failed to recruit challengers to Republican legislators even in districts with substantial black minorities.” The more encouraging news is that for 2008-2011 six southern states had half or more of their state legislative seats contested in comparison to just four states in the 1980s and five in the 1970s.

Table 6 demonstrates that the percentage of contested seats in southern state legislatures decreased in six states but increased in five states from the 1970s to the 1980s. When comparing the 1980s to the contemporary period of 2008-2011, the percentage of contested seats increased in eight southern states, with a small decline in Virginia (-3.4%), a more noticeable decline in South Carolina (-5.9%), and a rather dramatic decline in Louisiana (-17.5%). It is unclear if the decline in Louisiana for 2011 is episodic or part of a long-term trend. In the 2007 state legislative races, which just precede this study, more than 70% of the legislative seats in Louisiana were contested. In the 1980s, Louisiana has the highest percentage (73.8%) of contested state legislative races. The blanket primary or “Cajun primary” in Louisiana allows a free-for-all of candidates from all political parties. A candidate receiving a simple majority of the vote can win the seat. If no candidate has a majority, the top two vote-getters regardless of political party affiliation advance to a runoff/general election. As highlighted in Table 6, historically this system has been catnip for electoral competition.
Table 6. Contested Seats in Southern State Legislatures

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Sources: 1972-1988 calculations by Van Dunk and Weber (1997); 2008-2011 calculations by the authors.

Comparing Louisiana’s jungle primary to the other 10 southern states can certainly be problematic. Following the methodology of Van Dunk and Weber (1997), if a candidate is elected in the first round of balloting, even if all the candidates are from the same party, the seat is coded as contested. If no candidate wins a majority, and the top two candidates who advance to the runoff are both of the same party, the seat is also coded as contested. 1 Given that the coding of contested seats for the other southern states reflects candidates running against each other from different political parties, the parentheses for Louisiana in Table 6 report the percentage of seats in which candidates from different political parties ran against each other. For 1982-1988 as well as 2008-2011, only 29% of the seats in Louisiana involved candidates running against each other from different political parties. This

1 Van Dunk and Weber (1997) did not provide a detailed discussion of their calculations for Louisiana in the Legislative Studies Quarterly article. We replicated their score of .738 for the 1982-1988 period through the following coding schema: a candidate is elected in the first round with no competition (uncontested), a candidate wins in the first round against candidates all from the same party or different parties (contested), no candidate wins a majority in the first round and the top two candidates advance to the second round whether from the same party or different parties with both candidates competing in the second round (coded as contested), and no candidate wins a majority in the first round and the top two candidates advance to the second round but one of the candidates withdraws (coded as uncontested). In the final scenario, candidates do withdraw especially if both are from the same political party.
coding would place Louisiana at the bottom of the list for 2008-2011 and next to last in 1982-1988 with only Arkansas ranking lower.\textsuperscript{2}

**Discussion**

Since the time of Aristotle, political philosophy has involved the classification of political systems. The extensive literature on southern politics reflects our fascination with classification and categorization in contemporary political science. Initially, our study revisited Woodard’s classification of national, emergent, and traditional states with the most recent Census data. Furthermore, this study calculated the Ranney party control index for 2007-2011 across the southern states along with federal measures and combined measures of party competition. Our analysis concluded by calculating a district-level electoral competition measure for the most recent southern state legislative elections. While the indexes in this study are purely descriptive, the findings provide valuable insights about the region and specific southern states in the twenty-first century.

Beyond the descriptive analysis, we can explore the correlations between the various indexes in this study. Except for a given measure that is subsumed within a broader measure,\textsuperscript{3} none of the indexes in this study demonstrate a statistically significant correlation at $p<.05$. The 2010 composite rankings in Table 1 demonstrate a correlation of .45 with the 2007-2011 Ranney index of party competition at the state level and -.20 with the 2007-2011 federal measure of party competition. While the correlations are not statistically significant, the direction of the correlation coefficients indicate that traditional states have higher scores on the Ranney index of party competition at the state level (tilting toward the Democratic side of the index with the exception of

\textsuperscript{2} We appreciate the insightful comments of a reviewer that comparing the rate of contested seats in the Louisiana jungle primary (especially with races coded as contested where all the candidates are from the same party) to the rates in the other southern states where candidates are from different parties is akin to comparing apples with oranges. While the first round of balloting in the Louisiana jungle primary can very much look like a primary with all the candidates from the same party, the end result is very much like a general election if the candidate wins a majority and is elected to the legislature.

\textsuperscript{3} The combined measure of southern party competition from Table 4 has a correlation of .90 with the federal measure of southern party competition and .89 with the state-level Ranney index of party competition. The state and federal measures constitute the combined measures of southern party competition so the large correlations are no surprise and to be expected. The measure on contested seats has a correlation of .97 with the electoral competition measure, which is to be expected given that contested seats is one of four measures that comprise the electoral competition measure.
South Carolina), but traditional states have lower scores on the federal measure of party competition (tilting toward the Republican side of the index with the notable exception of Arkansas). Furthermore, the 2010 composite scores from updating Woodard’s study demonstrate a correlation of -.22 with the 2008-2011 district-level electoral competition measure and a correlation of -.33 with the measure of contested seats for 2008-2011. Again, while not statistically significant, the direction of the correlation coefficients remind us that traditional states rank at the bottom of electoral competition and contested seats.

The state and federal measures of party competition for the period of 2007-2011 have a correlation of .59 (p=.054), which is statistically significant at the more relaxed criteria of p<.10. The largest differences between the state and federal measures in this study are evident for Alabama (difference of .34 with a state score of .5135 but a federal score of .1735), Mississippi (difference of .2046 with a state score of .5130 but a federal score of .3084), and Florida (difference of .1824 with a federal score of .4698 but a state score of .2874). Alabama and Mississippi have clearly realigned to the Republican Party in the federal measures but approximate two-party competition for the state measures. As trickle-down realignment continues in these Deep South states, the gap between the federal and state scores on party competition will most likely narrow over time. On the other hand, Florida is an intriguing case with a federal score reflecting two-party competition but a state score indicating modified one-party Republican. Florida’s diverse demographics are reflected in the battleground status for presidential elections, but the state politics are increasingly dominated by the GOP. Florida and Virginia are the only two states in this study with scores on the federal measures of party competition that are higher than the state measures. Not coincidentally, Florida (54%) and Virginia (33%) have the two highest percentages of non-southern born populations as reported in Table 1.

For the states that rank as two-party competitive in this study, a reasonable question is whether or not there are essentially two one-party areas within a single state. For the combined state and federal measures of southern party competition, North Carolina (.5446) and Virginia (.4912) most closely approximate the “perfect” two-party competition score of .50 for 2007-2011. In the case of North Carolina, Woodard (2006, 97) describes three distinct geographic regions: the Atlantic coastal plain in the east, the middle Piedmont region, and the Blue Ridge Mountains in the west. Following the grand tradition of V. O. Key (1949), an analysis of recent voting patterns across the legislative districts and counties of the Tar Heel State reveals that Democrats enjoy success throughout the Atlantic coastal plain, the northern and southern areas of the middle Piedmont region, and the Blue Ridge Mountains of the west. Republican success in state and federal elections is most clearly concentrated in the central
and western areas of the Piedmont region as well as the Blue Ridge area bordering the Piedmont. A clearer regional clustering emerges for Virginia with GOP dominance in the western regions of the Old Dominion and Democratic strength concentrated in the D.C. suburbs of northern Virginia as well as the Tidewater area in the southeast corner of the state.

In addition to North Carolina and Virginia, Florida most closely approximates perfect two-party competition for the federal measures from 2007-2011. Democratic strength in these federal elections is clearly concentrated in the urban areas of the Sunshine State: Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, Tampa, Orlando, and Tallahassee. GOP strength can be highlighted in the Panhandle, Central, and Gulf Coast Plain regions of the Sunshine State as outlined by Woodard (2006, 80). For the state-level Ranney index, Alabama and Mississippi most closely reflect two-party competition with scores of .513 for 2007-2011. In Alabama, an analysis of state senate, state house, and gubernatorial election results highlight a clear cleavage of Democratic strength in the black-belt across a swath of the south-central region of the state with GOP dominance in the north and far southern counties. While V. O. Key (1949) identified a stark geographic cleavage in Mississippi between the Delta planters of the west and the “redneck” hills of the east, the cleavage is clearly evident for the most recent gubernatorial election of 2011, but Democratic strength in state house and state senate elections can be identified throughout the state with Republican success still concentrated in the southeast and Gulf Coast counties.

A couple of important insights about southern politics can be derived from a careful inspection of voting patterns for the two-party competitive states in this study. Woodard’s (2006, 72) focus on metropolitan areas as the new unit of political analysis for the South is clearly on display with Democratic strength in the urban areas of the battleground states of Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia. The regional cleavages that remain in the southern states, even those approximating two-party competition, remind us that geography is far from irrelevant in the South.

The two “Great White Switches,” first in presidential voting and then a generation later in partisan identification, are critical to the narrative of partisan change and the emergence of two-party politics in the South (Black and Black 2002, 4). Historically, the South was defined by a conservative Democratic Party with the overwhelming support of white voters. Today, the region is increasingly defined by a conservative Republican Party with the overwhelming support of white voters. This reminds us of the old adage that “the more things change, the more they stay the same.” In fact, the plummeting levels of Democratic Party identification among white southerners has not leveled off in recent years and raises the question of where is the floor for such a decline.
While the evolution of white voters tells the story of past change in the South, changing demographics will be the key to the narrative of future change in the South. When looking at increases in southern state populations from 2000-2010, the top four states are Texas (20.6%), North Carolina (18.5%), Georgia (18.3%), and Florida (17.6%). As noted previously about Table 1, Florida (54%) and Virginia (33%) have the largest percentage of non-southern born populations followed by Texas (30%), Georgia (27%), and North Carolina (26%). These are the national states of our study and a strong case can be made for including the Tar Heel State. Prysby (2010, 175) observes about North Carolina “there are trends in the state, such as the growth of major metropolitan areas and the migration of northerners to these areas, that may benefit the Democrats in the long run.” In the short run, Tomasky (2011, 9) reports, “I don’t know a single expert who thinks Obama has a great shot at winning the Tar Heel State again. But he wants it badly enough to hold the Democratic convention in Charlotte (Mecklenburg will be another county to watch).”

In another key southern battleground state, Rozell (2010, 150) reports that “demographic changes, especially the phenomenal population growth of the Washington, DC, suburbs of northern Virginia, have altered state politics forever.” Rozell (2010, 150-151) also calls our attention to the vast increase in the Latino population, and he observes that population shifts and demographic changes have “given rise to a political environment more conducive to minority group interests than ever before, although most analysts of state politics would agree that much remains to be done.” Even in the very red state of Texas, which ranks as “modified one-party Republican” across all the updated party competition measures in this study, Lamare et al. (2010, 281) remind us that “demography is destiny” and subsequently report that rising minority populations mean that “the Democrats no longer are in free fall and, at best, are poised to compete on a level playing field.”

Most notable for the future is the rising Latino population across the southern states (US Census Bureau 2012). Once again the national states dominate with Texas (37.6%) reporting the largest Latino population followed by Florida (22.5%), Georgia (8.8%), North Carolina (8.4%), and Virginia (7.9%). Between 2000 and 2010, South Carolina’s Latino population increased 148%, the highest rate for any state in the nation (Sutter 2011). The sea change of demographics is best reflected by the fact that white children are in the minority compared to children of other racial and ethnic groups in Texas, Mississippi, Georgia, and Florida (Sutter 2011).

For scholars of southern politics, the rise of Latinos in the South will be one of the most intriguing developments to follow with the potential to impact all the indexes of this study. In the 2008 presidential election, Obama carried 67% of the Latino vote compared to only 27% for McCain (Kucinich 2012).
Recognizing the critical role of the Latino vote, especially in battleground states, the Republican National Committee announced in April of 2012 that Hispanic outreach directors would be placed in six states: Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, New Mexico, Colorado, and Nevada (Kucinich 2012).

The results of this study on electoral competition are also intriguing across the South. When comparing the 1980s to the contemporary period of 2008-2011, the district-level electoral competition measure and the percentage of contested state legislative seats increased in eight states. In the 1980s, only four southern states witnessed competition in more than half of their state legislative races. Six southern states could make that claim between 2008 and 2011. With the art of gerrymandering now a science through computer software and G.I.S. technology to design safe seats as well as the ever rising cost of legislative elections, it is of note that electoral competition has been on the rise in the South. In the 1980s, ten of the eleven southern states were one-party Democratic or modified one-party Democratic on the state-level Ranney index. For 2007-2011, six southern states were two-party competitive. These results lend support to Squire’s (2000, 192) observation that partisan competition fuels electoral competition.

On the other hand, it is distressing that half or more of the state legislative seats go uncontested in six southern states mostly clustered in the Deep South. This is a sad commentary on our republican form of government, but it may be more of a statement on the professionalization of state legislatures. Hamm and Moncrief (2008, 163) classify Arkansas and Georgia as “citizen legislatures” with the remaining southern states categorized as “hybrid legislatures.” No southern states are classified as “professional legislatures.” It is no surprise that Arkansas and Georgia are at the bottom of district-level electoral competition as well as the percentage of contested state legislative seats with citizen legislatures that rank low on legislative professionalization.

Georgia also ranked near the bottom of district-level electoral competition as well as the percentage of contested seats in the 1970s and 1980s. The vast majority of Democratic incumbents in the General Assembly during those decades drew no Republican opposition, while today the vast majority of GOP incumbents draw no opposition. In their analysis of uncontested state legislative elections over the last four decades, Forgette et al. (2012, 305) paint a picture across the South of uncontested white Democrats who have given way over time to uncontested Republicans and Democrats from majority-minority districts. Once again, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

Fundamentally, this study highlights that the trickle-down Republican realignment of the South is in full force in southern state legislatures. In 2010, 49.71% of all the seats in southern state legislatures were held by Democrats (886 out of 1,782 total seats). Democrats were on roughly equal footing with
Republicans in terms of the overall number of seats as well as partisan control of the legislatures given that five were controlled by Democrats (Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina), five state legislatures were controlled by Republicans (Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas), and one legislature was split (Virginia). In 2011, Democrats held 162 fewer seats in southern state legislatures with control of 40.62% of all seats (724 out of 1782 seats). After 2011 state legislative elections in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia, Democrats find themselves in control of only 39% of all the seats in southern state legislatures (696 seats) and Arkansas is the only remaining southern state where Democrats control both chambers. The 2012 presidential election year begins with the GOP in control of both chambers in ten southern state legislatures. It is breathtaking that from 2010 through 2011 the Democrats have lost almost 200 seats in southern state legislatures and declined from controlling half of all seats to less than 40%.

Conclusion

Returning to the question in our title, is Dixie rising? Well, the evidence is mixed. The national states of Virginia, Texas, Florida, and Georgia are clearly reflective of a rising South, and North Carolina should be added to that conversation. On the other hand, the traditional states of Arkansas, South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi are still well below their southern neighbors as well as the national average on a variety of social, economic, and political measures. As Louisiana continues to recover from the battering of Hurricane Katrina and to a lesser extent the BP oil spill, the Pelican State warrants our continued attention. In our analysis of the state-level Ranney index as well as the combined measures of party competition, a majority of southern states (six) are classified as two-party competitive for 2007-2011. In the federal measure of party competition, no states are modified one-party Democratic with five states classified as two-party competitive and six states modified one-party Republican. While electoral competition is on the rise across southern state legislatures, the high percentage of uncontested seats in the Deep South is troubling for a democratic system. In the final analysis, the nation’s most populous region will garner plenty of political attention by hosting both national party conventions in 2012 (Florida for the Republicans and North Carolina for the Democrats) as well as watching the presidential

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4 The Virginia Senate is evenly split 20-20 between Democrats and Republicans in the wake of the 2011 legislative elections, but the chamber is essentially controlled by the GOP given that the Republican lieutenant governor presides over the chamber.
election play out in key battleground states like Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia.

References


Gender mainstreaming is a strategy, used not only in the European Union but the United Nations as well, whose goal is to ensure that gender equality is central to all activities of policy creation, discussion, planning, implementation, etc. The concept of gender mainstreaming is based on the idea that policy should be created looking at the needs of all constituencies from the outset rather than creating a policy and then making sure, after the fact, that it will work for all. The EU is committed to using gender mainstreaming as a tool in all policy areas, including the relatively recent integration efforts that fall largely under the rubric of migration policy. The EU’s new commitment to fostering the effective integration of migrants stems not only from the missed economic opportunities of weak integration, but also from the social disruption that poor integration can cause. While one would predict that gender mainstreaming and sound integration initiatives would complement each other and the overall goals of the EU, in particular the always-important goal of economic growth, this study demonstrates that rhetoric and policy are still very far apart when migrants, particularly female ones, take center stage. In particular, the EU’s singular focus on the ways in which female migrants can contribute in economic terms, while surely important given the EU’s economic crisis, ignores the very specific challenges that exist for migrant women in the EU. By not promoting an integration strategy that encourages female migrants to participate and integrate into European social, cultural, and economic life, the EU is missing a critical opportunity for widespread growth.

Since the formation of the European Communities in 1957, policymakers have sought the creation of a union that treats men and women fairly and equitably. Legislation adopted by the European Union (since its inception)
now goes beyond equal pay for equal work requirements and incorporates many other legal protections for women, including those that protect women from sexual harassment in the workplace and those that protect women from violence. In 2010, the European Union released the Strategy for Equality between Women and Men (2010-2015). This document, as expected, highlights the need to continue to focus on women’s economic independence, closing the gender pay gap, equality in decision-making, and on ending gender-based violence.

For the purpose of this study, however, it is critical to highlight that this important document also underlines the need “to promote gender equality in all initiatives on immigration and integration of migrants” (European Commission 2010, 14). This strategy builds on the 2000 Community Framework Strategy (2001-2005), that drew attention to the importance of extending equal rights to asylum seekers and third country nationals living within the EU’s Member States. One of the noteworthy changes in the 2010 Strategy is the emphasis the European Union now places on the integration of migrants and, furthermore, on the gendered dimensions of the integration issue. This change in focus is a substantive one, and one that reflects an important shift in EU priorities. Up until 2004 most EU work concentrated on developing a cohesive EU migration policy (to pre-date, not coincidentally, the large expansion of the EU in 2004). The EU has now begun to expand its role in the integration debate. While there are certainly many important issues that arise with the subject of integration, this paper builds on my previous work, which examined the relative gender blindness of EU migration policy, to ascertain the level of gender mainstreaming in the production of new European level integration strategies (Morris 2009). The EU’s success at adopting high standards for gender policies and its simultaneous failure to extend these same standards in a uniform way to migrant women constitute a puzzle of significant theoretical and substantive import given the EU’s supranational and international human rights commitments and is one that underlies this study.

The European Union professes to be a strong advocate for women and sets high standards for itself in terms of the promotion and protection of the rights of women. Evidence of EU leadership in the area of gender policy includes the following directives: equal pay (1975), equal treatment relating to employment (1976), social security systems (1978 and 1986), and pregnancy and motherhood (1992). However, despite high gender standards for EU citizens,
the EU has thus far failed to adopt social and economic policies that extend these same protections explicitly to female migrants living within the boundaries of the European Union. While protecting the rights of female migrants has not been at the forefront of mainstream policy and debate in recent years, the failure of EU policymakers to extend gender specific protections to female migrants is increasingly gaining the attention of migration scholars (Bach 2010; Boyd 1995; Crawley 2001; DeLaet 1999; Kofman and Sales 2000; Knocke 2000; Morris 2009), as well as some non-governmental groups that focus either on women’s issues or on migrant rights more generally (ENAR 2010; EWL 2010). For example, the European Network Against Racism, ENAR, published an extensive fact sheet in February 2010, whose sole purpose is to “raise awareness among ENAR members on the impact of migration policies on migrant women and the need to integrate a gender perspective in migration, integration, and asylum policies” (ENAR 2010, Abstract). In addition, the European Women’s Lobby, a powerful Brussels-based advocacy group that coordinates the efforts of over 3000 national and European women’s organizations across the Member States, released a document in February 2010 entitled “Immigration, integration, and asylum policies from a gender perspective” in which it argues that a new gender-based approach to migration is urgently needed (EWL 2010).

These developments indicate a broad shift in emphasis, even among non-governmental groups, in linking gender and migration. Indeed, interviews with leaders from the non-governmental community conducted in 2002 and 2003 showed that only a very few of them at the time were ready or willing to accept female migrants as a distinct group that needed protection (Morris 2009). Rather, these interviews highlighted the fact that female migrants were a subset that often fell between the cracks of the major platforms for both migrants groups and women’s groups across the EU.

With this background in mind, this paper argues that even while the EU commitment to gender equality for migrant women appears to be growing, given the shift in emphasis and tone among major EU institutions (especially the European Commission and the non-governmental community), the technique of gender mainstreaming continues to be an ineffective tool for change. Gender mainstreaming, in particular, as a policy instrument, is especially ineffective when applied to a complex, highly contested policy issue such as the effective integration of migrants. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates through careful policy analysis that even while the migrant woman is beginning to appear as an integral part of EU integration policy, the emphasis, thus far, is only on her economic participation as the key to effective integration. This strategy, while perhaps a marginal improvement for the EU, overlooks the many roles that migrant women play in the integration process by ignoring the very gendered experiences of migration and integration. In essence, by focusing only on the economic implications of the integration of migrant women, the EU is missing an opportunity to push integration policy forward in a way that acknowledges the realities of the migrant experience. Insofar as gender mainstreaming is the tool by which the EU incorporates gender into its policies, current integration policy demonstrates that it is a weak strategy thus far.

In order to lay the foundations for this study, the paper will first provide an introduction to gender mainstreaming in the EU context. Next, the paper will outline some of the principal ways that migration policy poses a particular challenge for the EU, especially in terms of creating a coherent migration regime. Then, the paper will explain the relevance of gender to migration before moving on to a discussion of the EU’s new emphasis on the integration of migrants. While the EU is relatively new to this area of migration policy, it is integration policy that underscores the important role that female migrants can play in ensuring a constructive relationship between migrants, their families, and host societies. Because female migrants are a large and growing group across the EU, their effective integration into the labor market and into the social fabric of their host societies is naturally more and more important.

Gender Mainstreaming

Before the paper can establish the ways in which a gendered migration regime is important to EU policy, let us now turn to an examination of the major tool by which the EU tries to ensure a gendered perspective in policy creation: gender mainstreaming. The policy and strategy of gender mainstreaming was adopted by the European Union in 1996.

According to official documents, gender mainstreaming:
Gender Mainstreaming in EU Integration Policy, Morris

involves not restricting efforts to promote equality to the implementation of specific measures to help women, but mobilising all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible effects on the respective situations of men and women (gender perspective). This means systematically examining measures and policies and taking into account such possible effects when defining them (European Commission 1996, 2).

As an update to the Commission’s 1996 position, the European Commission also issued a Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001-2005), which included a proposal to incorporate gender equality in all areas of life. This initiative aimed to continue the EU practice of gender mainstreaming while also requiring the implementation of specific actions in favor of women to correct the persistent, practical inequalities that continue to exist.2

This Commission initiative went further in promoting gender equality than any other EU program before it, thanks in part, to this “dual track” approach (Art. 12). It is worth noting that one of the operational objectives (Art. 3.4.2) of the framework strategy is to “promote women’s rights as human rights” (Art. 12) In this regard, the strategy underlines the possible “multiple discrimination” that some women, including migrant women, may experience and delineates one important action as follows: “to promote that the specific needs and/or particular situations of women are duly taken into account, where relevant, within initiatives in the field of asylum and in the field of entry and stay of third country nationals on the territory of the Member States” (12). This statement, in essence, signified that the dual-track approach outlined in the framework strategy was to be applied to the EU-level migration policies called for by the Treaty of Amsterdam.

While the Commission’s 2000 Framework Strategy on Gender Equality drew attention to the plight of female migrants in the EU, it also called for the application of the policy of gender mainstreaming to this policy area. These same strategies, of mainstreaming plus the use of “specific measures” to target gender inequality were also articulated in the Roadmap for equality between women and men (2006-2010) as well as the current Strategy for Equality between Women and Men (2010-15). The current Strategy (2010) pointedly notes that a key Commission role will be to “promote gender equality in all

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2 Practical inequalities in the EU include, for example, the gender pay gap, equal opportunities in employment, and equal treatment for women and men.
While there are many scholars who write about the strengths and weaknesses of gender mainstreaming as a tool or equality (Jacquot 2010; Krizan and Zentai 2006; Lombardo 2005; Lombardo and Meier 2006; Page 2011; Rees 2005; Stratigaki 2005; Verloo 2005), it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the various merits and drawbacks of gender mainstreaming in theory and practice. Rather, this paper builds on the assumption that because gender mainstreaming is the current tool of the EU, assessing and enhancing its effectiveness in the promulgation of gendered EU integration initiatives is an important task. In order to begin this assessment, it is first necessary to turn to an examination of the context in which migration policy is made in the EU, as well as the ways in which migration is considered to be a gendered experience, thereby necessitating gender-sensitive policies throughout the migratory experience, including within integration programs.

Migration Policy in the EU: Multilevel Conflict

Before one can move to a discussion of the gendered nature of migration and the role that integration plays within it, it is helpful to underline the ways in which migration is a policy area marked by discord in contemporary European Union politics and is, therefore, best understood as an intensely negotiated set of policies rather than as a coherent migration regime. Migration policy development at the EU level, which is the area under which integration policy resides, is rife with real and potential conflict. The primary evidence of this conflict is the gap between rhetoric and reality that surrounds many European migration policy debates. The discrepancy between rhetoric and reality illustrates how difficult migration as a political issue is for national and supranational policymakers across contemporary Europe. In states with high levels of unemployment, for example, politicians often use migrants as scapegoats for taking away the jobs of deserving citizens even when demographic studies indicate that the European labor market needs additional supply.3 Alternatively, in cities with high levels of urban crime, politicians can easily blame growing migrant communities for the offenses even when studies

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3 For more information on changing demographics in Europe, see, for example, D. Coleman’s article “Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition,” Population and Development Review 32(3): 401-46 September 2006.
indicate that there is no decisive link between immigration and crime.\(^4\) Migrants are easy targets for expedient politicians, because they are frequently in precarious legal, social, and political situations that make their voices in the political arena difficult to hear. Furthermore, public opinion in some European states is increasingly characterized by a measure of anti-migrant and anti-foreigner sentiment. In many cases, it does not take much campaigning for portions of the European electorate to side with right-wing and/or xenophobic politicians who appear to place blame on migrant communities as a simple and effective strategy.\(^5\)

Past interviews with migrants conducted by the author in 2002 and 2003 in the European Union confirm that interactions between citizens and non-citizens do little to ameliorate the conflict and animosity between the two groups (Morris 2009). In general, the migrants interviewed reported that they had not been welcomed into European society in any way. They noted instances of discrimination among people in shops, on the street, and in just about every aspect of their daily lives. Rather than being rewarded, for example, for their efforts at speaking the local language, they had been ridiculed and made fun of for lacking a proper accent. Rather than being encouraged to continue dressing in the clothes of their home countries, they had been told to integrate to improve the chances that they would be granted legal status. Informal interviews with EU citizens also conducted by the author in 2002 and 2003 further substantiate the notion that migrants and citizens in the EU have little to do with one another. When asked about relations with migrants in their community, many EU citizens admitted that they did not know many migrants and that they did not have migrants in their circles of friends. At the same time, they also noted that migrants seemed to want to stick together and were not interested in getting to know other Europeans or European culture (Morris 2009).

Conflict between the political right and the political left also affects migration policy development. Right-wing and conservative parties have, in the last two decades, effectively shifted the terms of the migration debate in some Member States of the European Union. Electoral successes of far-right

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\(^5\) The recent French presidential election (2012) is evidence of the interesting role that anti-immigrant rhetoric can play in a campaign, as Francoise Hollande and Nicholas Sarkozy both tried extensively to woo far-right Marine Le Pen voters after Marine Le Pen’s National Front garnered 17.9% of the vote in the first round of the elections in April 2012, necessitating a run-off election in May 2012.
parties include the June 2009 European Parliament elections in which the Dutch far-right, anti-Islamic party (Party for Freedom) claimed 17% of the national vote, just behind the ruling Christian Democrats, and two Austrian far-right, anti-immigrant parties (The Freedom Party and The Alliance for the Future) together took 17.3% of the vote. Far-right parties also gained in Hungary, Denmark, Slovakia, and Finland. All of these parties are characterized by a heavily anti-migrant platform and yet have made significant electoral breakthroughs at the local, regional, national, and supranational levels. Indeed, in the wake of the June 2009 election, far-right parties formed a new political group in the European Parliament -- the new Europe for Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) with 30 MEPs. In addition, in these same elections, the center right parties maintained their majority in the European Parliament with a win of 265 seats. The big losers in this election were the Socialists, who now made up only 215 of the 785 seats.

Most other historically mainstream parties also posted losses, as far-right and fringe parties made inroads across Europe. Migration is a subject that severely divides Europe’s political parties and the results of the 2009 election show Europe’s population heavily divided between the right and the left. The center-right and far-right parties emphasize the necessity of limited migration and tough measures for combating illegal migration and bolstering border security. By contrast, the left-leaning groups, which include the European Socialists and the Greens, while also in favor of combating illegal migration, underline the necessity of regulated legal migration, an efficient and fair asylum procedure, and rights for legal migrants.6

Europe is also divided geographically in terms of its response to migration politics, especially when gender considerations are added to the policy debate. It should come as no surprise, for example, that states in northern and southern Europe have distinctly different experiences with legal and illegal migration and, indeed, with gender politics in general. Southern European states such as Italy and Spain receive larger migrant populations, on the whole, than do the Nordic countries, ensuring that the challenges they face are unlike those that the Nordic countries experience. In addition, many states in northern Europe have more developed gender policies in place for citizens and so have been, on the whole, more willing to support extending these same policies to migrant women. Some southern European states, by contrast, are much more

6 See, for example, the website of the Greens in the European Parliament, also known as the European Free Alliance, available at http://www.greens-efa.eu. The Greens here detail the many human and minority rights positions that they espouse, including fair and gender-sensitive asylum procedures and other rights-based protections for legal migrants.
concerned with the sheer volume of migrants entering their borders than with offering specific groups of migrants additional rights. While these general trends are relatively accurate historically, it is becoming harder to argue that the Nordic states are leaders in the effort to extend progressive rights to migrant women because many of the Nordic states now see electoral gains by rightist parties, most dramatically in the April 2011 elections in Finland. The True Finns party obtained 39 of the 200 seats in the national parliament. Not only is the True Finns party decidedly anti-EU, it also professes a strongly anti-immigrant in its platform.

**Gender and Migration**

Now that a basic foundation is in place for understanding some of the politics behind the creation of a migration policy regime in the EU, it is important to consider the ways in which gender is an important category for analysis in thinking through and creating sound migration policy. Migration policies, in Europe and elsewhere, have traditionally assumed that the typical migrant is a male laborer seeking economic opportunity. This basic assumption has manifested itself in the adoption of laws. Indeed, the assumption permeates much of the scholarly literature on migration. However, it is important to recognize the fact that “migrant” is not a gender-neutral term, despite the fact that it has been misconstrued to appear as one (Knocke 2000). In fact, contemporary feminist and migration scholarship has shown the assumption of gender-neutrality to be categorically false (Crawley 2001; Knocke 2000; Kofman et al., 2000).

When laws or studies are construed to be gender-neutral, they suggest that the experience or model on which they are constructed is equally applicable to both sexes. Scholars who highlight the different patterns of female migration, as well as the diverse ways that female migrants shape host labor markets and host societies, have only recently succeeded in challenging and exposing the assumption of gender-neutrality (Boyd 1995; Castles and Miller 1998; DeLaet 1999; EWL 2007; Kofman et al, 2000; Simon and Bretell 1986). These scholars contend that female migrants are motivated to migrate for reasons different from those of men and that female migrants confront challenges in host societies that are specifically due to the hierarchies that enforce gender difference.

In addition, they (Boyd 1995; DeLaet 1999; Kofman and Sales 1997, 1998; Kofman et al., 2000; Lutz 1994; Morokvasic 1983; Simon and Bretell 1986) also maintain that the assumption that males and females constitute a single coherent category as migrants is an oversimplification. They argue, instead, that male and female migrants experience the many phases of migration in different ways. The research produced by these scholars, in both
case studies and cross-national analyses, demonstrates that the opportunities and constraints confronted by male and female migrants in host societies are various and yet these new data and knowledge remain on the outside of mainstream studies of European migration (Bach 2010; Collinson 1993; EWL 2007; King 1993; Miles and Thranhardt 1995; Ucarer and Puchala 1997).

Rooted in traditional migration policies is the notion that female migrants accompany male workers as wives, daughters, and mothers. Women are not thought to be migrants in their own right but rather are conceived as part of the male migration pattern (Bach 2010; Simon and Bretell 1986). Although women cross international borders at approximately the same rate as men, they often have vastly different experiences in both sending and receiving states due to social norms and laws that assume that women are not often heads of households and/or in charge of economic decisions for themselves or of their family members. In receiving states, female migrants have an especially difficult time, as a female migrant’s well-being is often tied to the status of her husband, father, brother, or other male relative.

However, migration studies show that women migrate for more complex reasons than typically assumed. These include family reunification, economic incentives, the possibility of greater autonomy, opportunities for their children, escape from persecution, educational opportunities, to name just a few (Bach 2010; DeLaet 1999; Kofman et al., 2000; Morokvasic 1983). To be sure, males migrate for many of these same reasons, but the critical factor is the impact of the reason why these reasons are gendered (Kofman et. al. 2000). Specifically, women often make the decision to migrate because of non-economic reasons that are intimately tied to improving their social conditions (Bach 2010; DeLaet 1999; Kofman et al., 2000; Morokvasic 1983) while male immigrants, by contrast, typically migrate for purely economic reasons. Because it is assumed that males and females make the decision to migrate for the same reasons, it is likewise assumed that males and females will react to situations and structures in host countries in similar ways (Kofman et al. 2000).

Assumptions of similarity have proven to be inaccurate and have led to disparities between male and female migrants in terms of the employment and integration opportunities that they confront in receiving countries (Bach 2010; Boyd 1995; European Commission 2003; ENAR 2010; Thorogood and Winqvist 2003). Because women experience migration differently from men due to, among other things, their often dependent legal status, their inability to earn the same wages as male migrants, and the fact that they often find employment in unprotected and unregulated sectors of the economy, such as care work, the laws governing immigration in a state or supranational organization have real consequences for the lives and decisions of female migrants. These consequences may be fundamentally different from the
consequences that immigration laws have on male migrants (Anthias 1993; DeLaet 1999; Kofman et al, 2000; Morokvasic 1983, 1984; Phizacklea 1983; Yuval-Davis 1997).

Laws that assume that economic gain is the only motivator for immigration do not fully address the concerns and decisions that female migrants must face. Specifically, conversations with migrant women in June 2003 indicate that family concerns, such as providing better opportunities for parents and dependent children, are central in the migratory experience (Morris 2009). The desire to allow children to grow up in a society free from poverty, disease, and the instability that civil unrest engenders, is a central factor in driving women to move. The prospect of the unknown is, according to those interviewed, much less frightening than a predictable life of hardship and little opportunity. Even in cases where women choose to relocate without their children and to send money home, the promise of eventual reunification is a strong motivator in allowing the women to contend with the difficult process of integration and acceptance in a strange host society.

However, women report frustration at the lack of assistance they receive in host societies, particularly in learning the language of their host communities so that they can put their plans for a better life into practice (Bach 2010). Instead of being able to improve their prospects by acquiring language skills in order to participate actively in work and society, many migrant women face situations where they find themselves having to wait for months and years in order to accumulate language skills sufficient enough for them to communicate effectively. Again, this is due largely to the type of work many female migrants find themselves performing in host societies. Domestic and care work is largely unregulated and unprotected and does not require additional skills or language training. Indeed, the type of language skills that female migrants acquire in domestic or care settings in no way prepares them for more professional jobs and/or for long-term integration in their host societies. Therefore, comprehensive policies that address social and general welfare conditions are needed in order for female migrants to be active, autonomous participants in their host societies.

The data now indicate that more and more female migrants are choosing to relocate themselves and their children independent of the support and protection of a male relative (EWL 2007, Bach 2010). Because of this, it must be considered that the increase in the number of female migrants changes the nature of the immigration issue in receiving societies (Pedraza 1991). Female migrants in a host society affect the host society’s job market and economy in ways that are fundamentally different from the impact of male migrants due to the nature of the skills they bring, the jobs they seek, and the pay they receive. Standards in receiving countries created around levels of income that typically
only male immigrants earn, will not provide equal opportunities for female immigrants because they earn less than men due to the heavy concentration of their work in service sectors such as domestic and care work, and because migrant women often find themselves having to accept temporary and part-time positions (Rubin et al 2008).

These issues mean that migrant women in the EU are particularly vulnerable in periods of economic downturn, because they have higher levels of underemployment and unemployment than female EU citizens and male migrants (Rubin et al 2008). In this way, ignoring major differences in the composition of immigrant communities not only creates problems for the immigrant women themselves, but also for the host societies which will be forced to grapple with increasing numbers of female immigrants who will require some form of social assistance to meet requirements based on male norms.

Another difference for the female migrant comes with the stereotyping that often occurs in host societies. One common stereotype across all states of the EU is that female migrants are typically unskilled migrants. Indeed, this is a widely held belief and is particularly acute for migrant women who come to the EU under the family reunification regime (Bach 2010). While this is a prevailing stereotype, an EWL document from 2010 cites OECD data which show that the share of women immigrants holding a tertiary degree in OECD states is only three percentage points below that of men (Bach 2010). Indeed, in some states, more immigrant women hold skilled occupations than native-born women (Bach 2010). Still, even with the data, it is clear that the idea of the unskilled migrant women prevails, in part because of the still high numbers of migrant women that enter the EU in order to work in the care industry. Although providing critical care work, especially as Europe’s population ages, across most EU states many of these women are not included in European social protection regimes because they have entered the country illegally and work in the informal sectors of the economy. Despite filling an important niche, they are generally deemed to be a “problem” because of their irregular status.

**Integration at the EU Level**

Beginning in 1999 the European Union began some, if minimal, involvement in the integration of migrants, when, at a European Council meeting in Tampere, Finland, leaders noted the importance of dynamic integration policies to the eventual creation of an EU-level migration regime. Then, in 2003, the European Commission issued a Communication on Immigration, Integration, and Employment which defined integration as a “two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country
nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant” (European Commission 2003, 17-18). However, it was not until 2004 and beyond that EU level work and focus really began on integration policy. While there have been a range of statements by various institutions of the EU on the subject of integration, three major initiatives will be presented and analyzed in this analysis. The three policy initiatives offer a snapshot of the EU’s current position on integration and, therefore, offer researchers the best glimpse into the EU priorities within integration policy thus far. It is worth noting here, as well, that the European Commission’s website on Integration gives priority to these same initiatives. To be sure, it is in these documents where one would expect to see a gender specific focus as a function of gender mainstreaming. These three statements are:

1. The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy (Council Conclusions 2004)
2. The Stockholm Programme (2010)
3. The Europe 2020 Strategy

The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy

The first major statement on integration at the EU level came in 2004 when the European Council agreed on “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy.” These principles represent the most formal commitment to integration to date at the EU level and continue to be a departure point for many subsequent EU level initiatives and statements. In all subsequent documents on integration at the EU level, the Common Basic Principles (CBPs) are referenced, explained, and, in some cases, clarified. In general, while the introduction to the articulation of the Common Basic Principles notes that the primary responsibility for the development of specific integration policies is to come from the Member State level, the CBPs also highlight the important role that the EU is to play in concert with the Member States due to the central role that integration plays to the overall health of the States and its citizens. In essence, the CBPs highlight the fact that while integration is best thought of as a Member State issue, the health of the Union depends upon successful integration strategies and is, therefore, also of utmost concerns to the EU. The principles are as follows:

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1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.
4. Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.
5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration.
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.
8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.
10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public-policy formation and implementation.
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective. (European Council Conclusions 2004, 17-18).

It is clear, given even a cursory look at the principles, that the special needs of a particular group of migrants (e.g. women) are not included. Instead,
the principles are written with the feeling that all immigrants are important to the integration process and that they will all participate and benefit from these shared principles in the same way. However, when one examines the text that accompanies some of the principles, more information can be gleaned about who exactly the principles are targeting and in what ways. In reference to Principle Number One, for example, the Council notes that “the integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new country of residence” (19). While this statement clearly draws attention to women and men as migrants, it does not indicate anything about the ways in which integration may be a gendered experience. No gender-specific mentions are noted in Principles Two, Three, or Four. In the remarks associated with each of these Principles, by contrast, the Council’s Conclusions indicate that practices surrounding basic values, employment, and learning a host society’s language, history, and institutions, will be experienced in a gender-neutral way.

Principle Five, however, which concerns the importance of education to successful integration, contains the following clarifications:

Educational arrears are easily transmitted from one generation to the next. Therefore, it is essential that special attention is given to the educational achievement of those who face difficulties within the school system. Given the critical role played by education in the integration of those who are new in a society—and especially for women and children—scholastic underachievement, early school-leaving, and all forms of migrant youth delinquency should be avoided and made priority areas for policy intervention (21).

Similarly, additional information with Principle Six notes:

If immigrants are to be allowed to participate fully within the host society, they must be treated equally and fairly and protected from discrimination. EU law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin in employment, education social security, healthcare, access to goods and services, and housing (21).

And, along with Principle Eight, the Council notes:

Member States also have a special responsibility to ensure that cultural and religious practices do not prevent individual
migrants from exercising other fundamental rights or from participating in the host society. This is particularly important as it pertains to the rights and equality of women, the rights and interests of children, and the freedom to practice or not to practice a particular religion (23).

Principle Eight is the last one in which the Council includes any gender specific claims or mentions. While Principle Ten specifically references the importance of mainstreaming, the explanatory remarks that accompany Principle Ten do not reference the tool of gender mainstreaming specifically.

The CBPs indicate that the focus on integration is a real concern for the EU, especially insofar as it concerns economic growth and stability. In addition, the CBPs clearly assume that the primary migrant is a male seeking employment, as is evidenced by the language included in the explanation of each principle. The most telling evidence of this comes in Principle Six, which outlines the various ways migrants are protected in the EU against discrimination. Principle Six does not reference in any way the various EU instruments for supporting and protecting equality between women and men.

However, while the CBPs promulgate the widely-held (erroneous) assumption that the primary migrant to the EU is male, they simultaneously problematize the female migrant. For example, Principle Five, which draws attention to the importance of education in promoting strong integration, singles out women and children as especially in need of education. Implicitly, the Principle ensures that one assumes that the female migrants are in secondary positions and that they are mostly uneducated. Furthermore, the Principle assumes that if female migrants are not targeted for education they could destabilize the integration scheme given the (assumed) important role that they play in the household.

Beyond Principle Five, the “problem” of female migrants continues with the assumptions that underpin Principle Eight. Here, the female migrant is assumed to be a victim of her own (non-Western) culture and in need of rescuing by Western standards of non-discrimination. While certainly it is not impossible to envision cases where this may be true, the Principle removes the agency from the female migrant herself. In addition, the Principle leads one to believe that female migrants are the principle bearers of “other” cultures and/or religions and that these issues make her particularly in need of integrating. The implication within the CBPs is that the female migrant is accompanying a male worker, that she is largely uneducated, and that she needs integrating so that she can run a household and raise children who themselves are capable of integrating productively into the host culture.
In examining the CBPs closely, it appears that the Council and EU policymakers responsible for the language contained in the CBPs did not understand and/or apply the technique of gender mainstreaming in crafting them. By contrast, the language that makes up the CBPs, while cognizant of gender in certain instances outlined above, does not in any way validate the gendered experience of migration or of integration. Instead of using the opportunity to craft principles that could make a real difference in the integration process of both migrant women and men, the principles only solidify antiquated assumptions that migrants are male and that they are important to integrate for only economic reasons. Unfortunately, the focus of the CBPs does nothing to move the integration discussion into the 21st century to reflect the new migration realities.

The Stockholm Programme 2010-14

The Stockholm Programme is an attempt by the Council to include a deeper human rights perspective in the so-called “Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice” in which a range of policies fall, including immigration, asylum, trafficking, and integration policies. A centerpiece of the Stockholm Programme is the emphasis throughout on the importance of human rights. Indeed, in the “Political Priorities” section of the document, “promoting citizenship and fundamental rights” is highlighted, with emphasis given to “vulnerable groups” (European Council 2010, 115/4). Nowhere, in this section, however, are women or female migrants mentioned.

Another prominent section of the document is titled “Promoting Citizens Rights.” In this part of the document, a larger section is dedicated to “vulnerable groups” and here one finds reference to “vulnerable groups in particularly exposed situations, such as women who are the victims of violence or of genital mutilation” (European Council 2010, 115/10). Further down in this same section, the document also highlights the importance of protecting “victims of gender-based violence” (European Council 2010, 115/10). Some mention of women as a particularly vulnerable group appears in the section on trafficking in human beings (European Council 2010 115/22), but the statement on integration of migrants is completely void of all references to women’s needs and role in the integration process (European Council 115/30). Instead, the document notes that “a more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them (migrants) rights and obligations comparable to those citizens of the Union” (European Council 2010, 115/30). Gender mainstreaming, as we saw before in the development of the CBPs, is not evident in the text of the Stockholm Programme.
Europe 2020

Europe 2020 is intended to be the “growth strategy for the decade” (European Commission, Europe 2020). It figures prominently on the EU’s website for Integration and is a centerpiece of the EU efforts to jumpstart effective integration strategies across the Member States. Not surprisingly, then, Europe 2020 focus on a range of growth strategies to meet the targets outlined in Europe 2020. The major targets include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>R&amp;D and Innovation</th>
<th>Climate Change and Energy</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Poverty and Social Exclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75% of 20- to 64-year-olds to be employed</td>
<td>3% of EU’s GDP (public and private combined) to be invested in R&amp;D and Innovation</td>
<td>a. Greenhouse gas emissions 20% lower (or even 30% if conditions are right) than 1990 b. 20% of energy from renewable c. 20% increase in energy efficiency</td>
<td>a. Reducing school drop-out rates below 10% b. at least 40% of 30- to 34-year-olds completing third-level education</td>
<td>At least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty or social exclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission, Europe 2020

While none of the targets include a specific gender dimension, the Commission, in its Strategy for Equality between women and men (2010-15) underscores the importance of working to include a gendered perspective in the relevant aspects of the Europe 2020 Strategy. In particular, the Commission notes the important role it can play in gendering the employment dimension of the Strategy.

The Strategy for Equality (2010-15) draws attention to the role of migrant women and the lower than average employment rate of this group. With this as a starting point, the Commission commits itself, in this document, to fighting for “early support” to migrant women in the early years of their stay in the EU and, more broadly, to helping ensure that migrant women are more aware of
their rights and have good access to education and healthcare (European Commission 2010, 12). The language included around the employment dimension of the Strategy for Equality (2010-15) indicates that while migrant women are important in economic terms to fostering growth across the EU, and therefore need comprehensive access to education and healthcare, there is no systematic effort in place to discern the particular role that migrant women may play in supporting the integration process. Furthermore, there is no apparent interest in examining anything about the experience of migrant woman other than the economic implications of it. In essence, from the two EU statements, it is possible to conclude that the EU’s interest in migrant women is still rather shallow and instrumental at best and, at worst, dismissive.

In the Europe 2020 Strategy, once again, it is easy to see that gender mainstreaming appears to have had little influence on the discussion and policy formulation that went into the development of the targets themselves. It is only through secondary documents related to Europe 2020, such as the Strategy for Equality 2010-15, that any gender dimension is evident. Indeed, groups across Europe, including the European Women’s Lobby, were disappointed and frustrated at the weak gender dimension included in the Europe 2020 Strategy. EWL’s press release draws attention to three major weaknesses with the Europe 2020 Strategy. First, they note that no women’s rights or gender equality dimension is included. Second, they argue that the Strategy does not address gender inequalities in the labor market or promote adequately the care economy. Finally, EWL notes that the Strategy does not systematically address women’s poverty or social exclusion (EWL 2011).

Conclusion

This paper set out to show the weak gender dimension included in the EU’s integration policies to date. Through a careful examination of three key initiatives, the Common Basic Principles for Integration (2004), the Stockholm Programme (2010), and the Europe 2020 strategy, the paper reveals that gender mainstreaming as an EU-wide tool for gender inclusion remains ineffective, at least in the area of integration policy development. Given prior work on the inadequate gender dimension of other areas of migration policy such as asylum and trafficking policy (Morris 2009), that integration policy would also be deficient is not a major surprise. Still, it is disappointing because female migrants are a large and growing group in the EU who have an

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8 See the EWL statement from March 7, 2011, on the matter, available at womenlobby.org.
important role to play in the integration process. As mothers, wives, and workers, female migrants constitute a sizeable group whose active role in both the immigration and integration process, though important, continues to be perceived as passive and secondary. This is a critical oversight and a major missed opportunity for the EU. The far-reaching and likely positive impact of acknowledging and fostering the important role that female migrants play in the integration process could benefit the EU in a myriad of social, cultural, and economic ways. While further work needs to be done on the extent to which the currently weak gender dimension in integration policy is a result of a failure of gender mainstreaming as a tool or is the result of the complex inequalities that are endemic to migration policy, the trajectory on which the EU finds itself in this policy area is not encouraging. In any case, this paper confirms that the current integration scheme falls very short of providing a useful transition path for all migrants.

As EU-level work in this area grows, it is critical that future policies include a specific gender dimension if the EU level integration policies are to galvanize real change across the EU Member States. With riots across Europe from a variety of migrant groups, most recently in France in 2009, it is clear that immigrant integration is of paramount important to a thriving Europe going forward. To that end, if the many gendered aspects of integration continue to be sidelined for what may appear to be more pressing economic issues, or if effective integration is misunderstood to mean only economic productivity, the EU will continue to find itself full of disenchanted migrants who not only find it difficult to integrate into European societies, but no longer want to. To ignore the migrant women at the heart of this debate is to destabilize further the social and economic future of Europe.

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Every year, millions of international travelers enter the United States through and between land, sea, and air ports of entry. There, travelers are required to show an official passport and a visa issued by a US Embassy, though some exemptions apply in the US Visa Waiver Program. To a great extent, for US homeland security strategists, the US visa application process has become a strategic tool for protecting the US homeland from abroad, especially in the aftermath of 9/11 all visitors are scrutinized before entering the US territory. By providing an overview of the US visa issuance system, this paper examines security at US ports of entry as a way of assessing the changes to the US visa system before and after 9/11. The assessment contributes to an evaluation of US security policy performance in areas other than between ports of entry where undocumented migrants and smugglers cross the borderline through the desert, mountains, and canals to get to urban areas. To a large extent, the balance of evidence shows that the level of integration between the United States and Mexico (economic, social, political, cultural integration) may be a stronger determinant of what is happening at US ports of entry on the US-Mexican land border, and the security programs implemented have had only marginal effects, given the long-standing dynamics of the US-Mexican land border.
more than 55 million in 2007 to 62 million in 2011. Visitors from Mexico and Canada constituted about 60 percent of the US international visitation market from 2006 to 2011. ¹ Given the increase in the flow of people, commodities, and financial transactions from and to the United States, Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2004) points out that borders are becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases, and more recently to terrorism. Consequently, it is crucial for the United States government “to work with other countries behind their borders and inside [US borders] … [the US government] is not only bound to lead, but bound to cooperate … American power is not eternal. If we [the US] squander our soft power through a combination of arrogance and indifference, we will increase our vulnerability, sell our values short, and hasten the erosion of our prominence” (Nye 2004, 27; emphasis added).

Within this framework of US interdependence with other countries and the post-9/11 context, the visa system became an important security tool for the US security agencies to track potential terrorists before entering the US. In the ex ante 9/11 context, for instance, Pearson (2000) argued about the latent infiltration of terrorists through the US-Canada land border because the level of security in this border was far lower than in the US-Mexico land border. In this context, he noted that “international terrorists who seek to enter the U.S. must do so by […] applying for admission at a POE [port of entry]” (see Pearson, 2000: 3, emphasis added), so the US visa system was seen as a very important element in upgrading US homeland security. Along the same lines, for Papademetriou et al. (2005, 9) post-9/11 changes in the US visa system were necessary to reassure the “US public that the government was taking all necessary steps to protect the homeland and to send a message to would-be terrorists that the United States was prepared and capable of stopping them from entering through the “front door.”

Thus, President George Bush and his administration made clear that security at US ports of entry was vital to deter potential terrorists from applying for US visas inside or outside the American territory. For example, then Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the post-9/11 US visa system was being restructured to facilitate the transit of people through US “Secure Borders, Open Doors” meant that even under the new circumstances “in every sense, America is still open for business.”² To some extent, the investigations

made by the 9/11 Commission in 2004 justified the US government concerns over the visa system. This was because the 9/11 Commission report confirmed that the perpetrators of 9/11 were in possession of US non-immigrant visas (tourist visa) (see Chapter Seven of 9/11 Commission Report). The US Department of State issues B1 business, B2 tourism and BCC land border crossings visas through US embassies and consulates worldwide as a legal requirement for foreigners to enter and get passage through US territories. Similarly, F, M, and J visas for academic scholars and visitors fall under the non-immigrant visas category.

Along the same lines, the post-9/11 US security policy framework provided, in the USA Patriot Act of 2001, with initiatives to improve information sharing for law enforcement. It also contained important provisions to enhance the protection of the US land, sea and air borders by providing security at ports of entry. This concern for border protection to secure US land, air, and sea ports of entry ran parallel to information-sharing concerns in framing the US Patriot Act of 2001 as a strategy of US homeland protection. In this respect, three sections of Subtitle B, in Title IV of the Patriot Act of 2001 were essential.

On the one hand, sections 414 and 415 mandated the immediate establishment of an Entry-Exit secure data system for airport, seaport, and land ports of entry to ensure that every US visa used by visitors to the United States is genuine. Visitors are also monitored before entering the US, as well as when they enter and leave the country (Ramirez, 2009). Furthermore, the Act allowed the Office of Homeland Security to participate in the Entry-Exit task force (see Sections 414 and 415 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001). On the other hand, Section 416 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 mandated a “Foreign Student Monitoring Program”, for all foreign students registered in all colleges and educational institutions as well as air-flight schools, language training, or vocational institutions in the United States. The main objective of this provision has been to watch students who could be keen on supporting terrorist groups inside or outside the United States. Some American universities reacted against this provision because they feared it would affect the number of international students who each year decide to enroll in American universities.

3 It must be recalled that the US Office of Homeland Security is the origin of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after a bureaucratic restructuring took effect in January 2003 when the provisions of the US Homeland Security of 2002 were implemented. The US Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated the creation of the US Department of Homeland Security to merge all the functions of the agencies in charge of protecting the US homeland before 9/11 under the umbrella of only one federal agency.
because US intelligence agencies would search students’ private records in detail even before they entered the US.

Under this provision the DHS was in charge of implementing the “Enhanced Border Security Act of 2002” which mandated the US government to put in place a foreign student web-based registration program (see US Homeland Security Act of 2002). As a result, the DHS created the “Student and Exchange Visitor Program, (SEVP).” SEVP made the “Student and Exchange Visitor and Information System, (SEVIS)” available to all universities via the Internet, so that each educational institution could individually enter students’ personal information.

In terms of students registered by geographic region, 58.8% of the international students registered in SEVIS are from Asia, 12.5 percent from Europe, 7.3 percent from North America, and 5.5 percent from Middle East countries. As of 2010, China (118,376) and South Korea (103,889) are the leading countries with the highest number of active students in the United States. From 2003, when SEVP took effect, to June 2008, SEVIS has registered 1,052,694 international students. Approximately 79 percent of the students registered during that period were admitted under student visa F1, 10 percent under student visa M1, and the remaining 11 percent were students registered in educational programs that required either a J1 visa or a combination of visa F1 and M1.

According to DHS reports, in January 2010 SEVIS records included seven million visa holders. After 9/11, the US Department of State significantly reduced the number of student visas, particularly the F1. For example, from 2002 to 2004 the number of F1 visas issued was reduced more than 20% compared to 2001. Similarly, the issuance of J1 and M1 visas decreased as well. But, in 2005 the reduction was roughly only 9% compared to 2001. The number of visas issued in 2006 and 2007 increased considerably for the three types of student compared to 2001. This information is summarized in Table 1.

4 The US government has classified South Korea, India, Japan, Taiwan, and others as Asian countries; United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, France, Russia among others as Europe countries; Canada, Mexico and Greenland as North America countries.

5 F1 or Student Visa is assigned to academic students; it is the most common for those who wish to engage in academic studies in the United States. It is for people who want to study at an accredited US college or university, or to study English at an American university or intensive English language institute. US visa M1 is for those who wish to engage in non-academic or vocational study or training in US institutions. J1 is a visa for Cultural Exchange visitors. For further details on US student visas applications and eligibility see US Department of State at http://educationusa.state.gov/. Alternatively, for US Visa Policy see US Department of State at http://www.unitedstatesvisas.gov/whatis/index.html.
Table 1. US Student Visas by type, 1997-2007
In actual numbers and relative annual variation - base 2001=100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total F1</th>
<th>Annual Variation 2001=100%</th>
<th>Total J1</th>
<th>Annual Variation 2001=100%</th>
<th>Total M1</th>
<th>Annual Variation 2001=100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>266,483</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>179,598</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>7,075</td>
<td>131.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>251,565</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>192,451</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>6,515</td>
<td>121.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>262,542</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>211,349</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>6,240</td>
<td>116.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>284,053</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>236,837</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>6,107</td>
<td>113.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>293,357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>261,769</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5,373</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>234,322</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>253,841</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>215,695</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>253,866</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>218,898</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>254,504</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>4,817</td>
<td>89.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>237,890</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>275,161</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td>5,822</td>
<td>108.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>273,870</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>309,950</td>
<td>118.4</td>
<td>7,227</td>
<td>134.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>298,392</td>
<td>101.7</td>
<td>343,946</td>
<td>131.4</td>
<td>9,221</td>
<td>171.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Report of the Visa Office–Bureau of Consular Affairs, US Department of State

In general terms, the US government reduced the number of non-immigrant visas in comparison to the number of immigrant visas after 2002. In this regard, US embassies abroad issued 7,588,778 non-immigrant visas in 2001 and 5,769,437 in 2002; this meant a 24% reduction in only one year. This reduction continued. In 2003 non-immigrant visa issuance decreased by 36% and in 2004 by 33% when compared to 2001. The US Department of State issued the largest number of non-immigrant visas in 2001. Papademetriou (2005) argues, however, that the US visa application process remained almost intact after 9/11, although the reduction in the number of non-immigrant visas issued after 9/11 has been substantial. This information is summarized in Table 2.

Here, it is important to note that US non-immigrant visas are issued to applicants for a temporary stay in the United States. The non-immigrant status means that the holders of these visas are not permitted to work or get government benefits as US residents. Immigrant visas are issued to applicants who wish to live and work in the United States. Holders of immigrant visas are entitled to get social security and other benefits as US residents.
### Table 2. US Non-Immigrant and Immigrant Visas, 1997-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Non-Immigrant Visas (millions)</th>
<th>Annual Variation 2001=100 %</th>
<th>Immigrant Visas (thousands)</th>
<th>Annual Variation 2001=100 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5,942,061</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>416,919</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5,814,153</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>375,684</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6,192,478</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>413,662</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7,141,636</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>413,534</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>7,588,778</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>406,080</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5,769,437</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>389,157</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4,881,632</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>364,768</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5,049,099</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>379,402</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5,388,937</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>402,247</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,836,718</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>449,065</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6,444,285</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>434,374</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Report of the Visa Office–Bureau of Consular Affairs, US Department of State

Additionally, Graph 1 shows the over-time pattern in the number of US non-immigrant and immigrant visas issued from 1997 to 2005. It also shows the number of visas issued before and after 2002 (vertical line). The graph makes clear the drop in the number of US non-immigrant visas (shaded area) after 2001. By contrast, the number of immigrant visas changed only marginally before and after 2002.

Another type of visa that was seriously impacted after 2001 is the B1/B2/BCC (Laser Visa) visa. This type of visa is exclusively issued to Mexican nationals. It can be used to enter the US as tourists/business (B1/B2) and get across the US-Mexico land border (BBC). In 2002 the number of Laser Visas issued decreased by 30% compared to 2001. The number of Laser Visas issued then drops abruptly in the subsequent years (2003-2005). The reduction was 58% in 2003, 63% in 2004, and 63% in 2005, and the trend follows a similar pattern until 2007 (see Graph 2).

The US visa system has also been a key element in protecting the US homeland beyond US land borders (US-Mexico and US-Canada land borders) before US visitors enter the United States. At the same time, it has been essential for the efficient functioning of One Face at the Border and the US-VISIT programs by monitoring visa holders during the visa application...
Graph 1. US Non-Immigrant and Immigrant Visas Over Time, 1997-2007

Source: Table 2


Source: Table 4
process, before they enter the US territory, during their stay, and when they leave the United States. In this regard, despite the sensitive information that the US government intended to collect from the implementation of the US-VISIT program, some exemptions have been granted to Mexican and Canadian nationals, who account for more than 80% of those crossing through US land ports of entry on the US-Canada and US-Mexico land borders.

As noted before, in the case of Mexicans, the US government issues a special type of visa (Biometric B1/B2/BCC) also known as a “Laser Visa.” This type of visa is issued exclusively to Mexican nationals, and it allows them to enter the United States either on a business (B1) or tourist (B2) visitor, and for multiple entries through the US-Mexican land border (Border Crossing Card–BCC). Mexican nationals in possession of a BCC visa are exempt from enrolling in the US-VISIT program. According to the US Department of Homeland Security, more than 45% of the crossings through the US-Mexican land border are BCC crossings. Canadians who do not have a US visa can be admitted to enter the United States with limited information, such as a passport or any other government-issued document that may be used to verify travellers’ identity. Mexicans using a Laser Visa are required to register in the US-VISIT program only once by filling in one I-94 Form. They are allowed to use that I-94 Form for up to six months and for multiple entries. Thus, Mexican nationals do not have to enrol in the US-VISIT each time they get across the border but may do so until the I-94 Form expires and they renew it.

Here it is important to mention that Mexicans in possession of Laser Visas that cross through the US-Mexico land border are required to register in the US-VISIT program for getting a six-month I-94 Form only when they want to go 25 miles further from the US-Mexico borderline. Otherwise Mexicans can use their Laser Visas to cross the border and move around a 25-mile radius from any land border point. For example, Mexicans crossing by land from Tijuana, Mexico to San Diego California through the San Ysidro Port of entry can use their Laser Visas to go up to downtown San Diego. If they attempt to go farther without an I-94 Form, they would violate the conditions of their admission in the United States. So, the CBP Border Patrol in San Diego Sector

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has a full-time traffic checkpoint on the northbound lanes of Interstate 5 in San Clemente, California, which is just outside of San Diego County and halfway to Los Angeles. The strategic location of San Clemente checkpoint enhances the effect of the Border Patrol activities against smuggling of illegal aliens and narcotics away from the San Diego CA-Tijuana Mexico land borderline.

From December 2004 to January 2007, the years of President Bush second term, the US-VISIT program processed more than 76 million visitors. The biometric identification capabilities of US-VISIT have resulted in more than 2,000 matches or “hits” with law enforcement databases. As a result, about 1800 immigration violators and people with criminal history have been intercepted (see Cornwell and Roberts, 2010). The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office of the DHS has made more than 290 arrests based on overstay information collected from the US-VISIT program. So far, the analysis made clear that the implementation of a biometric system has brought about difficulties for the US-VISIT program to enrol travellers in multiple entries; this is particularly true in the cases of Mexican and Canadian nationals. For instance, it lacks an efficient automated component to track visitors’ exits; therefore, travellers are not required to enrol in any US-VISIT Exit component but only when they enter the United States. Without the exit component, the US-VISIT program is unable to match entry and exit records and cannot identify those non-immigrants or visitors who violate the conditions of their stay in the United States. This feature and the impossibility of registering multiple entries at US ports of entry has made the US-VISIT Program weaker and more unreliable to track possible threats along the US-Mexican land border.

At this stage, it is still difficult to establish to what extent the implementation of both programs has increased US homeland security by regulating the flows of people through ports of entry along the US-Mexican land border to make it safer. This is particularly true if we take into consideration that One Face at the Border has only marginally modified the security infrastructure at US-Mexico land ports of entry. Apart from some remarkable technology improvements, the only organizational strength is the creation of the position of CBP officer to integrate three inspection processes into one. In addition, the US-VISIT has failed to register Mexican visa holders in multiple entries, and is incomplete without an efficient Exit component to collect reliable records of visitors’ departures.

It is also arguable whether the 9/11 events alone had a profound and long-lasting effect on the dynamics of the US-Mexico land ports of entry. This

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research suggests that the level of integration between the United States and Mexico (economic, social, political, cultural integration) may be a stronger determinant of what is happening at US ports of entry on the US-Mexican land border than policy changes initiated after 9/11. Data suggests that the security programs implemented by the DHS have had only marginal effects, given the long-standing dynamics of the US-Mexican land border. Consequently, it is important to note that US-Mexico economic integration process was formally accomplished in 1994 when the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), this is going to be analysed more in detail in the next section of the paper. Though, the analysis in this research only covers from mid-1990’s through the George W Bush presidency (2008), it is crucial do conduct further comparative research to identify changes in the Obama era on before and after 9/11 spectrum.

**Bilateral Cooperation in North America**

As previously noted, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US government has been aware of economic integration in North America. The impacts of this integration process on security policymaking and implementation processes. NAFTA formalized the US-Mexico bilateral relation as well as deepened the economic integration process between both countries. Mexico became the US second largest trade partner just after Canada. As a result, the United States has sought to cooperate with its main trade partners to guarantee the flow of safe goods and people. This was particularly important because, on the one hand, after NAFTA 90% of Mexico’s exports go to the US market through the US-Mexico land border.

It is estimated that about 12 million Mexican immigrants live illegally in the United States (Bailey, 2004). On the other hand, the current academic and political debate treats Mexico-to-US undocumented migration flows and border protection policy on the US-Mexico land border not as a US foreign policy concern but as a domestic concern of American society. In this context, trade, investment, migration, and border security remain as the most important issue areas of the US-Mexico bilateral agenda on before and after 9/11 framework. Some authors agree that “Economic concerns prompt the majority

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10 Here, it is important to draw attention to the US-Mexico economic integration as a way of identifying the interdependence between both countries. The emphasis is placed on the analysis of US-Mexico bilateral trade flows. This formalizes that US-Mexico economic integration plays an important role in the dynamics at US-Mexico ports of entry; thus, the US security programs “One Face at the Border” and “US-VISIT” have had marginal effects (see Section Two, Chapter Five).
of migrants to the United States from any area of interest, especially Mexico. It is obvious that, in the aggregate, the U.S. economy is dramatically more affluent and job-rich [also in capital and disposable income] than the economies of any of its southern neighbours” (Mitchell 1997, 40, emphasis added; see also Weintraub 1990; Glade et al. 1989; Benett 1989; Montes de Oca 1993; Orme 1996). On 22 March 2002, the then Secretary of State Colin Powell and Mexico’s Secretary of Governance (Secretaria de Gobernacion) signed the “Border Partnership Agreement.” This agreement was to secure borders by securing goods and people. For the United States:

The border of the future must integrate actions abroad to screen goods and people prior to their arrival in sovereign US territory … agreements with our neighbors, major trading partners, and private industry will allow extensive pre-screening of low-risk traffic, thereby allowing limited assets to focus attention on high-risk traffic…is essential to the task of managing the movement of hundreds of millions of individuals, conveyances, and vehicles.\footnote{See US-Mexico Border Partnership Agreement at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/usmxborder/}  

The United States and Canada also signed a similar agreement called “The Smart Border Declaration.”\footnote{See US-Canada Smart Border Declaration at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021206-1.html.} The objectives of this agreement are similar to the US-Mexico agreement and aim to protect the US-Canada border against terrorist infiltrations through ports of entry. In practical terms, the US-Mexico agreement was implemented by installing SENTRI lanes at US-Mexico land ports of entry. SENTRI is the “Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection.” SENTRI is a program for pre-approved low risk travelers. SENTRI applications are voluntary. All SENTRI applicants must undergo a thorough background check against criminal, law enforcement, customs, and terrorist indices, a 10-fingerprint law enforcement check, and a personal interview with a CBP Officer. If applicants are eligible for the SENTRI program, they are provided with a Radio Frequency Identification Card (RFID) that contains a file number that is read upon arrival in SENTRI lanes at US-Mexico ports of entry. In the US-Canada case, the program is called NEXUS. This program functions in a similar way to SENTRI, however, this is only for American and Canadian citizens, and successful applicants are provided with a photo-identification/proximity card for crossing through US-
Canada ports of entry. This program is not run in all US-Canada ports of entry, but it includes land, sea, and air ports of entry.\textsuperscript{13}

**Final Remarks**

In summary, this paper overviewed the US visa system before and after 9/11 to assess changes to the US visa system before and after 9/11. The intention of the study was to assess the impact of changes in the US visa issuance system as a means of evaluating US security policy performance in securing the US homeland through ports of entry before and after 9/11. In this case, the balance of evidence suggested noticeable changes in the number of visas issued by the US Department of State after 2002 and the enforcement of the SEVIS program to monitor international students. This is particularly true in the case of US student visas and B1/B2/BCC visas that fall into the non-immigrant category. On average, the number of non-immigrant visas reduced by more than 30\% after 2001; F1 student visas were reduced by roughly 30\%; and the B1/B2/BCC visas issued dropped by more than 50\%. At this stage, it is crucial to mention that as with most empirical studies, this one also presents limitations that deserve to be mentioned. In this regard, it is important to recall that this review study only attempts to examine what changes occurred in the US visa system after 9/11. However, the general findings, though rich, presented throughout the study can be used as a basis for further research. What the analysis could not show in detail, for example, is the extent to which the use of the visa system and the visa application process has affected the level of US homeland security.

In addition, the data was not analyzed by specific land, sea, or air ports of entry. The analysis concentrated on overall changes in the number of visas issued by the US Department of State. Finally, further research will be necessary to explore whether the use of the visa application process has been effective in dissuading visitors or terrorists from entering the United States. As mentioned earlier, future research on this topic is needed to keep on the changes that continue to occur under the Barack Obama administration.

\textsuperscript{13} For further details on SENTRI program, such as eligibility and program operational characteristics, see [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/frequent_traveller/sentri/sentri.xml](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/frequent_traveller/sentri/sentri.xml); for NEXUS program and a list of US-Canada operational ports, see [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/frequent_traveller/nexus_prog/nexus.xml](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/frequent_traveller/nexus_prog/nexus.xml).
References


As government has increasingly outsourced service delivery, critics have contended the state has become “hollow,” a government with little or no capacity to manage its relationships with service providers much less deliver services itself. In this environment, government’s heavy reliance on nonprofit agencies raises questions about the capacity and ability of these organizations to effectively deliver services and achieve public goals. A key component of that capacity and ability is the education and training of nonprofit employees, particularly the leaders of these organizations. This study evaluated the preparation and training of nonprofit managers in a medium-sized Southern city using semi-structured interviewing and assessed the need for additional education.

H. Brinton Milward (1994) coined the term “the hollow state” to describe the federal government’s increasing reliance on other entities, including nonprofit organizations, to deliver government services. In the field of human services, government has approximately 200,000 formal agreements and contracts with some 33,000 nonprofit agencies. These nonprofits have an average of 6 contracts and grants each, and government funding constitutes just over 65% of their revenue (Boris et al. 2010). Walters (2011, 33) states that “health and human services nonprofits deliver crucial services to the most vulnerable populations—in essence acting as shadow government agencies on the front lines of service provision.”

But if government is depending on these agencies to deliver critically needed services, an important question arises. Do these nonprofits have the
capacity to deliver the necessary services and fulfill the requirements of government grants and contracts? This paper seeks to examine one important aspect of the organizational capacity of nonprofits—the education and training of their leadership. We open with a discussion of the “hollow state” before moving into an exploration of the concept of organizational capacity as it manifests itself in nonprofits. We will then present the results of our research into education and training levels of nonprofit leaders before concluding with some recommendations.

Privatization and “The Hollow State”

Privatization, in the simplest sense, means to change “from an arrangement with a government producer to one with a private producer” (Savas 2000, 104). In other words, privatization as encountered in the United States is a change in the form a service takes rather than a change or elimination of a function (Seidman 1990). A private contractor becomes a substitute or a proxy for the government, performing public tasks under government supervision and authority (Gilmour and Jensen 1998; Rohr 2002). Thus, privatization can be viewed as a manifestation of principal-agent theory where the principal, the government, retains ultimate responsibility for the provision of the good or service privatized (Savas 2000; Breaux et al. 2002).

The most common reason for privatization cited by both local and state officials is to save money (Miranda and Anderson 1994; David 1992; Chi and Jasper 1997; Walters 2004). Seidman (1990) suggests that privatization is a practical response to the complex political, administrative, and budgetary problems that make it very difficult for government to function. Salamon (1994) notes that the explosive growth in the nonprofit sector is a response to public perceptions of government failure. Musolf and Seidman (1980, 127) claim that the “unfortunate rigidity and unimaginativeness in government regulations” has contributed to the pressures to privatize.

Critics of privatization have focused on pragmatic, constitutional and accountability concerns. Pragmatic critiques question whether privatization actually lives up to its claims to be more efficient and effective. Prominent concerns include lack of competition for contracts (Salamon 1989; Van Slyke 2003), cost savings that fail to materialize or disappear quickly (Martin 1993; Kettl 1993), and deterioration of service quality (Breaux et al. 2002).

Moreover, critics have raised significant constitutional concerns over the relationship between the public and private sectors. The end result of privatization has been to blur the distinction between public and private organizations. Salamon (1989) calls this phenomenon “third-party government,”
and says it has become increasingly difficult to make meaningful distinctions between government and the private sector.

This blurring of the lines between public and private is a topic of great concern to many scholars. Moe (1994) notes that the emphasis placed on “results” in the reinventing government movement leads to a disdain for laws and regulations that may be in the way of progress. This can result in administrators being encouraged to ignore inconvenient laws and regulations, which could lead to private organizations acquiring the powers of the sovereign state (Moe 1987). Rohr (2002) has also expressed concerns over due process rights for public employees in the privatization process.

Of equal or greater concern to critics is the loss of accountability that comes with privatization. In the traditional public administration model, authority and accountability are vested in a clear, hierarchal structure (Bozeman and Bretschneider 2002; Romzek and Ingraham 2000). In a democracy, public officials must be held accountable for their actions. When government performs a function or service, citizens can hold administrators accountable through elected officials. But when public functions are contracted out to private companies or nonprofits, citizens lose some of their ability to hold government accountable for its performance because there is no longer a direct link between the service provider and elected officials (Moe 1987; Bozeman 1988). Moreover, with privatization, government often sheds the very middle managers it needs to develop appropriately detailed specifications for a contract (Moe 1994; Bozeman 2002). This “hollowing out of government” can lead to a lack of government capacity to monitor contractor performance (Moe 1987; Moe 1994; Van Slyke 2003; Romzek and Johnston 2002; Bozeman 2002).

Milward (1994) is credited with inventing the term “the hollow state” to describe the use of third parties to deliver social services and act in the name of, and on behalf of, government. He noted that this is the result of several trends, including the increasing reliance of the federal government on state and local government agencies to deliver services, privatization of government programs, budget shortfalls, and a prevailing philosophy of reducing the size of government.

What has emerged is what has become known as “governing by network” (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). In this new environment, government’s chief task is to arrange and manage networks of private firms, nonprofits, and government agencies rather than manage hierarchies and deliver services (Milward 2000). Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) note the pivotal role technology has played in facilitating the creation and management of these networks.

Nonprofits have played an increasingly prominent role in these networks (Mirabella 2001). Government funding of nonprofits through grants and contracts
increased by 195% in real terms between 1977 and 1997 (Suárez 2010). Nonprofit reliance on government grants and contracts has continued to increase over the years. Government funding constitutes 65% of nonprofit funding, and 60% of nonprofits with government grants and contracts report that government funds constitute their primary source of funding (Boris et al. 2010).

This increasing reliance on government funding has not only fueled the growth of the nonprofit sector, it has led to broad changes in the nonprofit field. The demands of government contracts and grant management, and the increasing emphasis on accountability from philanthropic organizations, have led to nonprofits becoming more focused on efficiency and effectiveness (Suárez 2010). The result has been an increasing emphasis on professionalization in the sector (Suárez 2010; Mirabella and Renz 2001). Hwang and Powell (2009, 270) conclude that “the nonprofit sector has evolved from informal activities of charitable do-gooders to highly formalized endeavors by enterprising individuals.”

Simultaneously, questions have been raised about the capacity of nonprofit organizations to effectively manage contracts and grants while providing necessary services (Fredericksen and London 2000; Venture Philanthropy Partners 2001; Cairns, Harris, and Young 2003; Sobeck and Agius 2007; Stoecker 2007; Hwang and Powell 2009). Fredericksen and London (2000) noted that government agencies may be in such a rush to contract with nonprofits to build affordable housing that they may not be considering the capacity of those organizations to deliver services over time. Stocker (2007) found that nonprofits collect lots of data but do not effectively utilize it, indicating a lack of management capacity. Rivenbark and Menter (2006, 256) conclude that nonprofits are committed to performance management but “often lack the organizational capacity to implement and manage performance measurement systems that accommodate the demands of their various stakeholders.”

Organizational Capacity in the Nonprofit Sector

Organizational capacity can be broadly defined as having “the resources and conditions necessary to achieve effectiveness” (Christensen and Gazley 2008). Fredericksen and London (2000) propose four elements of organizational capacity—leadership and vision; management and planning; fiscal planning and practice; and operational support. Christensen and Gazley (2008) proposed that capacity is a function of organizational infrastructure, human resources, financial resources and management systems, and the political and market characteristics of the nonprofit’s external environment. Venture Philanthropy Partners (2001) identifies seven characteristics of
organizational capacity in nonprofits—aspirations, strategy, organizational skills, human resources, systems and infrastructure, organizational structure, and culture. Whatever qualities or characteristics on the list of factors, Sobeck and Agius (2007) suggest that questions remain about the importance of each proposed characteristic of organizational capacity and their temporal order.

Improving organizational capacity is a well-recognized imperative. Unfortunately, there is no established consensus on how to actually build capacity (Cairns, Harris, and Young 2003; Wagner 2003). Moreover, capacity building is often a service provided by contracted consultants engaging in a short-term relationship with a nonprofit that is either poorly evaluated or not evaluated at all (Sobeck and Agius 2007). To further complicate matters, nonprofits themselves prefer to invest resources into program delivery rather than building the organization’s capacity to manage itself effectively (Wagner 2003).

Despite this, all of the lists of the characteristics of organizational capacity include a leadership and human resource component. The training and development of nonprofit managers has been a consistent thread in the literature on capacity building. Indeed, Wagner (2003) identified “a glaring capacity gap in the area of high-level managerial skills.” Sobeck and Agius (2007, 243) found that executive directors “recognized the need” for additional training to “improve their leadership, time management, human resources and marketing.” Hwang and Powell (2009) found that nonprofit organizations led by a professional degree holder were more likely to adopt formal procedures, engage in efforts to demonstrate accountability, and stay current in management practice in their field. These findings point to the importance of education and training in improving organizational capacity. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to examining the level of education and training nonprofit managers have and the implications of that for the capacity of nonprofit organizations to deliver services and manage grants and contracts for “the hollow state.”

Methodology

This study was conducted in Columbia and Richmond counties in the Central Savannah River Area (CSRA). Richmond County is primarily an urban community centered on Augusta, Georgia while Columbia County is primarily a suburban community most of whose residents work in Augusta. A comparison of key demographic features is provided in Table 1.

Population and Sample

The population was defined as nonprofit organizations operating in Richmond or Columbia County. This population was identified by conducting
Table 1. Demographic Comparison of Richmond and Columbia Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State of Georgia</th>
<th>Columbia County</th>
<th>Richmond County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median household income</td>
<td>$47,469</td>
<td>$68,986</td>
<td>$34,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population living below the poverty level</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population with a high school diploma or higher</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population with a bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population White</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population Black</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership rate</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


multiple searches on the website of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for nonprofit organizations operating within Richmond and Columbia counties, which was then used to generate a list of all nonprofits operating within the target area. Contact information was collected on all of the organizations in the population using the internet and the local phone book. A total of 219 nonprofit organizations operating in the two counties were identified in this manner.

The organizations were then stratified into 21 categories based on type. A stratified sample was then pulled using type of organization and county as the critical categories. Nonprofit organizations that were identified as being no longer in operation, churches, scholarship-awarding, “one-person shops,” or managed by larger nonprofits were excluded from the sample, giving preference to those with phone numbers. The final sample size was 141. These organizations covered a wide range of activities from the arts (20) to education (15) to sports and recreation (6). A total of 49 organizations agreed to participate in the study for a response rate of 32.8%.

Instrument

To evaluate the level of training and education nonprofit managers possess, semi-structured interviews were used. An interview instrument was developed that featured only open-ended questions. The instrument asked a range of questions to gauge the size of the organization (budget, number of people employed, number of volunteers), its mission, the population served, the responsibilities of the respondent, the amount of training and education
received prior to assuming his/her current position in the nonprofit, and the respondent’s assessment as to the adequacy of that training and/or education. Respondents were also asked to identify what training or education they wished they had received before assuming their position. Finally, they were asked if they were to design a training program for nonprofit managers, what they would include. The instrument was delivered primarily through a telephone interview with a representative of the nonprofit and conducted by one of the authors of this paper. One interview was done in person, two were completed through e-mail, and two were completed through regular mail. The instrument is included in an Appendix.

Findings

The respondents were primarily chief executives of nonprofits (36 or 73.5% of respondents). The remainder was administrators. The organizations had few paid staff (81.6% had seven or fewer employees) and relied primarily on volunteers for service delivery. Just over half (53.1%) had 25 or fewer volunteers. Budgets also tended to be small with just over half (51%) having a budget of $150,000 or less. Just four organizations had budgets that exceeded $1 million.

The respondents were generally well versed with regard to their organizational mission statements, which covered a wide range of objectives (Table 2). Ten (20.4%) of the organizations had a mission that involved serving the mentally ill, disabled, or those with special needs. Five (10.2%) organizations were tied to other institutions in the area, such as colleges or hospitals, and described their missions as furthering the interests of those institutions. In addition, five (10.2%) organizations had missions that involved providing a venue for, or the promotion of, the arts.

When asked about the population served, many organizations provided specific responses such as “low to moderate income families.” However, a total of 17 respondents (59.2%) claimed that their population served was “the entire CSRA.” Ten of those respondents were chief executives. This vague response is an indicator that some organizations may have a poorly defined mission.

An equally disturbing result was the number of respondents who could not answer questions, despite their position as chief executive. For example, four respondents did not know how many volunteers the organization used; three of those four were chief executives. Eight respondents did not know the size of the budget; three of those were managers and one was the secretary/treasurer! As expected, respondents had a wide-range of responsibilities. But when asked to describe their specific areas of responsibilities, most respondents did
Table 2: Missions of Participating Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To promote the independence of minority groups</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To further institutional interests</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide affordable housing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help women in crisis situations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical preservation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To promote/provide a venue for the arts</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To serve/care for the homeless</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To serve youth</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To serve the poor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal rescue</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide assistance to families of local hospital patients</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support minority/disadvantaged businesses</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental stewardship/conservation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To serve the mentally ill/disabled/those with special needs</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation of a halfway house</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community/neighborhood improvement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide educational services</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

not identify responsibilities typically associated with executive leadership. For example, just one respondent identified “leadership” as part of his/her job. The most commonly identified tasks centered on day-to-day chores and program delivery. These responses included managing/organizing programs (12), managing daily operations (19), managing finances (14), developing and keeping the staff focused on the mission (16), and working with the board of directors. While these were the most commonly identified tasks, it is significant that NONE of these were identified by a majority of respondents. Given that 36 (73.5%) of respondents were in chief executive positions, this is a significant disconnect. Table 3 presents these results.

Respondents were also asked to describe the training they had received prior to assuming their current position and to evaluate its adequacy. Surprisingly 30 (61.2%) of respondents claimed they had received adequate training. This assessment seems to be based primarily on the respondents’ level of work experience because very few received any actual training. Just two (4.1%) respondents had received an orientation; eight (16.3%) were given on-the-job training; and 11 (22.4%) admitted receiving no training at all. The remaining 28 respondents felt that their experience or education meant they did not need training.
Table 3. Job Responsibilities Identified by Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th># (%) Identifying this as a job responsibility</th>
<th># (%) Not identifying this as a job responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managing/organizing programs</td>
<td>12 (24.5)</td>
<td>37 (75.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing/supervising volunteers</td>
<td>4 (45)</td>
<td>45 (91.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing organization’s finances</td>
<td>14 (28.6)</td>
<td>35 (71.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing organization’s property</td>
<td>2 (4.1)</td>
<td>47 (95.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing daily operations</td>
<td>19 (38.8)</td>
<td>30 (61.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with the Board of Directors</td>
<td>13 (26.5)</td>
<td>36 (73.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing the mission/Keeping the organization focused on the mission</td>
<td>16 (32.7)</td>
<td>33 (67.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media relations</td>
<td>4 (8.2)</td>
<td>45 (91.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing the organization</td>
<td>8 (16.3)</td>
<td>41 (83.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant writing</td>
<td>5 (10.2)</td>
<td>44 (89.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching/training staff and volunteers</td>
<td>3 (6.1)</td>
<td>46 (93.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>8 (16.3)</td>
<td>41 (83.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing/organizing events</td>
<td>6 (12.2)</td>
<td>43 (87.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with/organizing the community</td>
<td>4 (8.2)</td>
<td>45 (91.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing/Contracting items for the organization</td>
<td>3 (6.1)</td>
<td>46 (93.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing/supervising paid staff</td>
<td>8 (16.3)</td>
<td>41 (83.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caseworker</td>
<td>5 (10.2)</td>
<td>44 (89.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General administrative work</td>
<td>10 (20.4)</td>
<td>39 (79.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT administration</td>
<td>3 (6.1)</td>
<td>43 (87.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating the work of the organization</td>
<td>3 (6.1)</td>
<td>46 (93.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenting information to the public</td>
<td>1 (2.0)</td>
<td>48 (98.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>1 (2.0)</td>
<td>48 (98.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Everything”</td>
<td>8 (16.3)</td>
<td>41 (83.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this was a group of respondents with plenty of work experience and education. For example, 12 (24.5%) respondents had work experience in other nonprofit organizations, eight (16.3%) had worked in private organizations, and 11 (22.4%) had work experience in government organizations. In terms of education, two (4.1%) respondents reported having an associates’ degree related to the nonprofit’s work, eight (16.3%) had a related bachelors’ degree, 12 (24.5%) had a related masters’ degree, and two (4.1%) respondents held doctoral degrees.
When asked to identify what training they would have liked to have received, but did not, respondents had a wide range of responses. The only responses to draw significant support from multiple respondents were budgeting (14 or 28.6%), fundraising (eight or 16.3%), grant writing (eight or 16.3%), and marketing (seven or 14.3%). Nine respondents said “none.”

**Discussion and Recommendations**

Capacity building requires patience and commitment, specifically strong commitment from nonprofit leaders (Venture Philanthropy Partners 2001). Wagner (2003) notes, however, that nonprofit leaders prefer to devote their time and resources to service delivery and neglect capacity building. This study reinforced her conclusion.

An important facet of capacity building is training and education, particularly of those in management and leadership positions. The prevailing trend in the nonprofit sector is toward professionalization (Hwang and Powell 2009) with more specialized education and training in nonprofit management (Mirabella and Wish 2001). Unfortunately, this study found that nonprofits in this region are not following this trend.

Despite the fact that 73.5% of respondents in this study were in chief executive positions, few of them identified responsibilities that are typically associated with such a position. Moreover, some could not answer basic questions about the organization, including ones about the size of the budget, number of volunteers, the population served, or the mission, with any clarity or assurance. While over half had prior work experience that they felt prepared them for their position, and almost half had degrees in a field related to the nonprofit’s work, the respondents’ inability to adequately answer basic questions leads us to conclude that nonprofit managers in our area need training and education in managing nonprofit organizations.

This study found that nonprofit managers in our area receive little or no training to prepare them for the challenges of managing nonprofits. This lack may explain why they were ill-prepared to answer basic questions about their responsibilities and important facets of their organizations. With no training or education program available in our area to address this need, Augusta State University should follow national trends, and seriously consider affiliating itself with the Nonprofit Leadership Alliance and establishing professional certification programs for undergraduate and graduate students with an interest in nonprofit management. An alternative response would be to establish a short training program in nonprofit management skills through the university’s Center for Public Service and Research.
Building the capacity of nonprofit organizations through training and educating their leadership is essential if nonprofits are to be able to effectively provide public services and programs the hollow state is no longer willing or able to provide. Universities are ideally placed to build that capacity through training and education programs sustained over time and developed with an understanding of community needs and best practices in the field. Such work also allows universities to meet their obligation to serve the local community.

Appendix

Needs Assessment Survey

The Center for Public Service and Research wants to know if there is a demand for nonprofit training and education. Your participation in this survey will give us valuable insight into the training and education needs for nonprofit managers, and help us determine if Augusta State University should offer professional certification in this field. Your responses will be kept confidential.

1. What is the mission of your nonprofit organization?
2. Who does your nonprofit serve?
3. How many people does your nonprofit employ? How many volunteers do you have?
4. What is your annual budget?
5. What is your current title?
6. Could you please describe your responsibilities?
7. What training did you receive before you assumed these responsibilities? (If no training received, go to question 9)
8. (If training received) Was this training adequate?
9. What training would you like to have received, but did not?
10. Our Center is working on developing a one-week training class for new managers of nonprofit agencies. If you could design a training class for new nonprofit managers, what would you include in it?
11. Augusta State University is considering adding a professional certification program for nonprofit managers to its curriculum. The required components are on the next page.
   a. Do you think there would be interest and support for such a program in our community?
   b. Would you personally consider coming to ASU to gain such a certification?
c. Do you believe there are job opportunities for students who graduated with such a certification?
d. Would you prefer to hire someone who had a degree with such a certification?
e. If that degree was acquired on-line, would that matter in your hiring decision?

References


Treating Coordination Continuously: Retesting the Varieties of Capitalism on National Innovation Style

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University of Georgia

What causes national differences in innovative activities? The theory of varieties of capitalism (VOC) claims that coordinated market economies have comparative advantages in incremental innovation and liberal market economies have comparative advantages in radical innovation. In addition, the VOC has faced challenges from recent literature that offers conflicting evidence. This paper identifies two weaknesses of existing literature on VOC and creates a continuous economic coordination index to test VOC hypotheses on innovation with time-series-cross-sectional analysis. The results suggest that VOC can explain long term relationship between coordination and radical innovation; however, for the short term, it can only explain cross country variation but not intra-country variation. This weakness suggests that one key factor is missing. I propose culture as the missing factor to solve the puzzle. The results also indicate that international relations do not play much role in affecting radical innovation. Last, the results show that the US is not an outlier in radical innovation.

Why are some countries good at radical innovations, defined as totally new product lines or processes, while others are good at incremental innovations, defined as minor improvements of existing technology, products or processes? What causes national differences in innovative activities? In the field of comparative political economy, the theory of varieties of capitalism (VOC) provides a mainstream institutional answer. Coordinated market economies (CMEs) have the institutional advantages in incremental innovation and liberal market economies (LMEs) have the advantage in radical innovation. However, utility of VOC theory has been challenged in recent literature. After reviewing arguments from both sides, I argue that most of the works on the VOC are methodologically flawed because they treat economic coordination style as a categorical (nominal) variable. To fix the problem, I have created a
new continuous economic coordination index and applied time-series-cross-sectional analysis to evaluate different arguments. The results show general support for VOC theory but also suggest room for improvement in it.

Theory of the Varieties of Capitalism on Innovation

VOC theory emphasizes types of interaction among institutional economic actors within states. On the one hand, institutions constrain the choices of actors. On the other hand, actors not only are constrained by institutions but also actively look for ways to advance their interests by making institutions work for them (Hall and Thelen 2009). Such interaction between actors and institutions create different comparative advantages for different institutional structures (Hall and Soskice 2001).

The VOC distinguishes between two types of economic institutional systems, liberal market economy (LME) and coordinated market economy (CME). The theory postulates that significant and consistent structural variation in five sub-institutions, corporate governance, internal corporate structure, industrial relations, vocational training system, and inter-firm relations, impacts innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001; Herrmann 2008).

In LMEs, economies generally coordinate according to price signals. In terms of corporate governance, LME firms are mostly financed by the equity market. Because of the impatient and volatile nature of the equity market, investors can easily dump a firm with short term loss and the latter is always subject to merger and acquisition by other firms. These concerns define the essence of inter-firm relations in LMEs. Therefore, to secure stable financing, firm managers have to focus on short term performance and are willing to take high risks for high profits. Decentralized shareholding, another characteristic of the equity market, allows firm managers to have control over their decision making. Consequently, focus on short term performance requires managers to be able to hire and fire employees easily to deal with changing economic situation and product lines. Thus, firms usually offer short term contracts to employees. Due to insecure employment, labor prefers to invest in general skills that can be applied in different industries to industry- or firm-specific skills. Moreover, as firms tend to compete with each other on short term base, employee poaching is acceptable and encouraged in LME, making firms unwilling to invest in employee work related education, which further motivates labor to invest in general skills.

On innovative activities, the LMEs have institutional advantages in extremely profitable but risky radical innovation, such as the creation of the computer, internet or a new drug for certain disease. It provides firms short term but huge amounts of capital via equity market. Power concentration in
the inner firm structure allows managers to make major organizational changes swiftly. Short term employment contracts enable firms to change product lines drastically to fulfill market demands. A fluid labor market, a generally skilled labor force and frequent asset exchange resulting from mergers and acquisition create an environment conducive to interactive learning and information exchange across industries. This environment is the foundation for new idea creation (Lundvall 2010).

In CMEs, firms are mainly financed by “patient capital” such as long term bank loans and cross shareholding. Because of a secure short term operating environment, inter-firm relationships in CMEs are more collaborative than in LMEs. Shielded by long term financing from short term losses, managers are required to focus on long term and low risk performance. However, the long term relationship with lenders and their concentrated shareholding power make managers subject to shareholder influence over decision making. Focusing on long term planning requires managers to have stable work forces and be tolerant of labor unions. In return, firms demand high quality labor. Additionally, with long term employment and high wages, labor in CMEs is willing to invest in industry- or firm-specific skills instead of general skills.

CMEs have comparative advantages in incremental innovation, such as developing a more energy efficient engine or a manufacturing machine with faster processing speed. Long term financing and shareholder preference over low risks motivate firms to invest in specific assets that cannot be easily transferred to other purposes and emphasizes a focus on existing technological advantages. Stable employment, specific skilled labor force, and inflexible asset exchange create environment good for interactive learning within a firm or industry. As a result, these factors make it secure for employees to propose minor improvements to existing work. Collaborative inter-firm relationship, particularly supplier-client relations, helps guide the direction of within industry innovation.

The VOC and Its Challengers

Much VOC literature not only shows how institutional complementarity causes different innovation styles (Amable 2003; Unger 2000) but also provides evidence showing that uncomplementary institutions undermine innovation capabilities (Carney and Loh Yi 2009; Casper 2009). However, in recent years, more and more studies have challenged VOC as an adequate explanation (Lorenz 2010; Taylor 2004; Akkermans et al. 2007; Allen and Aldred 2009; Casper and Whitley 2004). They have argued that being a CME or LME does not affect the innovation style of a country. Rather, other factors play key roles. In particular, Taylor (2004) has claimed that the US constitutes
an outlier in innovation activity, and that the innovation performance of other countries has depended on their relations with the US. The better relations they have with the US, the better they are at radical innovation.

However, the existing VOC literature including its challengers has a common methodological weakness, in that economic coordination is treated as a categorical (nominal) variable. Such an approach is problematic because not only there are variations among nations in the same category, but over time domestic institutions change (Deeg and Jackson 2007). Palier and Thelen (2010) and Rohde (2001) showed that institutional style is not fixed—there is variation in institutional structures. By treating economic coordination as categorical, variation in economic coordination and institution combinations are ignored. What is worse, when countries with mixed institutions are treated in the same way as countries with complementary institutions, the effect of institutional variation on innovation style would be obscured because they must be classified as either CMEs or LMEs.

To illustrate my argument, Figure 1 shows that the relationship between stock market capitalization and employment protection are negatively correlated. Nation A and nation B are on the middle level of both variables. However, when economic coordination is treated as dummy variable and A is classified as CME and B as LME, no conclusion can be made on the relationship between economic coordination and employment protection. Some scholars suggested more categories (Crouch 2005); however increasing the number of categories may mitigate the problem but cannot fix it. Therefore categorizing economic coordination is problematic. To fix this problem, I have created a continuous measurement of national economic coordination with variables on the five sub-institutions. By doing so, I avoid the problem of categorizing economic coordination as a dichotomous variable and pay attention to variation in coordination level. With continuously measured economic coordination level, I first test one hypothesis implied by VOC.

In general, low coordination level results in good radical innovation performance and high coordination level causes poor radical innovation performance.

After testing the general hypothesis, I then scrutinize the hypothesis with time-series-cross-sectional analysis. If the VOC is correct, the following two hypotheses should be confirmed.

1. Countries with lower coordination level are better at radical innovation than those with higher coordination level.
For individual countries, the time periods with lower coordination level should have better performance on radical innovation than the periods with higher coordination level.

The last hypothesis receives little attention from the field. This paper contributes to the existing theory by adding time as a consideration.
Data

The sample includes data on innovation activities and institutions from 1985 to 1998. Only the following 18 OECD countries have the data for all variables: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherland, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.

Dependent Variable

Patents have been used to examine macro level innovation activities in the economic field. Among different kinds of patents, in this paper, I will focus on utility patents, which are defined to be “useful processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of matter”. With that said, patent number only measures general innovativeness of a country but not quality of innovation. To measure the quality of patents and a nation’s capability for radical innovation, I use forward citation weighted patent data. Patent citation has two functions. One is to set up boundaries of intellectual property and provides protection. The other is to track technological trajectories. In general, patent citation is similar to academic citation. One journal article or a book is a product of innovation. When one uses the ideas of others, citations of the works are required. Path breaking articles or books, which are radical innovation, usually have great amount of citations while less important or innovative publications tend to have fewer citations.

For a technology patent, when it is built upon existing patents, it needs to cite the old patents so that the intellectual property rights of old patents are distinguished from those of new ones. Also, from citations researchers can chart the relations between newly granted patents and the older ones cited to track technological development. As a radically innovative patent by definition starts a new technology trajectory, it is the only target to be cited and will receive a greater amount of citations as the technology matures. In contrast, an incrementally innovative patent, as an improvement on existing technology, is among a large number of similar patents and will receive relatively fewer citations than radical patents. Additionally, as old patents tend to have more citation than new patents, patent age is controlled.

Measuring innovation with patent also has some weaknesses. First, not all innovations are patentable. For example, the laws of nature such as new mathematical or physical formulas are not patentable. Second, not all patentable innovations are patented. Some firms prefer using commercial secret to protect their innovation. Coca-Cola’s recipe is the classical example of commercial secret. Obviously citation weighted patents cannot reflect the above two types of innovation because they are not patented.
The data on patents and citations are collected from the National Bureau of Economic Research patent dataset (Hall et al. 2001). The dataset includes all utility patents in the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted during my sample time period. My focus on utility patents only should not be a problem because these account for 92% of all patents assigned. Besides, some may doubt if the dataset is capable of representing international innovative activities. I acknowledge that the US has a much larger quantity of patents and citations in the data set than other countries. To fix the problem, I run two different models for each of the hypotheses to examine the impact of US cases: one with US observations and the other without US observations. For models without US cases, I argue that the dataset can represent international innovative activities because a patent is only protected in the country where it is granted. For instance, patents granted in the US are protected in the US only. In order for them to be protected in other countries, they have to be granted by the patent offices of other countries. Hence, new technologies have to acquire patents in different patent offices to be protected in different markets. The US as the key player in the world market is at the top target for international patent applicants and the dataset should cover all internationally marketable innovations.

**Independent Variables**

I create a continuous score of economic coordination with variables derived from five sub-institutions. Before describing how the coordination score is created, I need to describe these five variables first. Corporate governance is measured by the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP from World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) online dataset. A higher ratio indicates more reliance of domestic firms on domestic bank loans. Conventional VOC scholars used market capitalization to measure corporate governance (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Thelen 2009). Such measurement, I argue, overestimates the reliance of domestic firms on equity markets because the firms listed in equity markets do not necessarily operate in the listed market. For example, Sinopec, a Chinese oil monopoly ranked 5th in Fortune Global 500 in 2011, is listed in the US stock market but it does not operate in the US market at all. By contrast, as almost all domestic bank loans are received by domestic firms, my measurement is a better measurement for national institution of corporate governance.

Training system is measured with national skill specificity. High skill specificity represents high coordination level in the training system while low skill specificity represents low training system. I adopt Hall and Gingerich’s (2001) measurement of skill specificity, which uses the number of students enrolled in secondary vocational education as the percentage of the secondary
school age cohort population plus the number of students enrolled in tertiary vocational training as the percentage of the tertiary school age cohort population. The data on enrollment and school age cohort population are collected from UNESCO and OECD websites.

Other scholars provide alternative measurements of skill specificity. Estevez-Abe et al (2001) measured skill specificity with vocational training share (VTS) among secondary school age cohort population. Culpepper (2007) correctly argued that VTS failed to distinguish between tertiary general education and tertiary vocational education because in most of the developed countries some secondary vocational programs could lead to higher education rather than directly to the labor market. Culpepper proposed to measure skill specificity with tertiary vocational training (TVT) share among tertiary school age cohort population and he claimed that this measurement captures better national skill specificity than VTS. However, similar to VTS to some extent, TVT ignores secondary vocational training students who enter labor market right after graduation. Therefore, neither VTS nor TVT is a good measurement for national skill specificity. Iversen and Soskice’s (2001) measurement based on individual level survey and job classification is good but difficult to use to compare on the national level and the data are very limited to certain years.

Hall and Gingerich’s measurement has advantages over the others discussed above. Although Hall and Gingerich’s (2001) measurement focuses on vocational training only, it is a good proxy to measure general skill specificity. High vocational training share indicates high skill specificity; low vocational share could mean low skill specificity based on either high general skill level based on tertiary education or low skill level due to lack of education. Since my sample countries are all OECD members, I argue that it is unlikely that their population is unskilled in general and suffers from lack of education. Therefore, for this study, low skill specificity measures the level of general skills.

As for internal structure, industrial relations, and inter-firm relations, the Comparative Welfare States Dataset (CWSD) (Huber et al. 2004) provides widely accepted measurements for the three variables. Internal structure is measured with long term employment security guarantee score. All countries are assigned to one of three values: 0, 0.5, and 1. Being 0 means employment security is relatively uncommon; 0.5 means medium or long term employment security provided by some firms; and 1 means long term or lifetime employment security in common in large firms.

Industrial relation is measured by the wage setting coordination score from the CWSD. The variable measures how coordinated wage bargaining is. Values of 1 to 5 are assigned to countries, with 1 being fragmented wage bargaining and 5 being centralized bargaining by government imposition of wage schedule.
Inter-firm relation is measured with the level of alliances among competing firms for research and development (COMPFIRM) from the CWSD. Being 1 means extensive use of alliances usually among more than two firms; 0.5 means moderate use of alliances by many firms; and 0 means infrequent use of alliances.

With data from the above five sub-institutions, I conducted a factor analysis that produced a single factor with an Eigenvalue greater than 1. Skill specificity has a loading of 0.31, corporate governance 0.31, internal structure 0.83, inter-firm relations 0.59, and industrial relations 0.66. The preliminary results of loadings seem to fit the VOC’s expectation on institutional complementarity. The coordination score has a mean of nearly 0, and ranges from -1.57 to 1.65 with a standard deviation of 0.87.

**Control Variables**

Patent age, GDP per capita, number of researchers, R&D expenditure and alliance with the US are controlled in all models. Patent age has to be controlled due to a truncation problem embedded in the patent data; that is, old patents tend to have more citations than new patents. By controlling for patent age I can compare radicalness of innovation across time and countries. Because patents are only valid for 20 years in the US and the patent database covers patents granted in 2006, patents granted before 1986 are coded 20 for patent age; those granted after 1986 have decreased patent age from 19 years if granted in 1987 to 8 years for those granted in 1998.

GDP per capita needs to be controlled because more developed nations tend to have more resources to spend on capital-wise risky radical innovation therefore they are better at it. GDP per capita is measured with constant 2000 US dollar and collected from WDI dataset. The number of researchers is controlled because more researchers mean more human capital on research and development and greater overall innovation capability. It is measured with full time equivalent value, in which each individual full time researcher is counted as 1 and part time researcher as 0.5. R&D expenditure includes both public and private investments in R&D and is measured in million constant 2005 US dollar. R&D expenditure is a better control variable than defense budget or spending because the latter covers not only R&D but also the expenditure irrelevant to R&D such as retirement payment for veterans.

Alliance with the US is controlled because Taylor’s work suggests that international relations affect national innovation performance. Alliance is hard to measure particularly when none of the countries in the sample has had bad relations with the US during the time frame examined. Moreover, the narrowly defined alliance based on economic or trade relations does not guarantee improvement in innovation. Technology transfer usually boosts productivity.
but not innovation because in the short term the imported technology is directly applied in production not in research and in the long term when a nation is used to technology transfer there is no need to innovate. Second, the technology involved in foreign direct investment (FDI) is usually not state of art technology. The reason is that foreign investors always have strict restrictions on the scale and breadth of technology distribution in the FDI recipient countries; therefore the latter may benefit from the technology brought by the FDI but cannot have control over it.

To solve the problem, I focus on the military alliance that not only involves innovative activities but also grants allies access to core technology. According to US Code Title 10 section 2350a, only NATO members and major non-NATO allies (MNNA) are clearly defined and allowed to conduct cooperative research and development projects on defense equipment and munitions with the US. Being either a NATO member or MNNA would significantly improve nations’ innovative capability. Thus, the measurement on the alliance is based on NATO membership and MNNA status. Besides recent new NATO members, countries affected by MNNA status in my sample include Australia and Japan since 1989, and New Zealand since 1997 (US Code Title 22 Section 120.32). The US and US allies are coded as 1; non-allies are coded 0.

**Results**

The OLS results (Table 1) of the relationship between coordination level and innovation radicalness seem to fit VOC’s expectation as an increase in the coordination level causes a decline in the radicalness of innovation. Being an ally of the US, contrary to Taylor’s theory, undermines one’s performance in terms of radical innovation. More R&D expenditure results in greater radical innovation performance. Then I divide the sample by country and by year to examine whether the results suggested by the OLS model hold true for subgroups.

Surprisingly, Figure 2 and Figure 3 suggest different answers. Figure 2 shows that the OLS model is not applicable to countries such as Canada, Finland and Ireland whose increases in coordination level are accompanied by stronger radical innovation performance. For countries like Denmark, New Zealand and even the US, the coordination level seems to be irrelevant to radical innovation. In comparison, Figure 3 indicates that when we compare countries across time, there is a general negative relationship between coordination and radical innovation.
Table 1. OLS Test of Radicalness-Coordination Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>radical</td>
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<tr>
<td>coordination</td>
<td>-1.172***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdppc</td>
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<td>alliance</td>
<td>-1.973***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>researcher</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>rnd</td>
<td>0.0000213***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patent_age</td>
<td>-0.0265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>9.550***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 120
adj. $R^2$ 0.456

Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The conflicting but preliminary results shown above prompt me to scrutinize further the cross-country and cross-time relationships between coordination level and radical innovation. Table 2 includes results of four models. Model 1 examines the within effects of coordination level on radical innovation. No variable is significant indicating that changes in domestic coordination level do not influence one’s innovative quality. Model 2 examines between effects of the relationship. Coordination level and researcher are significant, indicating that countries with higher coordination level and fewer researchers are worse at radical innovation than those with lower coordination level and more researchers.

Model 3 and Model 4 aim to test Taylor’s claims that the US is an outlier of international innovative activities and that one’s innovation performance depends on its relations with the US. The theory is tested by excluding US observations from the sample. Comparing Model 1 with Model 3 and Model 2 with Model 4, the exclusion of US cases does not affect coefficients significantly. The results do not indicate the US to be an outlier. Secondly,
Figure 2. Radicalness-coordination relation, by country

Figure 3. Radicalness-coordination relation, by year
Table 2. Within Effect Model and Between Effect Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Within</th>
<th>(2) Between</th>
<th>(3) Within w/o US</th>
<th>(4) Between w/o US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>coordination</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>-1.548**</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>-1.522**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.688)</td>
<td>(0.590)</td>
<td>(0.697)</td>
<td>(0.598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdppc</td>
<td>0.00000257</td>
<td>0.0000137</td>
<td>0.0000494</td>
<td>0.0000450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000545)</td>
<td>(0.000116)</td>
<td>(0.0000585)</td>
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<td>-1.416</td>
<td>0.0189</td>
<td>-1.090</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.947)</td>
<td>(0.817)</td>
<td>(1.128)</td>
<td>(0.909)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0000489*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.0000178)</td>
<td>(0.0000223)</td>
<td>(0.0000258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rnd</td>
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<td>-0.000130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.000228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0000952)</td>
<td>(0.0000845)</td>
<td>(0.00000551)</td>
<td>(0.000142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000111)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patent_age</td>
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<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.0500</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0929)</td>
<td>(0.669)</td>
<td>(0.0952)</td>
<td>(0.786)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>7.956**</td>
<td>4.800</td>
<td>7.898**</td>
<td>9.862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.498)</td>
<td>(10.26)</td>
<td>(2.469)</td>
<td>(11.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Model 3 and Model 4, similar to the models with US cases, show that coordination level and number of researchers have significant impact on innovation style across countries but not across time.

However, the four models above assume that institutional change can affect innovation as quickly as within one year. Although some innovative activities are very responsive to institutional change, others take some time to reflect changes in institutions. Because of this, I also run the models with lags from one year to four years for independent and control variables. Results are presented in from Table 3 to Table 6. The first observation is that, for models with one-year and two-year lags, coordination level and number of researchers
Treating Coordination Continuously, Zhang

Table 3. Within Effect Model and Between Effect Models, 1-Year Lag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(5) Within</th>
<th>(6) Between</th>
<th>(7) Within w/o US</th>
<th>(8) Between w/o US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lag_1yr</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-1.608**</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>-1.550**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.664)</td>
<td>(0.554)</td>
<td>(0.676)</td>
<td>(0.555)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdppc_lag1</td>
<td>-0.0000573</td>
<td>0.0000346</td>
<td>-0.0000370</td>
<td>0.0000643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000565)</td>
<td>(0.000107)</td>
<td>(0.0000612)</td>
<td>(0.000111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alliance_lag1</td>
<td>-0.0529</td>
<td>-1.499*</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>-1.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.911)</td>
<td>(0.782)</td>
<td>(1.090)</td>
<td>(0.861)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>researcher_lag1</td>
<td>0.0000138</td>
<td>0.0000320*</td>
<td>0.00000187</td>
<td>0.0000494*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.000149)</td>
<td>(0.000169)</td>
<td>(0.000216)</td>
<td>(0.000238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rnd_lag1</td>
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<td>-0.000125</td>
<td>-0.0000531</td>
<td>-0.000233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000916)</td>
<td>(0.0000800)</td>
<td>(0.000107)</td>
<td>(0.000131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.00664</td>
<td>0.103</td>
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<td>(0.0911)</td>
<td>(0.571)</td>
<td>(0.0941)</td>
<td>(0.659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>10.03***</td>
<td>1.259</td>
<td>9.696***</td>
<td>6.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.439)</td>
<td>(8.355)</td>
<td>(2.414)</td>
<td>(9.533)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>-0.183</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

are significant only for between effect models. But for models with longer lags, coordination level is significant in all models and the effect of number of researcher starts to fade away.

In all, the results present us with two puzzling questions. First, how do we explain the difference between within effect model and between effect models in the short-term models? One explanation for this question is that the models miss one factor that is not only different from county to country but also is fundamental to radical innovation. Thus, the impact of the coordination level on innovation style may rely on the unknown factor. In other words, if the unknown factor can potentially boost radical innovation, then changes in coordination level can realize the potential quickly; if the
Table 4. Within Effect Model and Between Effect Models, 2-Year Lag

<table>
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<th>(10) Between</th>
<th>(11) Within w/o US</th>
<th>(12) Between w/o US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>lag_2yr</td>
<td>-0.540</td>
<td>1.33***</td>
<td>-0.526</td>
<td>1.462***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.669)</td>
<td>(0.631)</td>
<td>(0.683)</td>
<td>(0.627)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdppc_lag2</td>
<td>-0.0000289</td>
<td>0.0000504</td>
<td>-0.0000179</td>
<td>0.00000866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000569)</td>
<td>(0.000122)</td>
<td>(0.0000619)</td>
<td>(0.000125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alliance_lag2</td>
<td>-0.608</td>
<td>-1.15**</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
<td>-1.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.918)</td>
<td>(0.890)</td>
<td>(1.102)</td>
<td>(0.973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>researcher_lag2</td>
<td>0.00000568</td>
<td>0.0000271</td>
<td>0.00000175</td>
<td>0.00000484</td>
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<td>(0.0000192)</td>
<td>(0.0000218)</td>
<td>(0.0000269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rnd_lag2</td>
<td>-0.0000143</td>
<td>-0.000102</td>
<td>-0.0000235</td>
<td>-0.000233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0000922)</td>
<td>(0.0000911)</td>
<td>(0.000109)</td>
<td>(0.000148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patent_age</td>
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<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.0733</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0918)</td>
<td>(0.650)</td>
<td>(0.0952)</td>
<td>(0.745)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
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<td>3.780</td>
<td>8.192***</td>
<td>9.214</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(2.371)</td>
<td>(8.882)</td>
<td>(2.350)</td>
<td>(10.04)</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>110</td>
</tr>
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<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

factor undermines radical innovation then coordination change does not play much role in the short run.

One possible missing factor is informal institution, such as culture. Landes (1998) and Saha (1998) claimed that difference in technological capability cannot be understood unless cultural factors are taken into account. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010) claim that more individualism in a society leads to more innovation. Taylor and Wilson (2012), although not proposing a causal relationship, tested cultural theories on innovation. They confirmed that individualism generally helps radical innovation. More interestingly, they argued that certain types of collectivism such as patriotism and nationalism can help radical innovation, too; but other types of collectivism such as localism and familism undermine such capability. They also argued that cultural
Table 5. 3-Year Lag

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(13) Within</th>
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<th>(15) Within w/o US</th>
<th>(16) Between w/o US</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lag_3yr</td>
<td>-1.834**</td>
<td>-1.526**</td>
<td>-1.810**</td>
<td>-1.452*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.700)</td>
<td>(0.658)</td>
<td>(0.711)</td>
<td>(0.654)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdppc_lag3</td>
<td>-0.00000543</td>
<td>0.0000621</td>
<td>0.000172</td>
<td>0.0000997</td>
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<td>(0.0000596)</td>
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<td>(0.0000645)</td>
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<td>(0.961)</td>
<td>(0.929)</td>
<td>(1.148)</td>
<td>(1.016)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.00000463)</td>
<td>(0.000154)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patent_age</td>
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<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.124</td>
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<td>(0.0961)</td>
<td>(0.679)</td>
<td>(0.0991)</td>
<td>(0.777)</td>
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<td>7.075**</td>
<td>3.949</td>
<td>6.858**</td>
<td>9.163</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(2.392)</td>
<td>(8.610)</td>
<td>(2.353)</td>
<td>(9.723)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

There should be little concern about the correlation between culture and institution when we apply cultural arguments as answers to my questions. From the sociological institutional perspective, although culture does affect institutional structure, it usually promotes institutional status quo rather than change (Dobbin 1994). Therefore institutional change should be relatively independent of culture. From the perspective of cultural supply of innovation, as culture changes slowly within a country, when culture undermines radical demand for innovation, defined in terms of the need for new goods, plays a more important role than cultural supply of innovation, defined by the production of entrepreneurs.
Table 6. 4-Year Lag

<table>
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<th>(17) Within</th>
<th>(18) Between</th>
<th>(19) Within w/o US</th>
<th>(20) Between w/o US</th>
</tr>
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<td>lag_4yr</td>
<td>-1.194*</td>
<td>-1.383*</td>
<td>-1.177*</td>
<td>-1.307*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.624)</td>
<td>(0.670)</td>
<td>(0.632)</td>
<td>(0.666)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdppc_lag4</td>
<td>0.0000699</td>
<td>0.0000249</td>
<td>0.0000895</td>
<td>0.0000636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0000531)</td>
<td>(0.000130)</td>
<td>(0.0000573)</td>
<td>(0.000133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alliance_lag4</td>
<td>-0.814</td>
<td>-1.648</td>
<td>-0.256</td>
<td>-1.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.857)</td>
<td>(0.946)</td>
<td>(1.020)</td>
<td>(1.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.000204)</td>
<td>(0.0000202)</td>
<td>(0.0000285)</td>
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<td>(0.000100)</td>
<td>(0.000157)</td>
</tr>
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<td>patent_age</td>
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<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.382***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.691)</td>
<td>(0.0881)</td>
<td>(0.791)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.704</td>
<td>3.419</td>
<td>1.947</td>
<td>8.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(2.053)</td>
<td>(8.103)</td>
<td>(2.009)</td>
<td>(9.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

innovation, institutions cannot function as they are designed to do; whereas when culture facilitates radical innovation, institutional change matters.

Another puzzle pointed out by the results is: how do we explain the disappearance of the difference between the within effect models and between effect models in the longer run? The question could be answered from the perspective of cultural demand for innovation. According to Hippel (1988), besides the conventional radical innovation, which relies on the new ideas of entrepreneurs and the capability of one’s culture to produce these ideas, there is also user-based innovation, which is based on the needs and demands of the society instead of the supply of new ideas. He argues that one country can change its institutions to promote user-based innovation by focusing on the cultural demand of innovation without changing the cultural
supply of innovation. In other words, even when one country does not have an innovation-friendly cultural environment such as individualism to produce entrepreneurs or new ideas, the government can still achieve high innovation performance by creating institutional motivation to change the focus of innovators from their own ideas to the demands of technology users. Thus, for Hippel, in the long run, by focusing on the different aspect of culture, institutional change can affect innovation activities for cross country and within country comparisons.

Besides cultural factor, an alternative explanation could be globalization. Scholars of globalization claim that global economic institutions have been liberalizing in the last half century. It is possible that when countries are liberalizing their economies and lowering coordination levels the relations between coordination level and radical innovation that I have shown above are specious. However, when I plot historical coordination level by countries (see Figure 4), the results show that some countries have been liberalizing while others have been going the opposite direction; therefore, the assumption and argument of globalization are rejected.
Conclusion

This paper tests VOC with a new continuous coordination level index and has several interesting findings. First, the paper rejects the hypotheses that international relations, particularly the relations with the US, affect national innovation activities and that the US is an outlier of innovation. Second, more interestingly, I find that the effect of economic coordination level on radical innovation to some extent depends on time. For the short term models, coordination level is helpful in explaining cross country difference in radical innovation performance but not within country comparison. For the long term models, coordination level can explain both cross country and cross time comparisons. To combine the two aspects of findings, the paper proposes culture as a key factor that should be taken into account by the VOC. Further research on the relationship between culture and innovation is needed. If we can find that countries’ capabilities of radical innovation improve when their population becomes more open to new ideas and encourage people to deviate from traditions, then it would be supportive of the cultural argument.

References


